



1207 Program Evaluation: Republic of Georgia

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ACRONYMS

AIR	American Institutes for Research
AMP	Access to Mechanization Project
APLR	Association for Protection of Landowner Rights
CHF	Global Communities
CNFA	Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs
CRS	Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
CSO	Bureau of Conflict Stabilization Operations
DoS	U.S. Department of State
dTS	Development & Training Services
FAO	U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization
EUR	Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs
EUR/ACE	Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Office of Assistance to Europe and Eurasia
GARRP	Georgia Agricultural Risk Reduction Program
GEII	Georgia Employment and Infrastructure Initiative
GMIP	Municipal Infrastructure and IDP Housing Rehabilitation Project
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IOM	International Organization of Migration
INL	Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
IT	Information Technology
JCP	Job Counseling and Placement Project
MDF	Municipal Development Fund
MoE	Ministry of Energy
MoES	Ministry of Education and Science
MoIA	Ministry of Internal Affairs
MRA	Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation
MSC	Machinery Service Center
NAMSA	NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency
NEO	New Economic Opportunities Initiative
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
PM	Bureau of Political Military Affairs
PRM	Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration
PMP	Performance Management Plan
SOW	Statement of Work
TETRA	Terrestrial Trunked Radio
TOT	Training of Trainers
UNHCR	U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USG	U.S. Government
VEC	Vocational Education Center
VEP	Vocational Education Project
WFP	World Food Program

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Evaluation Purpose and Evaluation Questions

The subject of the evaluation was post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization programming in Georgia, supported by Section 1207 funding in FY 2008 and 2009. The evaluation purpose was to assess whether the full set of 1207 program activities implemented through USAID and DoS/INL, PRM, and PM achieved their stated objectives. The evaluation was also intended to extract lessons learned from its findings and conclusions to help inform decision-making regarding future conflict stabilization initiatives. Evaluation questions included:

1. Did the three programs achieve their objectives? If not, why not?
2. What are the takeaways and lessons learned, such as things that worked well or didn't, that would benefit any on-going programs or future stabilization initiatives?
3. Did the funded agencies fulfill the requirements of the 1207 program as a unified reconstruction and stabilization program with specific implementation guidance and reporting requirements? Did the 1207 funds keep their identity as a stand-alone program or were they subsumed into other initiatives?

Program Background

The five-day war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 killed hundreds, displaced 192,000 ethnic Georgians, and caused substantial damage to the country's infrastructure and economy. In response, the USG formally pledged \$1 billion in overall post-conflict assistance to the GoG. Of this amount, \$100 million was to be provided through 1207 funds in support of humanitarian relief and economic revitalization and stabilization efforts. The overarching goal of the 1207 program support was to: meet urgent needs; help the country stabilize in the immediate aftermath of the war; maintain public confidence in democratic governance; and, restore economic gains enjoyed prior to the war.

Evaluation Approach, Methods, and Limitations

The Evaluation Team employed a flexible, industry-standard, mixed-methods approach that utilized an array of tools and resources to provide information about the nearly two dozen 1207-funded projects' design, implementation, results, and long-term effects. The mixed methods included document reviews, key informant interviews, group discussions, and in-person visits to activity sites throughout Shida Kartli – the region most damaged in the conflict and where most of the IDPs were resettled. Information and data obtained through these qualitative methods were augmented by an electronic mini-survey focused on gathering data to assist in responding to the third SOW evaluation question

Extensive pre-fieldwork in Washington, primarily in the form of key informant interviews and document reviews, lasted three months. It was followed by the fieldwork phase of the evaluation, which took place over a three week period in January and early February 2015. Data collected came from various sources, including: interviews with GoG, Implementing Partner (IP), and Embassy/USAID personnel and IDP beneficiaries; review of documents provided by DoS, USAID, and IPs; and, site visits in Shida Kartli.

Projected as a potential limitation in the evaluation Workplan, the unusually large number of 1207 program projects (23) and associated USG funding agencies (4) and IPs (16) involved did create major difficulties for the Team. Keeping up with the volume of documents became a continuous issue, as did the ability to cover all the projects in sufficient breadth and depth in the fieldwork to generate sound findings. The end result of these factors was the Team effectively ran out of the contracted amount of LOE as the fieldwork was ending but, with DoS/CSO's support, arrangements were made for the remaining work to be completed.

Findings

Question 1: Results Achieved

Did the three programs – food, shelter and livelihood requirements for IDPs, economic revitalization and stabilization, and police support – achieve their objectives? If not, why not?

Food, shelter and livelihood requirements for IDPs

The three objectives established in connection with the allocation of 1207 funding under this Program heading were accomplished. Emergency food assistance was provided to IDPs during the winter 2008-2009 by the World Food Program, with the support of \$5 million in 1207 funds. The assistance focused on three activities: general relief food distribution; direct cash transfers; and food-for-work and cash-for-work.

In the case of the second objective, during 2009 UNHCR used \$9 million in 1207 funding to implement activities in Shida Kartli and elsewhere in Georgia aligned with its “shelter-plus” strategy; i.e., IDPs targeted for shelter assistance also received aid aimed at promoting their self-sufficiency and well-being. The activities resulted in the provision of adequate shelter for and the local integration of IDPs, in addition to developing enhanced protection for particularly vulnerable IDPs, including the elderly, victims of gender-based violence, and vulnerable women.

Regarding the third objective, rebuilding livelihoods of IDPs in Shida Kartli, activities implemented by the Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs (CNFA) and FAO provided agricultural inputs and technical assistance and animal feed and veterinary services to farmers, respectively. Through its \$19.5 million (\$14 million of which were 1207 funds) Georgia Agricultural Risk Reduction Program (GARRP), CNFA provided assistance for winter wheat and corn planting and orchard inputs that resulted in crop production from 36,121 hectares of agricultural land. FAO's \$5.5 million 1207-funded livestock assistance activity – animal feed, de-worming, water supply, and training – protected the livelihood of vulnerable recipients in Shida Kartli by allowing them to refrain from slaughtering or selling their cattle.

Economic Revitalization and Stabilization

Similarly successful outcomes were produced regarding the five objectives under this Program heading. One objective was displaced persons resettlement assistance, which embraced two activities: a \$1.5 million energy subsidy program implemented by USAID and a \$500,000 IDP property registration project carried out by the Association for Protection of Landowner Rights (APLR). The energy subsidy program covered payments on behalf of newly resettled IDPs who were getting gas and electricity at no cost under a deferred billing arrangement between utility

companies and the GoG. The APLR project provided IDPs property registration assistance and help in obtaining title to the land transferred to them by the GoG.

Another objective, continued recovery assistance for Shida Kartli, was and/or is being accomplished through two major projects. The first of these was the \$5.1 million CNFA-implemented Access to Mechanization Project (AMP), which sought to increase smallholder farmers' productivity and incomes by improving their access to and utilization of machinery services. The other is the \$20 million (including \$7.37 million in 1207 funds) New Economic Opportunities (NEO) Initiative still being implemented by Chemonics. NEO is an undertaking that attempts to move from initial efforts to restore livelihoods of conflict-affected populations to longer-term, comprehensive economic development by: increasing rural incomes; improving agricultural productivity and food security; addressing critical, small-scale infrastructure constraints in communities; and helping IDPs to sustain their households.

A third objective, employment and vocational training in construction trades, involved two related activities, the Vocational Education Project (VEP) and the Job Counseling and Placement Project (JCP). VEP was a \$5.5 million workforce development effort supported by USAID and 1207 Program funds (\$1.8 million), implemented by the American Institutes for Research (AIR). It successfully increased the supply of trained graduates in the tourism and construction trades through the establishment of five vocational education centers. Implemented by the International Organization of Migration (IOM), the \$3 million, 1207-funded JCP provided job counseling, referral services, training, and issued supplemental grants to new small businesses.

Under the objective, rebuilding schools and municipal infrastructure, several major projects have produced successful results, including the School Rehabilitation (SRP) and BAVSHVI Projects, implemented by CHF and the Municipal Infrastructure Project (GMIP), implemented by the Municipal Development Fund (MDF). Through the SRP, an extension of its Georgia Employment and Infrastructure Initiative (GEII), and the ensuing BAVSHVI project, CHF worked to renovate, rebuild and/or improve school buildings and housing for orphans, the disabled, and other vulnerable individuals. Supported by \$2.4 million in 1207 funds, the SRP renovated, repaired, and upgraded 16 badly deteriorated and/or conflict-damaged schools in and around the Shida Kartli municipalities, Gori and Kareli. The SRP's overarching goal, which it achieved, was to create a healthier learning environment for the students attending these schools. A \$12.9 USAID-supported activity that included \$9 million in 1207 Program funds, BAVSHVI enhanced learning opportunities and better living conditions for orphans and vulnerable children by improving the physical conditions of 50 schools and 25 small group homes, while at the same time providing employment opportunities for hundreds of VEP graduates and JCP clients. Lastly, under the \$17.7 million GMIP, the \$11.1 million portion in 1207 funds has been dedicated primarily to infrastructure activities in Shida Kartli, such as the rehabilitation of roads and improvements in water and irrigation works.

The last objective, security for IDPs, involved the HALO Trust and NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) in clearance of explosive remnants of war (ERWs) and mines. As part of a joint DoS/UNICEF effort, HALO received \$2.1 million in 1207 program funding to clear ERWs in Shida Kartli (\$.9 million) and Abkhazia (\$1.2 million). HALO completed its clearance operations in Shida Kartli in 2009. In March 2011, the NAMSA activity, supported in part by

\$500,000 in 1207 funds, trained 66 members of the Georgian Army Engineer Battalion in humanitarian mine clearance, battle area clearance, and large ordnance disposal.

Police Support

Adding to previous and ongoing USG support for GoG efforts to reform its law enforcement agencies, INL's \$20 million, 1207-funded Police Support Program responded to the immediate need to assist the MoIA in rebuilding the operational capacity and physical infrastructure of the nation's police forces after the Georgia-Russia conflict. Specifically, the Program focused on strengthening the police forces to help:

1. secure conflict-affected areas for those that had temporarily fled and IDPs who could not return to their homes;
2. provide a safe environment for commercial activity; and,
3. demonstrate an active patrol presence and investigative capacity to deter organized crime or militia activity in these same areas.

To these ends, INL efforts were organized around an array of "commodity-based," technical support, and training activities, including: patrol vehicles, a national crime database, emergency communications, IT and radio packages, tactical gear, emergency data recovery, and training and development. Overall, the intended objectives of these activities were accomplished and, in some cases – e.g., the expansion of the TETRA emergency communications system – produced very important results, i.e., connecting the eastern and western parts of Georgia for the first time. In addition, however, INL's overall record of accomplishment with the Police Support Program has been marred by implementation problems that have brought about significant delays in achieving results within the anticipated timeframes.

Question 2: Takeaways and Lesson Learned

What are the takeaways and lessons learned, such as things that worked well or didn't, that would benefit any on-going programs or future stabilization initiatives?

Lessons Learned

1. Future post-conflict/stabilization initiatives in general – but, large-scale ones in particular – need to anticipate and plan for items such as increased personnel, specialized expertise, and technical equipment that will likely have to be deployed in relatively short timeframes for the assistance to be effective.
2. Capacity building for officials and staff at the national, regional, and local levels became an essential part of shoring up the GoG's limited ability at the outset to manage its response to the difficult and complicated situation in conflict-affected areas, such as Shida Kartli.
3. Cost sharing is an effective way to engage local government authorities and keep them involved in following through on project activities.
4. Flexibility in being able to adapt funds to changing circumstances and conditions can be an important asset for IP officials and staff.
5. The participatory approach used in the Schools Rehabilitation Project could well serve as a model for future projects where community involvement is viewed as a key feature of the implementation plan.
6. Being part of an overall assistance effort, which involved enormous sums of money focused on a small country, created problems for some IPs whose activities were supported by 1207 funds.

7. Location of IDP settlements are thought to have had unintended consequences.
8. The absence of 1207 program performance management (PMP) and monitoring plans and other related reporting guidance has been consequential.

Things That Worked Well

Food-for-work/cash-for-work (WFP) – 61 projects, affecting 65,000 beneficiaries (including 15,000 IDPs) that rehabilitated irrigation channels, improved arable land and feeder roads, constructed potable water pipelines, and dug water wells.

Anti-parasite treatment (FAO) – 38,000 animals treated (78 percent of the total in Shida Kartli), which helped ensure good nutritional intake during the feeding period and reduced the chance of re-infection upon return to pasturelands and mixing with other cattle.

Electronic vouchers (CNFA/GAARP) – bank card-like voucher that enabled eligible IDP farmers to purchase necessary agricultural tools and supplies for their orchards; worked so well that it became a model for other GoG programs and activities.

Farm machinery services (CNFA/AMP) – 21 farm machinery service centers (MSCs) addressed countrywide shortages of agricultural machinery by purchasing 82 tractors and 235 other farm implements and providing planting and harvesting services to 16,539 small-scale farmers.

Disposal of explosive remnants of war (EMWs) (HALO Trust) – HALO teams cleared and returned a total of 3,400 hectares of land to safe, productive use, benefitting 38,000 individuals.

School improvement Plans (CHF/SRP) – the extraordinary end-product of a highly inclusive process conducted during the rehabilitation of 16 public schools in Shida Kartli, which involved school staff, students, parents, trustees, and community members working together.

Increased employment opportunities (CHF/BAVSHVI) – a concerted effort among IPs that helped hundreds of graduates/clients of USG-supported vocational education and job placement programs obtain short-term employment in school/small-group home rehabilitation activities.

Things That Didn't Work Well

Unwanted settlement buildings (UNHCR) – bathhouses were built in several IDP settlements that did not provide any benefit to residents, after being constructed over their objections.

Land documentation (APLR) – IDPs were interested in registering their abandoned properties, but this diminished as hope faded for a return. IDPs the Evaluation Team spoke with about this were unenthusiastic; still, there is now hard data on what someone owned, if this ever comes up.

Disabled access (CHF/BAVSHVI) – because there were no standards or local design templates and very little tradition of providing for disabled access, during the early part of the project contractors were forced to implement ad-hoc solutions, resulting in questionable deliverables.

Design-build contracts (MDF) – local contractors “lack[ed] the capacity to execute these innovative contracts in any meaningful sense,” causing major delays and disputes in a number of important irrigation projects.

Question 3: Program Requirements

Did the funded agencies fulfill the requirements of the 1207 program as a unified reconstruction and stabilization program with specific implementation guidance and reporting requirements?

Did the 1207 funds keep their identity as a stand-alone program or were they subsumed into other initiatives?

Regarding the first question which, in brief, asks whether or not the funded agencies fulfilled 1207 program requirements, the bottom line answer is: yes, they did. In the case of the second question, the summary finding is, yes, on both accounts – i.e., in some instances 1207 funds kept their identity while in other cases they were subsumed into other initiatives.

Conclusions

As administered by USAID and DoS/INL, PRM, and PM, 1207 funds clearly served their intended purpose and, equally important, did so in a manner consistent with the guiding principles regarding their use established by the 1207 Selection Committee. Without exception, the nearly two dozen projects that received 1207 funds accomplished their stated objectives or, in those few cases where their activities were still ongoing, had already achieved significant results.

Notwithstanding these noteworthy successes, it is important to point out that the \$100 million in 1207 funding committed and spent was part of the USG's overall \$1 billion aid package and was in effect at the same time that an additional \$4.5 billion was committed by other bilateral donors and multilateral organizations. This enormous amount of funding was an expressed concern among some key informants. One of them, for example, repeatedly used words like “overlap” and “over-saturation” in describing the situation he observed in 2009, while another said there was “too much money, too quickly” and insufficient staff to implement the activities the funds supported.

Finally, there are the perhaps confusing findings in response to evaluation question number three. Most particularly, the evidence suggests that in some cases 1207 funds kept their identity in a “stand-alone” sense, but in others were subsumed into other initiatives – the ratio was about evenly divided. Moreover, aside from Embassy/USAID officials and staff and a smattering of senior IP and GoG personnel, the Team found that virtually no one at the activity level knew or, one might argue, had any reason to know, that their activity was all or partly funded by 1207 program support. At most, they might have been aware that the funding was from the USG and/or USAID. In the end, it remains to be seen if the stand-alone/subsumed identity issue will be deemed a matter for further consideration by DoS/CSO and/or the 1207 Review Committee.

Recommendations

1. The experience with the 1207 Program in Georgia suggests that there is room for improvement in planning for and initially responding to future post-conflict situations in general, and large-scale ones in particular. In the case of Georgia difficulties at the Embassy arose at the outset and, in some instances continued on well into program implementation, in the areas of personnel, specialized expertise, and technical equipment. Accordingly, DoS/CSO and/or the 1207 Review Committee should consider the development of appropriate procedures – possibly in the form of an amendment to the *1207 Guidance* or other such documentation – to better enable those responsible to respond to post-conflict/stabilization situations and assure that necessary staffing and resources are in place as quickly and sustainably as possible.

2. In most, if not all, cases government agencies of countries selected to receive 1207 program funds are unlikely to possess sufficient capacity to manage emergency humanitarian assistance and other urgent needs effectively. Accordingly, DoS/CSO and/or the 1207 Review Committee

should consider the idea of having some kind of capacity building “toolkit” available for immediate use upon a country’s selection as a recipient of 1207 program funding.

3. Performance management (PMP) and monitoring plans should be a “no-exceptions” requirement for all 1207 country programs, since without them there is no systematically sound way to track progress (or lack thereof) in achieving project objectives. Nor is there a basis for comparing the situation at the start of a project with what it may have achieved by the end. While there were understandable reasons why the decision was made to forego the specified reporting requirements in Georgia’s case, the latter situation of having no basis for comparing the program’s start and end points is what occurred.

INTRODUCTION

This report summarizes the results of the dTS evaluation of post-conflict stabilization programs in the Republic of Georgia, funded through the “Section 1207” mechanism¹ during Fiscal Years 2008 and 2009. The purpose of the evaluation was to assess whether the full set of 1207 Program activities implemented through USAID and the Bureaus of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM), and Political Military Affairs (PM) achieved their stated objectives.² In addition, the findings and conclusions of the evaluation were used to provide “lessons learned” to help inform the decision makers on future conflict stabilization initiatives.

Background

The five-day war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 resulted in hundreds of deaths, left thousands of IDPs in temporary shelters, and brought relations between Russia and the United States to their lowest point since the end of the Cold War. Centered in the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the conflict resulted in substantial damage to the country’s infrastructure and displaced 192,000 ethnic Georgians, approximately 30,000 of whom were still displaced a year later. In addition, the conflict led to the weakening of investor, lender, and consumer confidence, a contraction of liquidity in the banking system, and stress on public finances. Two months after the end of the conflict, the World Bank and European Commission chaired a donor Joint Needs Assessment Conference in Brussels to enlist support for Georgia’s post-conflict recovery. Pursuant to this effort, the U.S. pledged one billion dollars of humanitarian and other post-conflict stabilization assistance, of which \$100 million were 1207 funds.

In keeping with Congressional intent, 1207 Program funds were designed to address situations that could not be dealt with by conventional forms of foreign assistance. Projects were designed for the short-term and coordinated with longer-term development efforts and other USG security-building programs. The 1207 Programs were to involve a “whole-of-government” approach by integrating initiatives across multiple sectors. Once completed, it was expected that the related activities would be sustained by host country governments or other donors. Program requirements also stipulated that proposals for specific activities be developed by Embassy country teams for submission through the Ambassador to the relevant DoS regional bureau.

Because 1207 funds have been available for obligation without limitation on FY spending, program activities have continued since their inception in Georgia in 2008. All of the IDP-focused activities were completed by the end of 2010, but some of the police support activities are still ongoing. Most of the economic revitalization and stabilization activities were completed by late January 2014, although

¹ Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2006 (P.L. 109-163) provided authority for the Department of Defense (DOD) to transfer to the State Department up to \$100 million per fiscal year in defense articles, services, training or other support for reconstruction, stabilization, and security activities in foreign countries.

² DoS/CSO documents also mention the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (EUR), Offices of Assistance to Europe and Eurasia (EUR/ACE) and Caucasus Affairs and Regional Conflicts (EUR/CARC); and, the Georgian Border Security and Law Enforcement Assistance Program (GBSLE).

support for municipal infrastructure development and new economic opportunities are ongoing.

Program Activities

The 1207 Program activities under review in this evaluation fall into three areas: food, shelter, and livelihood requirements for IDPs implemented through USAID and DoS/PRM; police support, implemented by DoS/INL; and economic revitalization and stabilization activities, implemented through USAID and DoS/PM.³

Food, shelter and livelihood requirements for IDPs (\$30.2 million)

- *Food* (\$5 million), World Food Program (WFP);
- *Shelter* (\$9 million), U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR);
- *IDP Property Registration* (\$.5 million), Association for Protection of Landowner Rights (APLR);
- *Winter Crops* (\$2 million), Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs (CNFA);
- *Winter Livestock Maintenance* (\$5.5 million), U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO);
- *Community Needs Grants Program* (\$3.5 million), CNFA and other U.S. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs);
- *School Rehabilitation* (\$2.4 million), Global Communities (CHF);
- *Vocational Education* (\$1.8 million), American Institutes for Research (AIR);
- *De-mining* (\$.5 million), NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA).⁴

Police Support (\$20 million)

- *Emergency Data Recovery* (\$3 million), DoS/INL;
- *Vehicle Replacement* (\$3.5 million), DoS/INL;
- *Police Equipment* (\$2.8 million), DoS/INL;
- *Criminal Records Database and Emergency Communications System* (\$9.2 million), DoS/INL;
- *Training* (1.49 million), DoS/INL.

Economic Revitalization and Stabilization (\$50 million)

- *Shida Kartli Region Recovery* (\$12.3 million), CNFA;
- *Employment and Vocational Training* (\$7.355 million), International Organization for Migration (IOM);
- *Rebuilding School and Municipal Infrastructure* (\$25.771 million), Municipal Development Fund (MDF), Tetra Tech, Chemonics, CHF;
- *Displaced Persons Resettlement Assistance* (\$1.558 million), USAID, GoG
- *Security and Unexploded Ordnance* (\$3.016 million), Halo Trust.

³ The Department of Homeland Security/Customs and Border Protection supported the restoration of operations at the Poti Coast Guard base and Radar Station at Anaklia, a 1207 Program activity not included in this evaluation.

⁴ NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA)'s new name is NATO Support Agency (NSPA).

Objectives

The primary goal of Section 1207 Programming in Georgia was to:

1. Meet urgent needs;
2. Help the country stabilize in the immediate aftermath of the war with Russia;
3. Maintain public confidence in democratic governance; and,
4. Restore economic gains enjoyed prior to the war.

Pursuant to this overall goal, three objectives were established for FY 2008:

Objective 1 – provide food assistance to IDPs during the winter;
Objective 2 – provide winterized shelter for up to 12,000 long-term IDPs in the Shida Kartli region; and,
Objective 3 – provide assistance to rebuild the livelihoods of IDPs living in or returning to homes in the Shida Kartli region.

For FY 2009, five additional objectives were established:

Objective 4 – provide assistance in the Shida Kartli region (Phase Two);
Objective 5 – provide employment and vocational training in construction trades;
Objective 6 – provide assistance to rebuild schools and municipal infrastructure;
Objective 7 – provide assistance for IDPs to resettle; and,
Objective 8 – provide security for IDPs.

The following questions specified in the Task Order's Statement of Work (SOW) were addressed:

- Did the three programs achieve their objectives? If not, why not?
- What are the takeaways and lessons learned, such as things that worked well or didn't, that would benefit any on-going programs or future stabilization initiatives?
- Did the funded agencies fulfill the requirements of the 1207 Program as a unified reconstruction and stabilization program with specific implementation guidance and reporting requirements? Did the 1207 funds keep their identity as a stand-alone program or were they subsumed into other initiatives?

METHODOLOGY

The Evaluation Team included Harold (Hal) Lippman (Team Leader), Konstantine Peradze (Local Evaluation Expert), and Maria Baazovi (Local Research Assistant). The Team carried out the evaluation specified in the SOW, as modified in initial meetings with CSO where it was agreed that the primary focus would be on 1207-funded project activities and their effects in the Shida Kartli region of Georgia. The work was done in accordance with an Evaluation Methodology and Workplan (Annex B) which was submitted to CSO on December 8, 2015 and approved on December 23, 2015. The Workplan provided a detailed description of the design, research methods, and tools the Team intended to use in conducting the evaluation. The Workplan was modified during implementation. The discussion below summarizes the approach used to implement the Workplan.

Approach

As outlined in the Workplan, the Team employed a flexible, industry-standard, mixed-methods⁵ evaluation approach to gather data on the nearly two dozen 1207-funded projects' design, implementation, results and long-term impacts. The mixed methods included document reviews, key informant interviews, group discussions, and in-person visits to activity sites throughout Shida Kartli. In addition to the information obtained through these qualitative methods, an electronic survey was conducted that focused expressly on gathering data to help answer the third SOW evaluation question. This mix of qualitative and quantitative information enabled the Team to acquire a more complete understanding of the projects' various activities and outcomes regarding:

1. emergency food, shelter, and livelihood assistance;
2. employment/vocational education and training;
3. police support efforts such as training, new equipment (e.g., vehicles, radios), and upgraded/expanded emergency communications systems;
4. rehabilitation of schools and small-group-homes;
5. clearance of explosive remnants of war (ERW); and,
6. improvements in municipal infrastructure (roads, potable water, and irrigation).

Data for the evaluation were collected in two phases, employing the same basic mixed-methods research tools. (Table 1) The first phase involved pre-fieldwork in Washington, D.C. Data was collected from various sources, including interviews and review of documents provided by DoS/CSO, INL, EUR/ACE, Embassy/Tbilisi, USAID/Georgia, and IPs. The second phase coincided with the in-country fieldwork, where data collection focused on the efforts and activities of stakeholders and beneficiaries. Data sources included interviews and documents, as well as extensive site visits in Shida Kartli, and the electronic survey of current and former Embassy, USAID, and IP officials and staff.

5) Also known as Rapid Appraisal.

Table 1: Target Groups and Data Collection Methods

Target Groups	Data Collection Method
USG officials: DoS/CSO, INL, PRM, PM and USAID	Documents, key informant interviews, mini-survey
Implementing partners and GoG stakeholders	Documents, key informant interviews (individual and group)
Participants in and/or beneficiaries of project activities	Documents, key informant interviews (individual and group), site visits

Initial Interviews/Document Review

The pre-fieldwork in Washington commenced immediately after the October 22, 2014 initial Team meeting with participating DoS/CSO staff. Subsequent to this meeting, the Team Leader worked with CSO and INL staff to develop an introductory letter/e-mail requesting the cooperation of all four participating USG agencies and 16 IPs. This routine research requirement was critically important in this case, given the unusually large number of IPs and the correspondingly large number of documents to be obtained and initial contacts to be made. Documents obtained and reviewed included: program proposals, quarterly and annual project reports, final evaluations, Letters of Agreement (LOAs), and Georgia Monitoring Program (GMP) quarterly reports and thematic evaluations.

Using an initial list of questions based on the SOW, key informant interviews were conducted in-person, via conference call, or Skype. Respondents were selected on the basis of their current or prior direct knowledge of and/or involvement in the administration, oversight, and/or implementation of the 1207 Program activities under review. Among those interviewed were present and former DoS/CSO, INL, PM, EUR/ACE, Georgia Monitoring Program (GMP), and implementing partner staff.

Fieldwork

The evaluation fieldwork took place between January 18 and February 6, 2015. The Team worked twelve days in Tbilisi and five in Shida Kartli, conducting key informant interviews, group discussions, and structured observations at activity sites (see Table 2 below). In Tbilisi, the interviews focused primarily on officials and staff of IPs, including UNHCR, FAO, WFP, CHF, CNFA, IOM, AIR, APLR, Chemonics, and MDF, regarding the 1207-supported projects their organizations implemented and/or are still implementing. Another focus area was the Police Support initiatives implemented by DoS/INL, in cooperation with the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA). The information gathering and research in this regard consisted of a mix of interviews with current and former MoIA officials and relevant staff members who were impacted by the projects – e.g. beneficiaries of training and material assistance – and structured

observation of INL-provided emergency communications system servers and central dispatch facility work stations, patrol vehicles, and IT equipment.

Also in Tbilisi, numerous scheduled meetings and informal contacts took place with key Embassy and USAID officials and staff. In addition to the expected benefits, these meetings and contacts were particularly useful because they became a source of key documents – e.g., INL End Use Monitoring reports and project LOAs, grant agreements, and contracts – the Team was either unaware of or had been unable to obtain in Washington. Lastly, meetings were arranged with former high-ranking officials of the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation, who had played key roles in the GoG’s post-conflict response to the events of August 2008.

In Shida Kartli, the Team focused primarily on the 1207 Program-supported projects that dealt with food, shelter, and livelihood requirements for IDPs, as well as economic revitalization and stabilization. As was the case in Tbilisi, the Team conducted interviews and structured observations to determine the effects of project activities, with particular emphasis on the IDPs that benefitted from them. Accordingly, the Team visited settlements and talked with leaders, farmers, and other residents, toured rehabilitated schools and small-group homes, and met with teachers/administrators and residents/caregivers. Structured observations and interviews also were conducted with former vocational education program instructors, the owner of a bakery established with a 1207-funded small grant, and in a “ride-along” with MoIA police officers assigned to patrol former conflict areas near the administrative border line (ABL).

Table 2: Summary of Fieldwork

	Tbilisi	Shida Kartli
Key Informant Interviews (KIIs)	20	6
Group Interviews	7	9
Implementing partner interviews	14	1
GoG interviews	7	3
IDP interviews (one-on-one)	-	8
IDP interviews (group)	-	6
Embassy staff interviews	5	-
USAID staff interviews	5	-
On-site observations (in-person visits)	3	12

Mini-survey

To help answer the third SOW evaluation question that deals with 1207 Program requirements and “identity” issues, a short, anonymous mini-survey (Annex E) was conducted to elicit responses to the following queries:

- Are you a current/former Embassy/Tbilisi, USAID/Georgia, or 1207-funded Implementing Partner employee?
- From your experience working as an employee, are you aware of the USG 1207 funding that supported post-conflict and stabilization activities after the August 2008 hostilities with Russia?
- Based on your experience, did participating USG agencies - i.e., USAID, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), and the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) - fulfill the requirements of the 1207 Program as a unified (diverse, comprehensive, and mutually reinforcing) reconstruction and stabilization program with specific implementation guidance and reporting requirements?
- To the best of your knowledge, did the 1207 funds keep their identity as a stand-alone program or were they subsumed into other initiatives?

The survey sample was drawn from Team contacts with DoS, USAID, and IP officials and source documents. Officials known to have been involved in or currently (February 2015) working on 1207 Program activities in Tbilisi and/or Washington, DC were included in the survey. By design, a number of names of individuals known to have been involved with the 1207 Program in some other capacity – e.g., contractor employees associated with the DoS-sponsored Georgia Monitoring Program – were also included in the sample. The total sample was 62 and there were 35 respondents. This indicates a response rate of 56 percent. While a 56 percent response rate is considered to be high for a voluntary online survey, the margin of error is $\pm 11.02\%$.

The survey was implemented electronically via Survey Monkey, an on-line survey research platform. It was active for a period of three weeks (February 13, 2015 – March 6, 2016). Reminders were sent to the participants at least once a week requesting that they respond. The survey was short and could be finished in five to ten minutes or more depending on how much time was spent on comments.

Limitations

The Evaluation Workplan noted two significant potential limitations: (1) the length of time since the large majority of 1207 Program-supported projects were operational; and (2) the large number of activities to be examined. These two limitations could potentially hinder the evaluation exercise. However, the Workplan did provide examples from the Team Leader’s own experience that indicated that a years-long interval between project completion and evaluation launch had not been overly disruptive in terms of locating and arranging interviews with key IP staff, government officials, and beneficiaries. In this evaluation, this again proved to be the case; i.e., with one exception, the Team was able to locate and interview beneficiaries, local stakeholders, and IP staff who were still in Georgia. Ironically, the only exception was the 2012

change in government that resulted from the country's first "free and fair" election in October of that year. For the purposes of this evaluation, this meant that senior officials in place during the post-conflict period were no longer in government and, according to former and current IP sources, their successors are largely unfamiliar with project initiatives implemented during the critically important two-year period after August 2008.

Regarding the second potential limitation, the Workplan concerns have proven accurate. The unusually large number of 1207 Program projects (23) and associated USG funding agencies (4) and IPs (16) involved in this evaluation did create major difficulties for the Team. As mentioned in the Workplan, for instance, being able to keep up with the volume of documents became a continuous issue, as suggested by the following:

1. there are 22 DoS/CRS 1207 Program quarterly reports covering the period January 2009 – December 2014;
2. the GMP issued five full length thematic reports, in addition to three quarterly reports, one annual report, and 72 weekly reports covering the period June 2010 – December 2011; and,
3. one key project semi-annual report contained 12 annexes and exceeded 450 pages.

An additional challenge posed by the large number of Program projects was to cover their multiple objectives and activities with sufficient breadth and depth in the fieldwork in order to generate sound findings.

As a result, seven weeks before the anticipated date of submission of the draft report, the Team exhausted the resources allocated for the entire project. This situation was further complicated when one of the Team members was instructed to stop work on the evaluation until additional funding was received. This resulted in an additional four-week delay. Throughout this period, the DoS/CSO's understanding and responsiveness has assured that the work could be completed despite the implementation constraints.

Data Analysis

As a starting point, the Team's data analysis was based on five key DoS and USAID documents:

1. *Guidance for FY 09 Section 1207 Process*, DoS Cable 09 STATE 5876
2. *1207 Guidance*, DoS/CRS;
3. *1207 Program Proposal for FY 09, Support for Effective Governance Through Economic Revitalization of Post-conflict Georgia*, USAID
4. *1207 Program Proposal for FY 09, Meeting Priority Food, Shelter, and Livelihood Requirements for Internally Displaced Persons in Shida Kartli*, USAID; and,
5. *1207 Program Proposal for FY 09, Police Support Package (DoS/INL)*.

For the purposes of this evaluation, the contents of these documents – and, most particularly, the respective segments on selection criteria and guiding principles in the two prepared by DoS/CRS – effectively constitute the 1207 Program's logical framework (log frame). Also known as the development hypothesis, the log frame is the conceptual tool that describes the causal linkages and underlying assumptions among inputs, activities, outputs, and outcomes. The framework also identifies the target populations, defines clear objectives, and establishes relevant outcomes based on appropriate and measurable indicators.

Using the log frame, the Team's analysis began with a rigorous comparison of data from key 1207 Program source documents with data on performance and outcomes from the KIIs, structured observations, and mini-survey. This comparison, together with the refined data derived from it, was used to inform the findings, lessons learned, and recommendations. In addition, by using a set of common questions in its data collection efforts, the Team was able to systematically compare the answers and reactions of different beneficiaries and stakeholders, as well as draw inferences on program performance and effects. Outcomes were also assessed in terms of the 1207 Program-funded project activities' implementation schedules and available resources.

Arguably the most important facet of the Team's data analysis efforts was the use of the multiple data points yielded by the mixed-methods approach to assess the qualitative and quantitative results of the overall research. Since a variety of methods were used for the evaluation, data collected using one method (e.g., document review) could be compared to data collected using other methods (e.g., interviews and the mini-survey). To the extent possible, multiple data points were used to triangulate the findings derived from the analysis. This cross-verification of the data collected helped strengthen the evaluation findings, while at the same time minimizing the effects of bias or other factors that could have impacted the overall research effort.

FINDINGS

The discussion below presents the findings derived from the Team's review of source documents, interviews, on-site observations, and survey questionnaire. The findings relate to the three evaluation questions listed in the Introduction to this report.

Question 1: Results Achieved

Did the three programs – food, shelter and livelihood requirements for IDPs, economic revitalization and stabilization, and police support – achieve their objectives? If not, why not?

Background

The 1207 Program funds were intended to address the aftermath of the five-day war with Russia in August 2008. Although brief, the conflict caused extensive physical and economic harm in the Shida Kartli region of Georgia where the 1207 Program-funded activities were concentrated. According to DoS documents, an estimated 139,000 inhabitants of Shida Kartli were forced to flee their homes. After the cessation of hostilities, some 113,000 individuals were able to return to their communities. What they found were ransacked, burned, and/or destroyed homes, damaged/inoperative infrastructure, and fields and other agricultural land mined or littered with unexploded ordnance and other remnants of war. The other 26,000 returnees – internally displaced persons (IDPs) – were unable to go back to their homes because they were located in territory that had fallen under the control of the South Ossetian authorities.

The returnees faced extreme economic hardship. Nearly 90% of them had depended on agriculture for their livelihoods and as they returned experienced major financial losses owing to looting, destruction of property, and the simple fact of having been away from their fields, orchards, and grazing lands. For example, because the outbreak of hostilities coincided with the summer harvest, many farmers lost much of their crops after they fled to safety. Similarly, animal husbandry, another key source of livelihood in Shida Kartli, was adversely affected. In the farmers' absence, feedstocks became scarce at the very time animals were at peak production and heavily dependent on access to pasture. In the end, a large number of livestock died or were in danger of dying, while many others were slaughtered or appropriated by the occupying military forces. Additionally, returnees experienced post-conflict constraints that affected water resources/irrigation, fertilizer stocks, agricultural equipment, and access to hay lands and pastures.

The IDPs who fled their homes in Shida Kartli and were unable to return faced changes and challenges to their lives and livelihood different from what those who were able to return to their own homes and lands experienced. In most cases they experienced greater hardships. They were relocated to new settlements or collective centers where the immediate focus was on the necessities of everyday life – food, shelter, and clothing. At the same time, the new settlements were located in areas adjacent to or near agricultural land that had not been cultivated for a long time and required extra effort to be used for agricultural purposes. In many cases, the plots of land were too small to provide IDPs with adequate opportunities to pursue agriculture as their main source of income. These problems were compounded by the lack of agricultural necessities, such as tools, machinery, and animals. Additionally, the IDPs that resettled in

collective centers were unable to pursue their traditional agricultural activities and had to start from scratch in the urban areas where the centers were located.

Food, Shelter, and Livelihood Requirements for IDPs and Other Conflict-Affected Populations

To meet the immediate post-conflict needs of the IDPs and other conflict-affected populations in Shida Kartli, \$28 million was spent between August 2008 and late September 2009 in support of three 1207 Program objectives: winter food assistance, winterized shelter, and rebuilding livelihoods. The diverse activities launched to accomplish these objectives were undertaken by multiple IPs, including the:

- World Food Program (WFP);
- U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR);
- Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs (CNFA); and,
- U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO).

Overall, as discussed below, most 1207 Program-funded activities that focused on IDPs and were carried out by these IPs achieved significant results. The Evaluation Team observed lasting effects years after the projects had been completed.

Winter Food Assistance

Post-conflict 1207-funded food assistance in Shida Kartli was provided by the WFP from December 2008 through August 2009 under a USAID grant agreement. The total amount spent was \$5 million – \$4 million for procurement of food commodities and \$1 million for cash transfers and cash-for-work. The overall goal was to improve food security by meeting the basic food needs of targeted beneficiaries and reestablishing their livelihoods in their original communities and resettlement areas. The assistance focused on three activities: general relief food distribution; direct cash transfers; and food-for-work (FFW)/cash-for-work (CFW).

General food distribution was accomplished via a food basket comprised of wheat flour, pasta, vegetable oil, beans, sugar and iodized salt. Individual rations covered the full amount of the per person/per day caloric requirement, as well as daily requirements for protein and fat. Food distribution partners included World Vision International, CARE, Save the Children and International Orthodox Christian Charity.

Various source documents indicate that the general food distribution effort helped sustain tens of thousands of IDPs and other conflict-affected populations during the winter. For example, the WFP's final progress report (November 2009) on its food assistance activities referenced a joint FAO/UNICEF/WFP assessment as having shown that their efforts "were successful in maintaining adequate levels of food consumption for the beneficiary populations during the harshest winter months." Similarly, in its October 2011 report on Shida Kartli assistance, the Department of State's Georgia Monitoring Project (GMP) stated that its survey of 2,000 conflict-affected households found that food aid "had been appropriately targeted and comprehensively delivered." In addition, 90 percent of the beneficiaries surveyed evaluated food aid as highly important or important for their households. The GMP report concludes by estimating that the food aid provided "saved more than 100,000 people from hunger."

Direct Cash Transfers (DCTs) complemented the food basket and enabled recipients to purchase additional food items to provide the extra calories needed for the winter months. The cash support was equivalent to 25 GEL (\$16) per month for IDPs officially listed with the GoG's Civil Registry Agency. The transfers took place between February and April 2009 and were conducted via debit cards distributed to beneficiary households by the People's Bank of Georgia.

DCTs were provided to 28,600 IDPs (10,300 IDP households) during the period February-April 2009. Of these, just under \$478,000 were 1207 Program-funded; another \$1 million came from funds supplied by the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO). A July 2009 WFP evaluation of the DCT program showed that most of the beneficiaries spent the largest part (60-70 percent) of the cash received on food commodities such as fruit, vegetables, and protein-rich items (meat and dairy products). The evaluation also determined that the DCT program contributed to an improvement in the beneficiary households' overall food consumption score, a positive indicator of a better diet and nutrition.

FFW and CFW activities in Shida Kartli settlements and return areas were initiated in June 2009. Projects were based on priority needs identified by the concerned communities and focused on rehabilitating agricultural infrastructure in order to increase food production. One person per household could participate in project activities and receive a four-member family food ration or cash incentive for each day worked. The FFW ration consisted of wheat flour, vegetable oil, and sugar. The cash value of the family ration was 5 GEL (about \$3.25) per day. The designated household representative could work for a maximum of 22 days per month and earn 110 Gel (about \$70.00).

Supported by just under \$500,000 in 1207 Program funds, a total of 61 FFW and CFW projects were undertaken, affecting 65,000 beneficiaries, including 15,000 IDPs. Projects were implemented in and around dozens of IDP settlements and included rehabilitating irrigation channels, improving arable land and feeder roads, constructing potable water pipelines, and digging water wells. Cash-for-work activities also enabled beneficiaries to repair their houses and establish and fence in "kitchen gardens." According to WFP data, FFW and CFW efforts helped beneficiaries rehabilitate 540 km of irrigation channels to improve water supply to nearly 29,000 hectares of land; increase the utility of more than 180 hectares of agricultural land; and, construct/rehabilitate 27 kilometers of potable water pipeline.

In several IDP settlements visited by the Evaluation Team in Shida Kartli, evidence of these activities and their continuing effects was readily observable. For example, in the Khurvaleti settlement near Gori a resident pointed out fencing around houses' gardens that she said was installed by community members supported by cash-for-work payments. The resident also pointed out water wells that she recalled were dug at the same time, but said that of those 12 wells only three were still in operation. All of the resident's comments were confirmed in a separate conversation with another Khurvaleti inhabitant who, at the time, was also working as a coordinator for a prominent international NGO.

Winterized Shelter

During 2009, supported by a USAID 1207 Program-funded \$9 million grant, UNHCR implemented a variety of activities aligned with its "shelter-plus" strategy; i.e., IDPs targeted for shelter assistance also received aid aimed at promoting their self-sufficiency and well-being. The activities focused on providing adequate shelter for and the local integration of IDPs, in addition to developing enhanced protection for particularly vulnerable IDPs – the elderly,

victims of gender-based violence, and vulnerable women. Numerous partners aided UNHCR in implementing its shelter-plus efforts, including the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), International Relief Committee (IRC), Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), World Vision International (WVI), International Relief and Development (IRD), and several local organizations. Of the \$9 million spent in support of these efforts, UNHCR data show that about \$2.3 million of funded activities focused specifically on IDPs in the Shida Kartli Region; \$4.9 million were spent on activities for IDPs outside Shida Kartli; and \$1.1 million funded IDP-related activities with countrywide applicability that included Shida Kartli.

According to source documents, such as Embassy/Tbilisi 1207 Quarterly Reports, with one notable exception encountered by the Evaluation Team (see below), UNHCR's shelter-plus efforts produced significant results. It is important to note, however, that as suggested by the above expenditure breakdown, many of these accomplishments occurred outside Shida Kartli and are thus beyond the purview of this evaluation. As an example, UNHCR-supported IPs spent \$3 million of 1207 Program funds on the successful rehabilitation of seven collective centers that provided durable housing for more than 600 IDPs in Rustavi and Imereti.

Activities Focused on Shida Kartli IDPs

Successful 1207-funded UNHCR activities that focused specifically on IDPs in Shida Kartli included a number of interventions. Perhaps foremost among these was the construction of several community centers in new settlements.

The centers have been used for developing handicraft and computer skills, training in business practices, and providing internet access for resident IDPs. They have also served as sites for social events, leisure activities, and community meetings. The community centers were built and became functional in 2009 and have remained in operation until now, as observed by the Evaluation Team in visits to ones located in the Berbuki, Karaleti, and Khurvaleti settlements. During one of the Team's visits to the Berbuki center, a psychologist was working with a group of elementary school-age children on emotional issues by having them draw pictures representing their



Berbuki IDP Settlement Community Center

(Photo: Harold Lippman)

feelings. The center coordinator, who is employed by a major international NGO, explained that the psychologist usually comes once a week – the same schedule, according to the Khurvaleti center's coordinator, followed by a psychologist that regularly visits her settlement. In the case of the Khurvaleti community center, when the Team visited it was being used for a meeting with local municipal officials, as dozens of residents waited outside for a subsequent social event.

The Team evaluated the 1207 Program-funded UNHCR efforts in support of building public bathing facilities in some of the settlements. While DoS Quarterly Reports characterize these bathing facilities as successes, residents of Berbuki and Khurvaleti settlements told the Team that these buildings have never been used for the purpose for which they were built and remain

vacant or underutilized. In Berbuki, the facilities consisted of two buildings, one for men and one for women. One of the buildings is used part-time as a health clinic, while the other, residents said, had never been used for any ongoing purpose since its construction. According to residents in both settlements, the bathing facilities were opposed by their respective communities but were constructed anyway, even though this sentiment was expressed to those in charge of the projects. In both cases, the residents insisted that there was not enough water to support the operation of these facilities and still meet other essential individual household and agricultural needs. In both cases, residents of the settlements have continuously, but unsuccessfully, pressed local authorities and donors for assistance to use these vacant/underutilized buildings as sites for urgently needed kindergartens.

Countrywide Activities that Benefitted Shida Kartli IDPs

IDPs in Shida Kartli also benefitted from 1207-funded activities with countrywide applicability that were not targeted solely on their region. For example, UNHCR-supported capacity building efforts helped the Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation (MRA) improve its operations by decentralizing its services and strengthening its staff capacity to deliver those services and respond to IDPs' needs. These capacity building efforts – characterized by a knowledgeable IP sub-office director as “on-the-job-coaching” – also strengthened the MRA's management capability at the central level. As a result, according to documents provided by a UNHCR key informant, the MRA was able to;

- facilitate the resettlement of IDPs inside public buildings;
- establish centers that disseminated information to IDPs on durable housing alternatives and their rights in the related eligibility determination process; and,
- register IDPs in a public database.

In addition, 1207 funding enabled UNHCR to extend protection monitoring for vulnerable IDPs in the new settlements and some 100 collective centers around the country. Similarly, supported by this funding, UNHCR and MRA were able to better identify and then address IDPs' legal and social needs, as well as establish response mechanisms against gender-based violence. As to the latter, this included crisis centers, psycho-social counseling and empowerment activities in Shida Kartli and western Georgia.

Assistance to Rebuild Livelihoods

Immediate post-conflict, 1207-funded assistance to rebuild livelihoods in Shida Kartli included diverse activities carried out by two IPs, with the support of numerous international and local NGOs. These activities included the provision of agricultural inputs and technical assistance to farmers by CNFA and animal feed and veterinary services by FAO. The other three activities cited under rebuilding livelihoods in the SOW – vocational education (AIR), rehabilitation of school buildings (CHF), and registration of IDP land (APLR) – are discussed in the next section (Economic Revitalization and Stabilization) because they do not fall expressly within the subject matter at hand. In all cases the CNFA and FAO activities were successful and, in some instances, produced remarkable outcomes with lasting effects.

Agriculture

The USG spent a \$19.5 million for the Georgia Agricultural Risk Reduction Program (GARRP). Of these, \$14 million were spent on efforts to support and revitalize the agriculture sector in Shida Kartli. Implemented by CNFA from October 2008 to December 2009 under a USAID

grant agreement, GARRP was a rapid recovery initiative that targeted farmers and IDPs whose livelihood had been devastated by the 2008 war. It consisted of three main components:

- winter wheat assistance for affected wheat growers in the fall of 2008 and, again, a year later for IDPs and growers whose land could not be used in the earlier effort due to unexploded ordnance (UXO);
- corn planting assistance to farmers and resettled IDPs cultivating spring crops in 2009; and,
- assistance in 2009 to farmers whose pre-conflict livelihood depended on orchard production.

The initial winter wheat activity was supported by funds from two sources: non-1207 Program-funded USAID grants (\$5.5 million) and 1207 Program resources (\$2 million). An additional \$12 million in 1207 Program resources from the GARRP grant agreement with USAID were used to support the rest of the component activities.

Winter Wheat

Supported by the above-referenced non-1207-funded USAID grants, the fall 2008 winter wheat assistance effort consisted primarily of voucher assistance provided to every farmer in conflict-affected communities that had grown winter grains in the previous year. Local government authorities assisted with compiling beneficiary lists and facilitated distribution of the vouchers to 7,600 farmers in 100 communities. The farmers used the vouchers to cover the cost of the winter wheat seed and machinery for plowing, soil cultivation, and planting. A \$2 million 1207-funded grant was used to buy the fertilizer for this planting. By the end of March 2009, this effort resulted in the distribution and application of 3,795 metric tons of fertilizer to 12,650 hectares.

The fields planted and fertilized under this activity were harvested in September 2009. DoS quarterly reports state that the combined use of fertilizer and an improved seed variety helped produce yields twice as high as those reported in previous “good” years. The resulting crop had an estimated value of more than \$10 million and generated nearly \$1,300 in average income per beneficiary family. The DoS source documents go on to say that these results could be seen as particularly significant in light of the relatively “poor” winter wheat crops that had been harvested in immediately preceding years in Kakheti, Georgia’s major wheat growing region. These sources also highlight “the important and immediate economic boost to the private sector” produced by the winter wheat harvest: estimates of more than \$500,000 for local distributors and service providers as well as \$1.5 million in cash injected into the local agricultural economy.

Added evidence supporting these findings is provided by the GMP report on USG assistance efforts in Shida Kartli. The report points out that the winter wheat aid allowed conflict-affected farmers to sow crops just a few months after the war and retain a portion of the harvest to develop a seed bank for future seasons. Referring to the considerable effects of the war-inflicted damage to Shida Kartli’s irrigation infrastructure, the report underscores the importance of winter wheat as a drought-tolerant crop that has become a key element in the efforts to rapidly restore agricultural livelihoods in the region.

Corn

Assistance for the Spring 2009 corn planting was provided through \$3.55 million in 1207 Program funds to GARRP. More than 11,000 beneficiaries – including 1,880 IDP families in 14

new settlements – were targeted, using much the same procedure that had helped determine the eligibility of the winter wheat activity participants. In addition to IDPs, eligible participants included all conflict-affected farmers who grew spring crops in 2008 and had not benefitted from the winter wheat assistance the previous fall. As with winter wheat, paper voucher coupons were distributed to cover expenses for plowing, soil cultivation, seed, planting, fertilizer, and fertilizer application service. Distribution was carried out by CNFA staff, with local government participation, and all vouchers were received by intended beneficiaries. All voucher supported services – machinery, planting, and fertilizer application – were completed by May 2009 and a total of just over 9,000 hectares were planted.

Based on an October 2009 CNFA survey of 285 randomly selected respondents from 96 communities, GARRP corn program beneficiaries' fields yielded an average of six tons per hectare. This outcome, according to the GARRP final report, is significantly higher than the 2.2 tons per hectare average reported for Shida Kartli over the previous 10 years. The overall estimated value of the corn crop was \$10.76 million, bringing an average of nearly \$975 in income per beneficiary family.

Orchards

As with corn planting operations, GARRP assistance provided to orchard growers was funded entirely with 1207 Program resources. Activities in this regard reflected the long-lived major revenue generating role of fruit growers in Shida Kartli and the serious damage to the region's orchards during the war. Thus, livelihood restoration efforts focused on orchards ended up targeting nearly 18,000 beneficiaries, by far higher than the comparable numbers for winter wheat and corn. The assistance provided consisted primarily of pesticides and fungicides, at a total cost of about \$5.8 million.

However, according to source documents and interviews with CNFA/Tbilisi officials and staff, the defining feature of the orchards assistance effort was the replacement of the paper vouchers used in implementing the winter wheat and corn activities with an electronic (magnetic stripe) voucher card. Similar in appearance and function to ATM and debit cards in the U.S., the card provided farmers with maximum flexibility to choose the products they were familiar with and knew to be effective for their purposes. In addition, and perhaps most importantly, the card enabled farmers to make multiple purchases during the growing season – as many as seven or eight sprayings are often required – for products they needed when they needed them. This capability, the GARRP final report states, “would have been highly impractical (if not impossible) using paper vouchers.”

The results of the orchard assistance effort were remarkable. According to the GAARP final report, “this assistance enabled production from at least 11,672 hectares of orchard that would otherwise have been impossible.” Based on CNFA's post-harvest survey of 265 beneficiaries in 90 Shida Kartli communities, the total estimated amount of apples harvested topped 215,000 tons in 2009 – the highest output for the region going back at least ten years. CNFA estimated the value of the total crop at \$52.5 million, more than three times the amount it had projected in the course of developing the project proposal. The average income per beneficiary family was \$2,929 – more than twice the level generated by winter wheat farmers and three times the level of income achieved by corn growers.

Other Results

GARRP-inspired accomplishments also included significant outcomes with broader implications than the quantitative measures described above. Most notable among these are the entirely unanticipated effects that grew out of the use of the voucher cards in the orchard assistance activity. A senior CNFA/Tbilisi official, along with other key informants, pointed out that the voucher card worked so well that it became a model for and is still being used by the GoG for other government programs and activities. Similarly, another high-level CNFA source explained that the card's use supported long-term USG efforts to promote privatization in Georgia's economy. Indications of this appear in the GARRP final report, where the point is made that "no single retailer, importer/distributor, or manufacturer was favored by this system; all had the same opportunity to sell their products...." In this sense, the interaction between growers and farm supply businesses prompted by the card's use could be seen as helping to establish a foundation for future commercial relationships free of Soviet-style economic constraints, once farmers have their own resources to invest.

Lastly, while it must be remembered that most but not all GARRP activities were funded by 1207 Program resources, summary life-of-project data are still instructive and provide added statistical weight to the overall accomplishments:

- paper vouchers and electronic voucher cards were distributed to 37,443 beneficiary families and 2,196 IDP families, representing an estimated 120,000 individuals;
- winter wheat, corn, and orchard crops were produced from 36,121 hectares of land;
- injection of \$16,380,475 into the local agricultural economy; and,
- facilitation of crop production for program beneficiaries worth an estimated \$73,428,691, making for an average estimated income per beneficiary family of \$1,850.

Livestock

Livestock activities – animal feed, de-worming, water supply, and training – funded entirely by 1207 Program resources were implemented by FAO under a \$5.5 million grant agreement with USAID. The activity was carried out between October 15, 2008 and January 15, 2010 and aimed at achieving the following objectives:

- protect the livelihood of vulnerable livestock owners in conflict-affected areas; and,
- provide technical assistance and coordination support to ensure that the affected populations accrue greater benefits from related rural household food security interventions.

In responding to this task, FAO was assisted by a number of partner organizations including CARE, Save the Children, World Vision International, and International Orthodox Christian Charities.

Activities

Animal Feed – the project provided 4,240 tons of animal feed for cattle belonging to 18,244 families in 127 Shida Kartli villages. Distribution took place from the end of January through the end of March 2009, using vouchers and signed beneficiary lists to ensure that the inputs reached the intended recipients. In December 2009, an additional 300 tons of feed were distributed to 3,000 vulnerable farm households in 14 villages. These households had lost access to their pastures and plots and had not benefitted from the prior feed distribution. In sum, more

than 5,400 tons of feed were distributed to more than 21,000 beneficiaries – significantly greater, according to FAO documents, than the 12,000 called for in initial project planning.

Deworming – planned anti-parasitic treatments of cattle began in April 2009 and benefitted the same 18,244 households targeted previously with the feed distribution. A second round was administered to the same cattle the next month to prevent the re-infection of livestock reintroduced to common grazing areas and pasture, as well as to protect against another damaging pest, the cattle grub. According to FAO data, more than 38,000 animals were treated, 78 percent of the total estimated number of cattle in Shida Kartli. Additionally, in response to a GoG Veterinary Service request, 32,000 cattle were treated in October to address Fall infestations in 80 Shida Kartli villages.

Water Supply – livestock assistance recipients benefitted from the construction of 53 new water troughs and the rehabilitation of two damaged water troughs to improve access and availability of water for the Region's cattle. The 55 new and repaired troughs were 20 more than originally planned, according to FAO documents. The additional troughs were situated in 10 newly identified villages where cattle had concentrated animal feed with little or no access to water.

Training – training courses and related printed materials on silage-making and the preparation of homemade animal feed concentrates were provided to thousands of Shida Kartli farmers. Most of the training activities took place at the peak of the silage production season. This allowed participants to use what they had learned for the upcoming winter. In September 2009, for example, beneficiary farmers and all state veterinarians from the Gori District received training on how to make silage from whole maize plants and available vegetation. Three hundred farmers, veterinarians, and others attended 14 demonstration classes/trainings and nearly 2,000 participants benefitted from 50 classroom-based sessions. In addition, during the feed distributions and de-worming efforts, beneficiaries received training from IPs on their use and/or application, accompanied by fliers and pamphlets printed by FAO.

Results

Surveys of 1,610 beneficiaries conducted by teams of independent consultants retained by FAO provide sound evidence that the assistance achieved the basic objective of protecting the livelihood of vulnerable livestock holders in the conflict-affected areas of Shida Kartli. The availability of affordable fodder allowed livestock holders to refrain from slaughtering or selling their cattle. This generated urgently needed food or cash for affected populations. In addition, FAO's experience has shown that had a de-stocking occurred it could have taken many years and involved high costs to get stocks back to a sustainable level. In turn, over time this would very likely have had far reaching consequences for the livelihood of conflict-affected households.

Indications of the project's success are evident in the beneficiaries' responses to questions posed by the interviewers. For example, to a question on "differences" observed in animals that received the FAO-supplied feed, 71 percent of the beneficiaries reported an increase in milk production and more than 20 percent said their animals were stronger and healthier. The report on the survey results underscores the positive impact of increased milk production – a nearly 50 percent increase in potential income, from about \$10 to \$15 per day per household. The report's statistical analysis further suggests that this increased potential income represented about \$65 per month which, taking into account the 4-5 month timeframe of the project and the number of beneficiaries involved, translates into an estimated \$5.9 million "generated and given into farmers' hands through the intervention."

On a more basic level, the survey report analysis concludes that this added potential income meant that livestock holding families were able to increase their self-sufficiency in terms of milk and derivative products, such as cheese and yoghurt, as well as generate income from their sale in or around their communities. In addition, it links the positive effects of the feed assistance with those realized from the de-worming efforts – e.g., a reduction in feed costs – pointing out that the combined impact could result in higher meat value if the animals were to be slaughtered later on and sold. Lastly, as a result of the increased number of troughs, the report cites a significant improvement in the reliability of the water supply in terms of quantity and access, as well as a reduction in the duration of irrigation needed at peak periods.

Economic Revitalization and Stabilization

In the second year of the overall effort funded by the Georgia 1207 assistance grant, the emphasis shifted from emergency response/initial recovery to intermediate development activities aimed at economic revitalization and stabilization in the Shida Kartli region. To this end, a second tranche of 1207 funding worth \$50 million was obligated. More than 95% of this amount was disbursed by the end of 2014. These funds supported efforts to accomplish five objectives:

- provide assistance in the Shida Kartli region (phase two);
- provide employment and vocational training in construction trades;
- provide assistance to rebuild schools and municipal infrastructure;
- provide assistance for IDPs to resettle; and,
- provide security for IDPs.

The IPs involved in carrying out the activities intended to accomplish these objectives include:

- Association for Protection of Landowner Rights (APLR);
- American Institutes for Research (AIR);
- International Organization of Migration (IOM);
- Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs (CNFA);
- Global Communities (CHF);
- Chemonics;
- Municipal Development Fund of Georgia (MDF);
- HALO Trust; and,
- NAMSA

The 1207 Program-funded activities carried out by the IPs achieved significant and, in some cases, impressive results with lasting effects.

Displaced Persons Resettlement Assistance

As discussed in this report, IDP resettlement services supported by 1207 Program funds include two activities: a \$1.5 million energy subsidy program implemented by USAID and a \$500,000 IDP property registration project carried out by APLR. The energy subsidy program covered payments on behalf of newly resettled IDPs who were getting gas and electricity at no cost under a deferred billing arrangement between the utility companies and the GoG. The APLR project provided IDPs property registration assistance and help with obtaining title to the land

transferred to them by the GoG. According to source documents and key informant interviews, both activities accomplished their objectives.

Energy Subsidy Program

The GoG Ministry of Energy (MoE) requested the utility subsidy to ease the burden of high electricity and gas costs faced by IDPs who had moved into new government-constructed homes and were trying to cope with the winter weather and their diminished household budgets. The program operated from November 2008 to April 2009 and provided gas and electricity to nearly 4,000 newly-built homes in 13 IDP settlements located in three regions. One of these regions was Shida Kartli. Five settlements from the region participated in the subsidy program: Barbie, Karaleti, Metekhi, Shavshvebi, and Skra. While the exact number of participating homes is not shown in available documents, it could be determined that slightly more than one-third (\$565,000) of the total \$1.5 million 1207-funded outlay for the activity was spent in the five Shida Kartli settlements.

The successful outcome of the subsidy program is described in a joint MoE/Transparency International (TI) report requested by USAID and completed in mid-August 2009. The report details the survey effort carried out by an eight-member team comprised of MoE, TI, and USAID representatives. A representative sample of IDP bills and electricity and gas meters was selected and joint site verification visits were conducted at 498 homes (well above the 10 percent minimum sample required) in three settlements representing each of the participating regions. Using the data obtained, a comparison was made between the actual energy use and bills received from the participating utility companies. In addition, IDPs were interviewed to further verify that electricity and gas were available during the period for which the utilities companies claimed reimbursement. Having been able to “demonstrate parity between billing data provided and actual power and gas consumed,” the survey team recommended that the utility companies receive the \$1.5 million in subsidy payments claimed. Disbursement of these funds by USAID was completed in September 2009.

Property Registration

The APLR’s Property Registration project was an extension of USAID’s Land Market Development II – an activity built on USG-supported land privatization efforts that originated in the late 1990s. The project started on January 1, 2009 and was completed on September 30, 2010. It was intended to provide IDPs with the documentation needed to protect their real property assets and secure the benefits of land ownership. Its primary objectives included:

- registering claims by IDPs who were forced from their homes and lands in South Ossetia as a result of the August 2008 conflict;
- surveying and registering houses and land purchased by the GoG for them; and,
- digitizing registry data for districts – mostly within Shida Kartli – where large numbers of IDPs were concentrated.

To help accomplish these objectives, in February 2009 APLR opened an IDP Consultation Center in Gori. The Center was charged with: (1) creating a database for properties within South Ossetia that were abandoned during the conflict; (2) collecting land ownership and other related information needed to document a claim; and (3) inputting relevant information into the National Agency for Public Registry (NAPR) database. Center staff also worked to ensure that properties

transferred to IDPs by the GOG were surveyed and mapped in order to comply with government titling requirements.

In an interview, a longtime senior APLR official stated that by the end of the project 15,660 property units (residential and/or agricultural land parcels) for approximately 7,800 beneficiary households were identified and recorded into the database for lost properties. Initial projections, it should be noted, estimated these numbers at 7,000 units and 3,500 households, respectively. In addition, according to this same official, 2,000 houses that had been transferred to the IDPs by the GoG – most of which were located in the Shida Kartli region – were surveyed, mapped, and registered. Lastly, by the end of the project, digitalization of land registry data for Gori, Kaspi, Kareli, and Khashuri – districts in Shida Kartli with high concentrations of IDPs – had been completed and entered into the publicly available NAPR database.

A final point is worth noting - IDPs had somewhat unexpected views regarding the claims registration effort. Settlement residents interviewed by the Team about this subject seemed indifferent or dismissive in their responses. One IDP, for example, said he had not bothered to file a claim because he knew where his home and land were and could not be satisfied simply by having a piece of paper that proved that. Others said that, while they were aware of the claims registration activity, their own communities had not benefitted from it and/or residents had chosen not to pursue it.

Prior to these interviews, however, the above-mentioned senior APLR official alerted Team members to the likelihood that IDPs would be unenthusiastic about the claims registration effort. He explained that the IDPs interest in the registration effort was initially high but declined rapidly as their chances of returning home faded over the winter months. In his view, on the one hand IDPs could not be satisfied by mere paperwork, while on the other hand there is “hard data that has accurate information on what someone owned, if this issue is ever addressed/resolved in the future.”

Shida Kartli Recovery

In parallel, building on the initial efforts aimed at restoring livelihoods in Shida Kartli, the second tranche of 1207 funding supported “phase two” activities to achieve the same objective. One such activity was the CNFA-implemented Access to Mechanization Project (AMP), which sought to increase smallholder farmers’ productivity and incomes by improving their access to and utilization of machinery services. The other is the New Economic Opportunities (NEO) Initiative, an activity implemented by Chemonics that aims to develop economic opportunities at the community level, improve the livelihood of vulnerable people and households, and enable IDPs to sustain their households. In the case of AMP, project objectives were achieved on a countrywide basis as well as in Shida Kartli. Regarding NEO, while substantial results clearly have been achieved, the project is not complete and an independent end-of-project evaluation is expected to be completed later this year.

Farm Machinery Services

In key ways, the three-year, \$5.1 million AMP activity continued and built on CNFA’s experiences with GARRP. Most notably, in source documents as well as at meetings that the Team conducted with CNFA officials to discuss GARRP, the shortage of agricultural machinery was cited as a major issue. In this sense, it is understandable that farmers’ access to machinery and related service delivery was AMP’s primary objective.

As implemented by CNFA from September 2009 to December 2012, AMP was meant to showcase how to develop and put into practice a commercially feasible, effective, and sustainable model for machinery service operations. To this end, AMP sought to:

- establish at least 25 service providing enterprises (MSCs) offering improved mechanization services to over 12,500 additional smallholder farmers;
- provide technical assistance to the MSCs, using a combination of local consultants and Farmer-to-Farmer volunteers, to support their operations and long-term sustainability;
- leverage project grant funds via matching investments from local partners, including large-scale involvement of local and international financial institutions and interests;
- improve the competitive environment for machinery services by reducing the cost to farmers;
- facilitate the rehabilitation of more agricultural land into production;
- contribute to increased productivity and income of smallholder farmers; and,
- provide discounted machinery services to about 3,000 resettled IDPs in connection with the 2010 crop production cycle.

According to project documents, 1207 quarterly progress reports, and an independent end-of-project evaluation, AMP accomplishments were significant. Summary results include:

- 21 MSCs established, 16,539 small-scale farmers served, and 195 new jobs created;
- \$2.7 million in grants, leveraged by \$3.1 million in private sector matching funds;
- 82 tractors and 235 implements purchased;
- more than 30,000 hectares of agricultural land served, \$1.8 million in sales generated;
- small-scale farmers' annual incomes increased by between \$5.3 and \$6.1 million;
- \$1 million in financing mobilized in support of machinery services;
- 35 business training activities conducted, 25 volunteer assistance assignments organized;
- more than 2,400 farmers participated in 119 extension training activities; and,
- 2,098 IDP families benefitted from improved machinery services.

With some seemingly minor exceptions – e.g., 21 MSCs established versus 25 called for – these summary results compare very favorably to the outcomes listed above and collectively affirm the conclusion that as a countrywide activity AMP was a substantial success.

This overall success, moreover, seems to describe AMP's related achievements in Shida Kartli – the region on which this evaluation is focused. As evidence of this, the Team discovered on the CNFA website a document with brief profiles of all 21 MSCs, including the two located in Shida Kartli, Gori and Kareli. Each profile contains end-of-project summary data that attest to its MSC's established status and overall accomplishments – numbers of beneficiaries, hectares of land served, jobs created, and equipment purchased. On average, as two of 21 MSCs, the Shida Kartli Centers' results are slightly above the mean 9.5 percent.

Table 3: AMP Machinery Service Centers – Shida Kartli

		FUNDING		
	<u>Gori/Kareli</u>	<u>Percent of Total</u>	<u>Other MSCs</u>	<u>Total</u>
Grant total	\$340,000	12	\$2.36 million	\$2.7 million

Matching funds	\$420,431	13	\$2.68 million	\$3.1 million
		RESULTS		
Land served	3,900 hectares	13	26,100 hectares	30,000 hectares
Farmers served	2,723	16	13,816	16,539
Added tractors	10	12	72	82
Added implements	53	22	182	235

In addition, there is disaggregated data in the AMP Annual Report (October 1, 2009 – September 30, 2010) that shows that 1,156 (80 percent) of the 1,438 IDP households that benefitted from project activities during the year were located in Shida Kartli. The table summarizes the results of AMP-supported Spring 2010 corn planting efforts, including the amount of land serviced and average harvest per hectare.

Table 4: AMP IDP Beneficiaries

Region	District	Village/Town/Settlement	Households	Land serviced (hectares)	Average harvest/hectare (tons)
Shida Kartli	Kareli	Mokhisi	58	47	4
Shida Kartli	Kareli	Akhalsopeli	100	25	4
Shida Kartli	Kaspi	Metekhi	35	9	5
Shida Kartli	Kaspi	Teliani	54	20	5
Shida Kartli	Gori	Berbuki	124	62	4
Shida Kartli	Gori	Karaleti	283	62	2
Shida Kartli	Gori	Shavshvebi	177	22	2
Shida Kartli	Gori	Khurvaleti	139	70	2
Shida Kartli	Gori	Skra	86	15	2
Shida Kartli	Gori	Shindisi	100	50	2
Kvemo Kartli	Gardabani	Gardabani	121	31	2
Kakheti	Lagodekhi	Lagodekhi	36	5	8
Kakheti	Sagarejo	Sagaredjo	24	12	1
Mtskheta Mtianeti	Mtskheta	Tsinamdgvariantkari -Zakaro	101	21	2
TOTAL			1,438	451	2.8

New Economic Opportunities

The New Economic Opportunities Initiative (NEO) began at the end of April 2011 and is expected to be completed in December 2015. This \$20 million activity, which has incorporated \$7.37 million in 1207 funding, is being implemented by Chemonics International. NEO links to and builds on the experience and results of the immediate post-conflict assistance and initial recovery activities following the August 2008 war. In this sense, NEO is an undertaking that attempts to move from short-term humanitarian relief and early efforts aimed at restoring the livelihoods of conflict-affected populations to longer-term, comprehensive economic development. Accordingly, since its inception NEO has worked to:

- increase rural incomes;
- reduce poverty levels;
- improve agricultural productivity and food security;
- address critical, small-scale infrastructure constraints in targeted communities;
- enable targeted IDP communities to sustain their households; and,
- assist communities distressed by natural or other disasters.

To achieve these goals, NEO has used an integrated strategic approach comprised of four components that focus on 85 communities within 10 target municipalities located in four regions – Shida Kartli, Mtskheta-Mtianeti, Samegrelo-Zemo Svaneti, Racha-Lechkhumi and Kvemo Svaneti:

Community-level Economic Development (LED) Planning – Under this component NEO has partnered with targeted local communities to prepare and/or update existing economic development plans (EDPs). The EDPs are a product of working group deliberations, supported by focus group discussions, aimed at identifying community priorities in the areas of agriculture, non-agriculture, infrastructure, and the social sector. Once completed, the EDPs are submitted to appropriate municipal authorities for inclusion in their jurisdictions' economic development plans. In turn, NEO works with community members to identify and carry out small-scale infrastructure projects with direct economic benefit, such as rehabilitating or upgrading local water, sewage, and irrigation systems.

Rural Economic Development Support – Efforts under this component have centered on production grants and agricultural training intended to promote increased household production levels, diversified income sources, and long-term employment opportunities. Emphasis is placed on strengthening links between small-scale producers and other agricultural sector actors – e.g., producers, input suppliers, and processors – in addition to existing economic entities, such as producer associations. Production grantees are individual farmers who receive cash and/or in-kind assistance to help them improve their output and income. The grants, which may come directly from NEO or indirectly through sub-grantees, have focused on the tourism, strawberry, beekeeping, seed potato, hazelnut, and vegetable sectors. Agricultural training activities are typically organized around demonstration plots and may last a day or more depending on the crop and/or cultivation practices being promoted.

Assistance to Strengthen Highly Vulnerable Households and Individuals – For this component NEO has used “livelihood packages,” vocational education, on-the-job training, and interest-free loans to increase employment opportunities, strengthen business skills, improve agricultural

production, and enhance household food security. Livelihood packages consist of a starter-kit for an income generating activity, combined with assistance to beneficiaries on how to use it and training in basic business skills. More than a dozen agricultural packages, ranging in value from around \$650 (1,100 GEL) to \$2,100 (4,365 GEL), have been made available to beneficiaries in areas such as animal husbandry and fruit, vegetable, and grain production. More than a dozen non-agricultural packages, ranging in value from around \$315 (520 GEL) to \$815 (3,000 GEL), have also been used in areas including service provision, production, and retail. In both types of packages, beneficiaries contribute between 5 and 30 percent of the package's value in cash or in-kind, depending on their resources and level of vulnerability.

Vocational education and on-the-job training are also part of the assistance to vulnerable households and individuals. Vocational education in multiple areas, including construction trades, beekeeping, apparel making, hairdressing, and culinary skills, is provided through public vocational colleges or NEO-supported NGOs. Upon completing their courses, graduates may receive toolkits applicable to the work area for which they had been trained. On-the-job training with local businesses recruited by NEO has been arranged for vulnerable individuals, many of whom have been hired as full time employees by those businesses after completing their programs. Lastly, an NEO-supported program has made interest-free loans available to vulnerable individuals and IDPs, along with related business development training to provide them with skills needed for establishing a successful start-up.

Promoting the Sustainability of IDP Houses Being Rehabilitated with Support from the USG – To ensure that IDP buildings and settlements are managed and maintained after undergoing rehabilitation, activities under this component have focused on the formation, operation, and ongoing development of homeowners associations (HOAs), tenants associations (TAs), and maintenance teams (MTs). Activities include training on the purpose, objectives, and benefits of establishing HOAs, TAs, and MTs as well as capacity building for relevant local authorities. In response to the realization that HOAs and TAs needed sustainable revenue sources to cover the costs of managing and maintaining their apartment buildings and cottages, income-generating small grants were provided and the idea of membership dues and maintenance fees was introduced.

Results

NEO is an on-going activity. As a result, its life-of-project results are incomplete and, therefore, it is premature to assess whether the activity achieved its objectives. However, for the purposes of this evaluation a timeline for reportable results is suggested by a statement in an Embassy quarterly report that, as of the January - March 2014 reporting period, “1207 resources allocated to the NEO initiative were fully expended.” Accordingly, the results described here largely reflect project experience in the four component activity areas over the three-year period, April 2011 - March 2014. In some cases, where more up-to-date information is available to help make or clarify a point, that material will be used with an appropriate explanation.

Before turning to the results achieved in each of NEO's four component activity areas, a few summary performance indicators bear mention. According to project and Embassy reports, by the end of March last year NEO assistance had reached 66,834 households – this is slightly more than 90 percent of the 74,000 target established at the start of the project. Significantly, given NEO's emphasis on rural economic development, 65,677 (98 percent) of those reached were

rural. In addition, during the same timeframe some 3,200 IDP households – about 90 percent of the project’s 3,500 target – had somehow been assisted by NEO activities.

In the area of local economic development planning, NEO successfully facilitated the formation of working groups and focus groups in all 85 target communities and, in so doing, involved more than 2,000 residents in efforts to develop their localities’ EDPs. Based on the priorities identified in the EDPs, in conjunction with further deliberations by community groups, local government officials, and other concerned parties, 71 small-scale infrastructure projects were completed during the above-mentioned timeframe. These projects, such as the elevated water tanks and water intake tower visited by the Evaluation Team in and around Gori municipality, have helped improve livelihoods for thousands of households by providing better access to agricultural land, more potable water, and increased amounts of irrigation water. In Shida Kartli, more than 30 potable water, rural road, and related projects were completed, benefitting more than 10,000 households in the Gori, Kareli, and Khashuri municipalities.

Because the vast majority of NEO beneficiaries live in remote, rural communities and own small (less than one hectare), fragmented plots of land, project rural economic development activities have concentrated on introducing new and affordable crops, technology, and know-how to enable farmers to optimize their harvests and income. In Shida Kartli, as in the other NEO-targeted regions, the corresponding transition from subsistence to small-scale commercial farming is being pursued through quick impact and high margin crops such as vegetables and berries; coupled with new technology such as seedling production, drip irrigation and fertilization systems. Rounding out these efforts, customized training and one-on-one technical assistance is provided throughout the production cycle. In the case of Shida Kartli, a leading example of the results of these combined efforts is the four apple, pear, plum, and cherry nurseries NEO has supported in the region. In November 2013, these nurseries joined together to form the Intensive Fruit Sapling Producers’ Association – a key organizational component of NEO’s overall value chain approach – which subsequently sold 17,200 apple saplings that generated \$65,568 in revenue.

Overall, according to DoS reports, more than 12,000 farmers have received training in modern agricultural production techniques and technologies and thousands among them have applied what they have learned on more than 8,000 hectares of land.

According to NEO’s latest annual report, results of project activities aimed at increasing opportunities for vulnerable individuals to gain employment or start a business have exceeded expectations. Specifically, for example, between Fiscal Years 2012-2014, 678 out of 889 (76 percent) vulnerable individuals who completed the project-supported vocational training courses gained employment. Of the 889 graduates, 225 (26 percent) were from Shida Kartli. The largest number of Shida Kartli participants were in the hair dresser (66), plumber/tile setter (58), and apparel-maker (42) trades. Other trades for which Shida Kartli graduates received training include electrician, welder, carpenter, stone mason, painter, and fruit grafter. In addition, 777



**Rehabilitated Water Tower
Brotsleti Village, Shida Kartli**

(Photo: Harold Lippman)

out of 889 (87 percent) graduates received toolkits upon completing training. This was a significant outcome, according to a senior NEO official, because toolkits are not routinely given out to everyone. Lastly, the report data indicate that 170 out of 189 (90 percent) of those who participated in NEO's the on-the-job training program obtained new or better jobs following the completion of their programs.

Vulnerable individuals were also beneficiaries of NEO livelihood packages and interest-free loans. As of late September 2014, a total of 796 livelihood packages – 636 agricultural and 160 non-agricultural – were provided to beneficiaries. The packages typically included small in-kind grants of equipment, technical assistance, and training to help beneficiaries in their effort to develop sustainable sources of household income. According to survey data that compared pre- and post-package income levels, recipients have experienced an average increase of 75 percent in their household income levels as a result of the assistance provided. Positive results have also been reported regarding the distribution of 342 interest-free loans to vulnerable individuals for a total of \$197,965. Embassy periodic reports, for instance, state that loan-supported microfinance ventures have resulted in recipients experiencing, on average, more than a 100 percent increase in their income levels, as compared to the levels that existed prior to receiving the loans.

In the area of promoting the sustainability of IDP housing, NEO applied lessons learned from the pilot project in Senaki, Rustavi, Kutaisi, Khurvaleti, and Berbuki to revise the training materials and presentations used in the establishment of their HOAs and TAs. The revisions provided subsequent target audiences with a clearer and more complete explanation of the purpose, goals, and benefits of establishing the associations. Since then they have grown in number from the original eight to 49. As of the latter part of 2014, there were 38 HOAs representing 3,087 residents in rehabilitated IDP collective centers and 11 TAs representing 5,711 IDPs residing in cottage settlements. While precise figures were not included in available reports, many of these HOAs and TAs – e.g., the ones in Khurvaleti, Berbuki, Shavshvebi, and Skra – are located in or around municipalities in Shida Kartli, such as Gori, Kareli, and Kaspi.

In addition to supporting their development, NEO has helped HOAs and TAs prepare and implement Sustainability Plans, which include the establishment of maintenance funds derived from membership fees, rental of maintenance toolkits, and revenues from income generating grants. By the end of FY 2014, maintenance funds in the 49 NEO-supported HOAs and TAs had collected \$4,380 from these fees, rentals, and grants. From these revenues, HOAs and TAs spent \$1,100 in FY 2014 on various maintenance activities. For example, the TAs in Shavshvebi, Berbuki, and Skra settlements spent a little over \$100 on bread bakery ovens and construction of a play space for children.

Lastly, NEO-support for maintenance teams in the settlements and apartment buildings has also produced significant results. For example, NEO bought and distributed toolkits to maintenance teams, which included tools such as an electric drill, jack hammer, angle grinder, electrician's set, welding machine, electric circular saw, power planer, plastic pipe welding machine, heat gun, soldering iron, gas powered scythe and other equipment. The toolkits, in turn, have helped MTs maintain their properties and enabled team members to generate personal and HOA/TA income by renting tools for commercial services performed outside of their buildings and cottage settlements. In FY 2014, according to NEO reports, 27 HOAs and 7 TAs collected \$2,058 in fees from their respective MTs for the use of the toolkits in such situations.

Employment and Vocational Training

Employment and vocational training activities include the Vocational Education Project (VEP) and Job Counseling and Placement (JCP) project. VEP and JCP focused on increasing employment opportunities through education and training of varying types, adjusted in terms of participants' needs. In both cases, the projects achieved their stated objectives.

Vocational Education Project

The VEP began in May 2008 and was completed in July 2011. This \$5.5 million workforce development project was supported by both USAID and 1207 Program funds (\$1.8 million) and was implemented by the American Institutes for Research (AIR). The project was intended to fill a skills gap in the construction and tourism industries in Georgia through training and education that would:

- increase the supply of trained graduates in the tourism and construction trades from four or more vocational education centers, certified to international standards or their equivalent;
- increase the sustainability of the centers through public-private partnerships and the application of business models to their development; and,
- facilitate public-private cooperation for the development of vocational standards and related curricula in the tourism and construction trades to ensure that the competencies created meet market needs.

At the start, the project aimed to provide professional training to 1,000 individuals in the construction and tourism industries in Tbilisi over a two-year period; however, due to the effectiveness of the project and strong post-conflict demand from potential beneficiaries, the target was expanded to 5,000 graduates. In addition, instead of just focusing on the original two schools in Tbilisi, the project was expanded to include five additional Vocational Education Centers (VECs) strategically located throughout Georgia, as shown below.

Table 5: Vocational Education Centers Participating in VEP

School Name	City/Region	Focus
Spectri VEC	Tbilisi	Tourism
Icarus VEC	Tbilisi	Construction
Kutaisi VEC	Imereti	Construction
Khidistavi VEC	Shida-Kartli	Construction
Kobuleti VEC	Adjara	Tourism
Akhalkalaki VEC	Samtskhe-Javakheti	Construction
Mestia VEC	Svaneti	Tourism

In working to achieve the goals of the program, AIR utilized an integrated approach that capitalized on the interconnectedness of the intended project outcomes. This approach incorporated the following four areas of activity:

Teacher Training and Structural Improvements

In the VECs' early offerings, the quality of the instruction became an area of concern, owing to the fact that most of the teachers had been educated under the Soviet system and most of the training manuals were printed in that same era. In response, AIR developed intensive training seminars for teachers, with the Spectri VEC acting as a training hub. The training program increased the subject-specific knowledge of trainers and provided training in up-to-date pedagogical methods. A total of 106 instructors from 25 vocational colleges were trained in construction-specific teaching as part of the program. This training exposed them to international building codes and provided practical experience using modern equipment which, when applied in the classroom, ultimately helped improve the marketability of the VEP graduates.

Also, as part of the VEP, major facility renovations and equipment upgrades were undertaken on behalf of the participating VECs. Relatedly, the course curriculum was approved by the Ministry of Education and Science (MoES) and industry representatives. In total, 6,400 instructor manuals were published and distributed to the 25 vocational colleges within Georgia. In many cases, according to a DoS Georgia Monitoring Program (GMP) report, these manuals represented the first curriculum update for vocational schools since Georgia was part of the Soviet Union.

Involvement of Private-Public Partnerships throughout the Project Cycle

As part of the program, AIR initiated and conducted market surveys in Spring 2010 to identify professions that were in demand and orient the program to fill vacant positions. The surveys showed that most available jobs were in Tbilisi, and that many businesses were unaware of the activities of local VECs. In response, AIR jointly began with the MoES an aggressive marketing and advertising campaign in national and local media. Job fairs were organized in Tbilisi, Kutaisi, and Kobuleti, television ads were aired, and a vocational college fair called "Georgian Education Week" took place in March of 2011.

AIR also encouraged public-private partnerships through workshops and roundtables with representatives of VECs and local business associations. This direct dialogue led to targeted internship opportunities and enabled the VECs to tailor their courses to meet industry demands. In addition, according to a former Khidistavi College teacher familiar with the VEP, all VECs established advisory boards that engaged with local businesses and acted as resources in encouraging them to hire VEC graduates. Advisory boards are still functioning at vocational colleges such as the one the Evaluation Team visited in Gori. They are assisting the colleges with curriculum development and student coaching, as well as maintaining contacts with local businesses.

Employment Service Centers

In order to increase the employability of graduates, AIR set up employment service centers in all colleges where VEP participants were being trained. The service centers included a special database for job seekers that created links to the private sector. For construction students, the centers also distributed 1,000 toolboxes containing gear that would allow graduates to act as independent contractors upon completion of their programs. In conflict-affected areas like Shida Kartli, graduates were also linked with the International Organization for Migration's Job Counseling and Placement program, which helped the VEP graduates in their job searches.

Vulnerable Groups

The program made a concerted effort to reach vulnerable groups, including IDPs and people with disabilities. AIR collaborated with the Union of Hearing Impaired to reach out to the hearing impaired individuals, which resulted in 48 of them graduating from the program. In the case of IDPs, the inclusion of the Khidistavi VEC in Shida Kartli was in part due to its proximity to the conflict-affected area where many of them live. Targeted information campaigns directed towards IDPs were conducted in the area to encourage participation in the courses.

Results

In July 2011, according to an AIR summary report, the VEP reported a total of 5,543 graduates – 4,723 in construction and 820 in tourism. Sixty-seven percent of trainees secured temporary or permanent employment. The VECs' engagement with the private sector also paid dividends.



Vocational Education Electrical Classroom, Gori

(Photo: Harold Lippman)

were familiar with the project have praised it and confirmed that it had been replicated by State employment offices in various municipalities across Georgia.

This was most notable in the case of a Shida Kartli business, Wood Services, Ltd, which offered internships to several Khidistavi graduates. Impressed with their performance, it later requested that an additional 19 VEC program participants be trained in steel fixing, formwork, and concrete pouring and gave all of them one-year contracts after graduation. In terms of the number of beneficiaries trained and placed at permanent or temporary jobs, the results of the project exceeded the original expectations. Beneficiaries told the Evaluation Team that they have improved their income and employment situation, while former government officials who

Job Counseling and Placement

The JCP project began in March 2010 and was completed in May 2012 as a follow-on project to VEP. This nearly \$3 million, 1207 Program-funded project was implemented by IOM. The project provided job counseling, referral services, educational training, and issued supplemental grants to new small businesses. The structure of the program was developed through interviews with both job seekers and businesses operating throughout Georgia. The JCP's key objectives were to provide: job counseling, referral, and outreach to employers; vocational education training for occupations in demand in the labor market; and, self-employment opportunities.

The project used two existing JCP centers in Tbilisi and Batumi and established five new regional offices in Gori, Kutaisi, Poti, Akhaltsikhe, and Telavi. Each center conducted outreach activities within their local community in order to connect job seekers to employment

opportunities. IOM also developed a database and supporting software that was available to both local businesses and individuals looking for work. In addition, as with the VECs, classrooms in schools and colleges in targeted areas were renovated and given modern equipment.

Each center was also responsible for conducting training sessions throughout the country. Much like with the VECs, the course curricula were influenced by the needs of the private sector. With the assistance of the MoES, IOM conducted three national labor market surveys to determine course content. JCP centers had regular contact with ongoing construction projects, as did the VECs. Program coordinators referred job seekers to vocational training programs and, after they had completed their training, to employers recruiting highly skilled workers. Meetings were held with stakeholders from the private and public sectors which, in turn, helped target the curriculum to meet the needs of employers.

Results

In IOM's final report on the project, the JCP is credited with benefitting a total of 21,477 participants, 7,085 individuals finding temporary or permanent employment, and 201 local businesses supported through grants. In the JCP center in Shida Kartli, located in Gori, there were 3,509 beneficiaries – 1,861 females and 1,648 males— and 695 of them were IDPs. Overall, through direct or post-vocational training, 5,473 individuals – 3019 females, 2454 males – including 656 IDPs, found employment.

JCP centers also had regular contact with the school rehabilitation and group home renovation projects implemented by CHF⁶ as well as vocational educational programs established by AIR. JCP coordinators referred job seekers to VEP vocational training courses and VEP graduates to various employers, including CHF contractors who were recruiting highly skilled construction workers. Also, as a result of meetings and presentations with business associations on JCP services and projects that focused on employment opportunities and job demand in different regions, hundreds of job seekers were placed in large and small companies throughout the country.

In the area of self-employment, the program supported a total of 201 local businesses, 41 of which were located in Shida Kartli. In this connection, the Evaluation Team met with a former Gori municipal official, who was responsible for coordinating employment related concerns. This source identified 2009 as a particularly difficult year for returnees from the 2008 conflict because of lack of opportunities in the region and, thus, the JCP was welcomed by local authorities. Indeed, the Gori local government supported JCP's outreach efforts and the business grant component by contributing 10 percent of the grant amount to each of the businesses funded in its municipality. Relatedly, the Team also spoke with a female IDP business owner in Gori

⁶ See related discussion below pp. 42 - 43.

who had received a \$1,000 self-employment grant through the JCP. She used the grant to purchase a freezer and other equipment and furnishings to help her start a bakery. According to her, the bakery has been successful; she has been able to expand the business and currently employs two other IDPs.

Rebuilding Schools and Municipal Infrastructure

Infrastructure Rehabilitation Activities

Large scale infrastructure rehabilitation activities funded by 1207 Program resources have

been implemented by CHF International and the Municipal Development Fund (MRD) of Georgia. Through an extension of its Georgia Employment and Infrastructure Initiative (GEII) and the ensuing BAVSHVI Program, CHF worked to renovate, rebuild and/or improve school buildings and housing for orphans, the disabled, and other vulnerable individuals. Similarly, in its Municipal Infrastructure Project (GMIP), MRD worked to rebuild, repair and/or improve municipal roads, irrigation works, and water and sanitation systems. For the most part, the three projects accomplished their overall objectives. In a few instances, the projects benefitted from innovative measures undertaken during their implementation processes. This alone can be viewed as a very significant result.

GEII School Rehabilitation Program

With the support of \$2.4 million in 1207 Program funds received pursuant to the June 2009 extension of GEII, CHF's School Rehabilitation Program (SRP) renovated, repaired, and upgraded 16 badly deteriorated and/or conflict-damaged schools in and around the Shida Kartli municipalities, Gori and Kareli. The SRP's overarching goal was to create a healthy learning environment for the students attending these schools. To accomplish this, two objectives were established: (1) improved physical conditions, including maximum use of appropriate, locally available, and energy efficient construction materials and techniques; and (2) improved access to better equipped learning environments. Although each school was different, the majority of the requests focused on roofs, windows, doors, floors, walls, painting, heating, and bathrooms. The rehabilitation work in the schools took place from September 2009 to March 2010, although the project was extended through September 2010 in order to complete an added water and sanitation component.

In some key ways, the manner in which SRP was implemented to pursue the program objectives was instrumental in delivering the results achieved. In this sense the innovative implementation mechanisms could be viewed as significant outcomes in their own right. Most notable in this



Gori IDP Bakery Owner With Prized Khachapuri

(Photo: Harold Lippman)

regard is the participatory methodology CHF used, that was modeled on the one it employed during its five-year experience with GEII. This highly inclusive and collaborative approach brought together diverse stakeholders – students, parents, teachers, administrators, community members and local, regional, and national government authorities – in a continuous process of consultation with and responsive decision-making by SRP staff. Key organizational units with members drawn from among these stakeholders included School Improvement Groups at the local level and School Improvement Working Groups at the municipal level. The former played a key role in: (1) prioritizing the rehabilitation and non-rehabilitation needs to be addressed in the target schools, and (2) participating in the management of project activities. The latter acted as the main coordination point for: (1) interaction with GoG authorities regarding school improvement projects, and (2) coordination of all school interventions in their areas.

Equally important were the extraordinarily thoughtful and comprehensive efforts made to develop a novel School Improvement Plan for each target school (see Annex F). The Plans were the end product of School Improvement Planning Working Groups. These ranged from 12 to 25 members in size and were comprised of school directors, teachers, administrators, students, parents, Board of Trustees members, and community representatives. The Working Groups, in concert with a unique survey of parents' views and attitudes, collected information on the communities, school performance, challenges faced, and areas for improvement. Reflecting these considered efforts, each School Improvement Plan includes an overview, school profile, parent survey results, strengths and weaknesses, vision statement, strategic aims and objectives, and prospective activities with specified goals, targets, and strategies. According to the introductory statement of the Director of the Karbi School, a rehabilitated facility visited by the Evaluation Team, its Improvement Plan:

“aimed to bring about the maximum usage of existing resources and raise[e] additional funds and seek outside investments, which is considered as...the best way to bring about an optimum learning environment. As the school has [a] small budget...the School Improvement plan was a really timely step...forward....”

Lastly, also featured among the SRP activities incorporating the CHF participatory approach were a stream of public hearings and other information-sharing efforts around complicated and culturally sensitive issues. For example, there were public hearings attended by community members, teachers, administrators, students, and parents on the environmental impacts of work being done in the schools, such as asbestos removal and disposal, and efforts being undertaken to mitigate any potentially harmful effects. According to CHF reports, 18 such public hearings were held, with more than 1,400 participants in attendance. In addition, there were numerous public meetings regarding the added project component on sanitation and hygiene. The latter involved subjects and issues about which little was generally known and/or understood and readily crossed over into culturally sensitive areas, such as indoor bathrooms versus customary outside structures.

Results

As indicated by the list of summary results prominently displayed in CHF's final report on the School Rehabilitation Program, SRP's accomplishments were impressive. Specifically, while successfully completing the rehabilitation efforts in the 16 target schools, the following were achieved:

- 3,328 students benefitted;

- 561 teaching, administrative and technical staff jobs were created;
- 218 classrooms were repaired;
- 16 schools School Improvement Plans were completed;
- energy efficient construction materials and techniques were used in all 16 schools;
- \$25,789 in voluntary community contributions were received;
- 246 local persons gained short-term employment; and,
- 2,749 students, teachers, parents, and community members received training.

Overall, according to the same source, all 16 communities surrounding the target schools as well as a total of 9,703 people benefitted from the SRP.

In its visit to the Karbi School and review of supporting documents in connection with that effort, the Evaluation Team found further evidence of the rehabilitation program's impressive accomplishments. In the same School Improvement Plan introductory statement cited above, the Director described the situation the school faced before the rehabilitation and what was achieved after its completion:



Karbi School

(Photo: Harold Lippman)

have a fully rehabilitated school that provides the conditions for the best learning environment, and one that has increased the motivation of both parents and teachers.”

“In snowy and rainy weather, water leaked into the building and damaged [the] school and its inventory. Broken and old windows made it impossible to keep warmth in the building. Due to this children often got ill and missed the lessons.... [E]lectricity and heating system[s] w[ere] also problematic issue[s].... [After the work] windows and roofs have been replaced, new electricity [and] heating system[s] ha [ve] been installed, toilets have been organized and the interior of the building has been rehabilitated.... [W]e now

In the Team's meeting with the Director, along with other school personnel whose tenure dated back to the time of the rehabilitation, she repeated the essence of what she had written more than five years earlier and backed up that comment with specific examples during a tour of the building. She pointed out, for instance, the changes that had taken place in the main hallway and refurbished classrooms, all of which were pictured in before-and-after photographs prominently displayed just inside the school entrance. She said that student interest and learning increased because the educational setting had been markedly improved by better lighting and comfortable temperatures in the classrooms. No longer, she added, did children “miss lessons” as they did before the rehabilitation because the classrooms and other parts of the building were so cold.

The rehabilitation process, she continued, also prompted increased parental interest in their children's education. Increased parental interest and improved student interest and learning, she noted, have continued to the present. Lastly, when asked about what happened with the School Improvement Plan, she responded that parts of it were still being followed. However, her answer also left the impression that it was no longer as relevant as it was at the time it was completed.

GEII BAVSHVI

BAVSHVI – the word for child in Georgian – was a \$12.9 million USAID-supported activity that included \$9 million in 1207 Program funds and took place between July 2010 and March 2012. Implemented by CHF, the project's overall goal had a dual focus: (1) providing enhanced learning opportunities and better living conditions for orphans and vulnerable children; and, (2) improving the short-term economic status of ethnic minorities, IDPs, and graduates of USG-supported vocational education (VEP) and job counseling/placement (JCP) programs. To achieve these ends, two objectives were established: (1) improving the physical conditions of approximately 50 schools and 25 small group homes, with maximum use of locally available and appropriate energy efficient construction materials; and, (2) increasing employment opportunities for ethnic minorities, IDPs, and graduates of the VEP and JCP programs. According to DoS and CHF periodic reports, BAVSHVI achieved its overall goal and objectives, although it did face serious challenges along the way in all three project areas.

BAVSHVI's school renovation efforts employed a similar but scaled down version of the approach CHF used in the SRP, which was being completed as it was starting. For example, as with the SRP, School Improvement Groups comprised of students, school administrators, teachers, parents, and community members were formed for each target school. In concert with CHF staff, the groups refined renovation priorities, identified potential cost share sources, and helped find local ethnic minority, IDPs, and other vulnerable individuals to work on renovation activities. In addition, there were improvement plans, although there are no indications in project documents that they were as comprehensive as those developed in connection with the 16 SRP schools. In the vast majority of cases, the renovations dealt with items such as: replacing floors, doors, and windows; dismantling, plastering, and painting ceilings; and, plastering and painting inner walls. Also, in the large majority of cases, clean combustion central heating systems were installed, asbestos-tiled roofs were replaced with corrugated sheet metal plates, and new toilet systems were installed.

BAVSHVI's original objectives called for the renovation of eight orphanages. However, during the project's early stages the GoG changed the state institution approach left over from the Soviet era to one based on a system of group homes housing a small number of children with live-in caregivers. Accordingly, the project's program description was amended to shift from renovating eight orphanages to renovating and furnishing 25 small group homes. The small group home renovation work involved much the same activities as the school renovation: replacing floors, doors, and windows; plastering and painting ceilings and wall-papering walls; and, installing new indoor staircases and electrical systems.

To increase employment opportunities for ethnic minorities, IDPs, and graduates of the VEP and JCP programs, CHF worked closely with the VEP and JCP's implementing partners, AIR and IOM, in a number of ways. In the case of VEP, CHF included a requirement in its bidding documents that BAVSHVI contractors hire semi-skilled graduates who appeared to be capable of and willing to work on the school and/or group home renovations. Similarly, CHF required a

minimum number of IOM clients to be hired by a winning contractor. In both instances, CHF promoted graduates and clients by making joint presentations with VEP management to bidders during the tender process and including JCP's program description and contact information in its bidding documents for contractors.

Results

As suggested above, 50 (two in Shida Kartli) public schools located largely in minority and geographically remote areas and 25 (six in Shida Kartli) small group homes were renovated successfully. In addition, according to CHF performance monitoring data, a total of 623 – 194 VEP, 429 JCP – graduates/clients were employed in some capacity on the school and group home renovations. Other summary performance data are also instructive:

Table 6: BAVSHVI Performance Monitoring Data

Performance Indicator	Target (LOP)	LOP
Number of individual students benefitting from USG-sponsored school repair projects	11,131	11,208
Number of orphans with improved living conditions	248	192
Number of people gaining employment as a result of project activities	3,800	4,623

Visits by the Evaluation Team to the renovated Metekhi School and Biliki group home, both located in Shida Kartli, provided added perspective on BAVSHVI's accomplishments. At the school, the Team toured the building and site and met with the Director, teachers, and others that were knowledgeable about the renovation. As with the Karbi School, pre- and post-renovation photos are prominently displayed near the building's entrance. The all-new wood flooring, wood doors, and energy-efficient windows and new ceilings and walls appeared to be in very good condition more than three years after the work was completed. In contrast to the Karbi facility, there were two new bathrooms with flush toilets and sinks, along with a central heating system.

Even more impressive, however, were some of the comments and observations made by the Director and her colleagues. She explained that the school building was more than 100 years old and had never undergone a full-scale renovation. Her description of its pre-renovation, deteriorated condition and the effect it had on the students was strikingly similar to what the Karbi Director had described: a learning environment continuously undermined by bad weather, leaks in the roof, walls, and windows, and overly cold conditions throughout the building. In her view, as the Director as well as a former Metekhi student, all this changed dramatically with the renovation. For instance, she explained that students' grades have improved, the students have won academic competitions, and the number of students that have enrolled in college has increased from none to more than ten. Perhaps most pointedly, she continued, a high number of parents that had chosen to send their children to a private school in a nearby town because of Metekhi's deteriorated condition and poor learning environment have reenrolled them there.

Lastly, two other important points were discussed during the meeting. First, the Director emphasized the high degree of parental interest and involvement during and after the renovation

project. For example, she noted that after a late-breaking decision was reached to undertake the renovation during the school year and no other suitable alternative could be found, parents held classes in their own homes. Second, she also recalled the key role that community meetings and committees (e.g., the above-mentioned school improvement groups) played in the renovation process. Some of the latter, she added, are still operating in some form today in connection with current projects under consideration, such as rehabilitating the building's front exterior and back yard.

At the Biliki group home, the Team was given a tour of the house and held a brief group discussion with the residents, caregivers, and a service provider manager. As described in the CHF progress reports: laminate and tile floors had been installed; doors and windows had been replaced; plastering, painting, and wall-papering had been done; an indoor staircase had been restored; and a new electrical system provided. The three-story house has five bedrooms, three bathrooms, a large kitchen, and full-size living room. Its capacity is 10 residents – two to a room – but at the time of the visit there were eight teenagers, two boys and six girls. Some of the residents had come from the orphanages, others from different circumstances. During the group discussion, all indicated that their present home was much better than where they had come from; two residents who had previously stayed in orphanages recalled the crowded conditions they had lived in. All of the residents go to school and will be able to stay in the home until they reach legal adult age. As noted in source documents, the home is embedded in a residential neighborhood in Gori, giving residents the opportunity to establish relationships and interact with the surrounding community.

Lastly, BAVSHVI's overall results are perhaps best captured in the following excerpts from a July 2012 commentary by CHF's President and CEO at the time:

“Until last year, the most vulnerable of Georgia's children lived in danger of falling through the cracks of a...system that placed children in need of state assistance in large, one-size-fits-all institutions...[where] the buildings were old and unclean, workers were undervalued, and children lived in overcrowded and unattended environments. For years, Georgian civil society organizations and children's advocates pressured their government to close these relics of the Soviet past and develop a better system [....]

Today, all 25 of the old institutions have been closed and all of the children have been returned to their families or relatives, or are living in brand new small group homes. As we completed the [BAVSHVI] program this spring...I was amazed at the difference that can be made in 20 short months. Children who once fell through the cracks of a crumbling system are now receiving dynamic, individualized care from highly trained specialists dedicated to their welfare. The change itself is also evidence of a civil society that has developed the capacity to demand better services and attention from its government for those who need it most, setting the example for the next generation of leaders.”

Municipal Infrastructure

After the events of August 2008, the USG allocated \$83 million for the GoG to use on various municipal infrastructure and development and IDP housing assistance projects. As part of this agreement, \$17.7 million – of which \$11.1 million came from 1207 funding – were designated for use in the Municipal Infrastructure Project (MIP) to be implemented by the Municipal Development Fund of Georgia (MDF) with Tetra Tech's oversight. The project began in

February 2011 and is scheduled to end in December 2015. Although the 1207 funding has been dedicated primarily to infrastructure activities in Shida Kartli, such as the rehabilitation of roads and improvements in water and irrigation works, the overall objectives of the MIP are to support economic growth and improve IDPs' livelihoods and living conditions,.

Results

The MIP is an ongoing activity and, therefore, it is not possible to completely determine whether its objectives have been met. That said, much has been accomplished by the project. For example, 21 kilometers (13 miles) of access roads throughout Shida Kartli have been rehabilitated in conflict-affected municipalities. Similarly, external water supply systems, drainage, shower and toilet facilities, as well as waste water treatment and collection systems in multiple Shida Kartli settlements have been rehabilitated, restored, or improved. It is anticipated that these improvements will benefit more than 12,000 IDPs.

Similar accomplishments could be observed in irrigation system activities, such as the rehabilitation of headworks in the Oni and Karbi municipalities and the main and secondary channels in the Tiriponi-Saltvisi canal system. Regarding these efforts, the Team spoke with Karbi school staff and learned that water and sanitation conditions have improved dramatically in their own and neighboring villages. As shown in the table below, it is expected that the rehabilitated irrigation systems will contribute significantly to improving livelihoods and enhance the agricultural capacity of conflict-affected rural populations and IDPs in Shida Kartli. It should be noted that an independent evaluation, conducted shortly after the end of the above-mentioned irrigation works rehabilitation activity, reported that the outcome represented a significant improvement over pre-project conditions.

Table 7: Effects of Rehabilitated Irrigation Systems

Number of beneficiaries receiving improved infrastructure service	Number of additional and improved hectares irrigated	Increased family/farm income
20,000 Households/farms (including 8,000 IDPs)	20,000 hectares	\$7 million (based on average added income \$350/ha/year)

Challenges

According to an MDF semi-annual report, during the irrigation system rehabilitation, there were problems with the quality of the products submitted by the company that was hired to assess the technical, economic, and social feasibility of the initial proposals for the target municipalities. These problems included insufficient time to prepare the required feasibility studies and the company's lack of experience working with USAID-funded projects. Due to the poor quality of the work and serious delays in implementation it caused, MDF formally requested that the company take corrective action at no cost to the project.

Security for IDPs

HALO Trust and the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) were the two primary organizations involved with clearing explosive remnants of war (ERWs) in the aftermath of the August 2008 conflict with Russia. HALO Trust immediate post-conflict clearing activities were concentrated in Shida Kartli and Abkhazia. NAMSA provided training in explosive ordnance disposal to units of the Georgian Army. Both organizations carried out their tasks successfully and accomplished the activities' stated objectives.

HALO Trust

HALO Trust is an NGO dedicated to the safe disposal of ERWs and has worked continuously in Georgia since 1998. After the August 2008 conflict with Russia, it was able to immediately start work on clearing ERWs in Shida Kartli and elsewhere. As part of a joint DoS/UNICEF effort, HALO received \$2.1 million in 1207 Program funding to clear ERWs in Shida Kartli (\$.9 million) and Abkhazia (\$1.2 million). HALO's initial efforts in Shida Kartli and elsewhere were highly successful. By the end of 2009 it had received an additional \$6.7 million for the clearance of landmines and ERWs throughout Georgia – \$4.3 million of which were used for operations in Shida Kartli.

Results

Following the conflict, HALO identified a total of 36 sites contaminated with cluster munitions and/or other ERWs. Of these, HALO worked on 29 sites, resulting in the removal and/or safe destruction of 1,762 cluster munitions and 2,032 other items of ordnance and the return of 3,400 hectares of land to safe, productive use. A total of 38,000 individuals were identified as direct beneficiaries of these activities.

As a part of its clearance activities, HALO also worked very closely with local communities. In Shida Kartli, for example, 179 schools in the cities of Kaspi, Gori, Khashuri, and Kareli were visited at least three times and over 30,000 children and teachers received risk education information. Risk education teams distributed leaflets and posters warning of the dangers of plowing contaminated land. Simultaneously, HALO clearance teams targeted land for spring wheat sowing. These activities were well received by the local population, as demonstrated in a quarterly report quote from a beneficiary:

“After the cluster strike I couldn't continue working on my land. There were many explosions around. I knew how dangerous they were and I was afraid for my children. Eight cluster munitions were found and destroyed on my land. 2008 was a very hard year for my harvest but after HALO's clearance I gained an extra \$400 from crops.”

Additionally, HALO worked closely with other NGOs, including those engaged in implementing 1207-funded activities, such as CNFA. CNFA initially used HALO's survey information to target its assistance and then worked with it to track the progress of clearance activities. Based on the tracking information, CNFA was able to direct its assistance, for example, to areas where ground intrusive work (primarily, plowing for wheat) could be conducted safely. Similarly, in areas that required sub-surface clearance of cluster munition contamination, CNFA was able to provide other types of support, such as orchard assistance. In this manner, CNFA was able to offer some type of support to almost every farmer in the region, which contributed to one of the region's best ever apple and wheat harvests. According to source documents, virtually all other

NGOs working in the Shida Kartli region at some point benefitted from HALO's work, either from information provided or by being able safely to implement projects on HALO-cleared land.

NAMSA – ERW Clearance Initiative

In the two years following the 2008 conflict with Russia, over 400 Georgians suffered severe injuries as a result of unintentional detonations of ERWs. In response, in October 2010 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) created the €3 million Georgia Explosive Remnants of War and Medical Rehabilitation Trust Fund to assist in the safe disposal of ERWs and provide needed medical assistance to affected areas. Through DoS/PM, \$500,000 in 1207 funds was contributed to this fund.

In early 2011, as part of this larger project, the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA) was selected to provide six months of training in explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) in a new ERW Clearance Initiative. The project budget of €500,000 included the above mentioned 1207 funds. Its objective was to provide Training-of-Trainer (TOT) instruction to soldiers in the Georgian Army Engineer Battalion, in accordance with internationally recognized standards for humanitarian mine clearance, battle area clearance, and large ordnance disposal. In March 2011, a group of 66 Georgian servicemen, ranging from relatively junior soldiers to senior NCOs and officers (including the EOD Company Commander), was transported by ANAMA to the Goygol Regional Training Center in Azerbaijan.

Results

All 66 soldiers went through the following components of the training program: basic de-mining, explosive ordnance disposal/battle area clearance, technical surveying, and operational verification/mentoring courses. Additionally, high-performing trainees were provided further training in methods of instruction, quality assurance, and site supervision. Of the 66 soldiers that participated in the training program, 10 failed to meet the required standards in the written tests, but all passed the practical tests. After completing the training, all participants were qualified as Battlefield Area Clearance operators, although only those who passed the written and practical tests qualified as EOD technicians. Eighteen months after completing the training, 54 of the 66 soldiers were still involved with the Georgian Army Engineer Battalion's EOD Company.

Police Support

Adding to previous and ongoing USG support for GoG efforts to reform its law enforcement agencies, INL's \$20 million, 1207-funded Police Support Program responded to the immediate need to assist the MoIA in rebuilding the operational capacity and physical infrastructure of the nation's police forces after the Georgia-Russia conflict. Specifically, the Program focused on strengthening the police forces to help:

- secure conflict-affected areas for those that had temporarily fled and IDPs who could not return to their homes;
- provide a safe environment for commercial activity; and,
- demonstrate an active patrol presence and investigative capacity to deter organized crime or militia activity in these same areas.

To this end, INL efforts were organized around an array of “commodity-based,” technical support and training activities, including: patrol vehicles, a national crime database, emergency communications, IT and radio packages, tactical gear, emergency data recovery, and training and

development. Overall, the intended objectives of these activities were accomplished. However, in contrast to the experience of virtually all the other 1207 Program IPs discussed in this report, INL encountered implementation delays that, in several instances, adversely affected its ability to achieve results within the anticipated timeframes.

Police Patrol Vehicles

To support the objective of assisting the police in displaying a visible, proactive, and effective presence in remote, mountainous areas affected by the 2008 conflict, INL donated 75 Toyota Land Cruiser four-wheel drive passenger vehicles and 25 four-wheel drive Toyota Hi-Lux 4x4 pick-up trucks with passenger cabs to the MoIA in December 2010. This donation was the key component of the overall \$3.52 million project that started in June 2009 and ended in March 2011. According to key DoS documents – End Use Monitoring reports, the Georgia Monitoring Project (GMP) Special Thematic Report, and 1207 Program progress reports – the new vehicles were used as intended and achieved most of the desired results. For example, as required by the performance measure calling for augmented patrol coverage, a majority of the new Land Cruisers were assigned patrol responsibilities in and around the conflict-affected areas in Shida Kartli. This was found to be the case in early 2012 when the GMP review team conducted its fieldwork.

As to the second performance indicator – improved response time – a senior MoIA official stated in an interview with the GMP review team that the Toyota vehicles typically reached crime scenes twice as fast as their predecessors in mountainous areas and off-road driving conditions. In addition, a small group of patrol officers based in Gori told GMP evaluators in an interview that the new vehicles had better engines, went through mud and water more easily, and were able to get to places that others could not reach. Similarly, during a “ride-along” with patrol officers near the border, the present Evaluation Team was told essentially the same thing, i.e., response time had improved with the Land Cruisers.

Lastly, while the GMP Review Team report raised questions regarding potential maintenance shortfalls over time, subsequent annual End Use Monitoring reports list all 100 vehicles as “operational.” Anecdotally, the veteran officers – 33 years combined experience – the Evaluation Team rode along with stated that vehicle maintenance is mileage based, with oil changes every 8,000 kilometers. According to the officers, the vehicle has been in service since early 2010 and at the time of our visit had registered 33,390 kilometers (20,747 miles) on the



Patrol Vehicle Near Administrative Boundary Line

(Photo: Harold Lippman)

odometer. Visually, the vehicle appeared to be in very good condition, with no visible signs of wear-and-tear damage such as dents and rust. The vehicle was not equipped with a Police Pad, the hand-held computer tablets that give patrol police and other law enforcement personnel access to the National Crime Database.

National Crime Database

This Project was an effort to further develop a nationwide crime database for the MoIA capable of being accessed by police, prosecutors, the Courts, and other ministries to share information on criminal histories and cases, missing persons, and vehicle registration. Funded at just under \$2.7 million, it began in June 2009 and ended in September 2012. As determined in consultation with the MoIA, the Project included several components to develop database capacity and accessibility:

- additional computers and software –about 170 on-board computers for patrol cars; about 200 fixed computer terminals for regional access; and, software licenses for security software, the administrative violations database, and the criminal history database;
- data center capacity upgrades to accommodate significant increases in user volumes; and,
- hardware, software and/or systems training and support for new users, including 800 police officers.

All three of the output-level project performance measures have been achieved: (1) at least 170 police vehicles have been equipped with on-board computers; (2) 800 police officers received training on the new system; and (3) data center upgrades to accommodate new users were completed. Regarding the fourth performance measure – expanded database access for police units nationwide – source documents provided by INL do not mention specific outputs or outcomes. The scant evidence the Team did obtain was provided in an interview comment by a MoIA official, that indicated that such expanded database access for police had taken place in the area of vehicle registration/driver licenses.

On the other hand, arguably stronger evidence that database access has expanded can be inferred from GMP Thematic Report discussion along these lines. For example, the report states that a key impact of the Database Project has been MoIA's use of the INL-provided technical assistance and training to develop the hand-held Police Pads mentioned above. These devices have been provided to investigators, neighborhood police, and patrol police for their use in connection with the Database. Additionally, expanded database access is the result of a new device developed by the Patrol Police that prints GPS-stamped tickets for traffic violators and enters the ticket data into database electronic records. Lastly, the report cites statements by investigators interviewed by the Review Team confirming that the database had made it much easier to track down witnesses directly or through contact with their families.

TETRA Emergency Communications System Expansion

TETRA (Terrestrial Trunked Radio) is an integrated communications system with a central dispatch facility at MoIA headquarters in Tbilisi that is tied into a national network. It enables police officers, as well as fire and rescue unit personnel around the country to receive emergency calls and respond more quickly via “one-click” radio access, especially in times of crisis or natural disasters. Phase I of TETRA's four phases was launched in 2003 and resulted in the establishment of five base stations in the Tbilisi and Gori areas, installation of 50 car-mounted radios, and distribution of 221 hand-held radios. The 1207 Program-supported \$6.5 million

expansion of TETRA continued the work completed in Phase I in three successive stages, Phase II, III, and IV, starting in June 2009. As of the Evaluation Team's fieldwork in early 2015, Phases II and III had been completed and Phase IV was expected to end by mid-2015.

While the multi-year TETRA Expansion has experienced substantial delays – primarily because of delays in the procurement process – the overall results achieved have been impressive and, in some cases, remarkable. Over the course of Phases II, III, and IV, for example, base station communications equipment has been installed at more than 70 communication tower sites throughout the country. The number of base stations has grown from five to more than a dozen, connecting the eastern and western parts of Georgia for the first time and, according to MoIA officials interviewed by the Team, providing coverage for more than 70 percent of the country's territory. Moreover, as the Team observed during a site visit at the MoIA, the central dispatch facility is operational and carrying out its intended functions. These accomplishments, it should be noted, exceeded the specified Project Performance Measures: (1) installation of six to eight new base stations to expand the geographic reach of the TETRA network and connect East and West Georgia; and (2) six to eight new base stations will be connected to the five existing ones in the Tbilisi and Gori areas.

The TETRA Expansion's results become less abstract when what happens at the operational level is described in practical terms. As one MoIA technical specialist explained during an interview, a system operator sitting at a central dispatch facility console can receive an emergency call and with "one click" patch-in the caller to the nearest police or ambulance contact. In the past, the best an emergency operator could do was answer a call and then tell the caller that s/he would call back to provide further information. This same source said that there are about 3,800 TETRA users and a minimum of 2,000 of them do so on a daily basis. In separate discussions, MoIA and INL sources brought up the example of TETRA's vital role in connection with the August 2014 landslide near Kasbegi, a town in a mountainous area adjacent to the border with Russia. TETRA central dispatch operators assisted with the mobilization of emergency vehicles and personnel to clear blocked roads and dispatch help to the injured and others in need, including drivers of 22 tractor trailer trucks trapped by the slide.

Police IT Package

This \$1.62 million activity specifically responded to the need to replace IT equipment stolen and/or damaged during the August 2008 conflict. The activity began in June 2009 and the core tasks were completed in June 2010 by delivering to the MoIA: 1,276 desktop computers; 100 laptop computers; 460 desktop printers; 136 network printers; and, 1,300 Uninterruptable Power Supply (UPS) units. About ten percent of the total funding was left over after the core procurement. This was used to purchase IT office systems equipment for police units located in conflict-affected areas around Gori, including the Administrative Boundary Line with South Ossetia.

Together these procurements met the requirements of the single Project Performance Measure: delivery and installation of PC workstations to replace equipment that was stolen and/or damaged during the August 2008 conflict and provide the police with sufficient IT capacity to carry out their law enforcement responsibilities. According to INL End Use Monitoring reports, the IT equipment "has been useful in supporting continuity of operations within the Ministry [of Internal Affairs] regardless of natural disaster and infrastructure limitations." Anecdotally, the

Evaluation Team observed some of the computers obtained from the IT package procurements in operation at the Gori District Police Headquarters.

Police Radio Package

The police force lost hundreds of radios during the August 2008 conflict, As such, the purpose of this activity was to purchase a mix of 600 high-end and medium-range radios. The Project started in June 2009, but the procurement was postponed later that year after the INL and MoIA officials agreed that the radios needed to be compatible with the TETRA system equipment that was to be purchased at a future date. By the time the requisite TETRA equipment purchases were made in 2013, followed by the radios procurement, a total of \$936,200 was spent. The 600 radios included a mix of Motorola high-end model XTS 5000 and medium-range units comparable to the XTS 3000 for shorter range daily operations.

Two of the three Project Performance Measures – radios replacement and increased police communication capability – have been met. Regarding the third Measure – improved response time – there are no references to this subject in either DoS 1207 Program reports or INL End Use Monitoring reports. Additionally, there is no information in these source documents that explains this Performance Measure.

Police Tactical Gear

This activity focused on replacing tactical gear for special weapons police team officers that had been lost or damaged during the 2008 conflict. The Project, worth \$240,290 and funded from 1207 Program resources, started in June 2009 and was still not completed as of late 2014. However, with the exception of the last two items, virtually everything else requested was delivered in November and December 2010 to the MoIA Special Operations Center team members in the cities of Zugdidi (Western Georgia) and Gori (Shida Kartli), as shown below:

Table 8: Tactical Equipment Replaced

Quantity	Description of Items
52	Gas mask carrier
52	Sets of ballistic leg protectors
52	Pairs of tactical gloves
52	Duty belts
52	Holsters
52	Double magazine pouches
52	Elbow pads
52	Knee pads
52	Boots (steel toe)
52	Tactical vests
52	Ballistic plates, Level III for vest (front, back)

The Project Performance Measures – delivery of tactical gear to outfit 50 officers and safe outfitting of officers engaged in tactical operations – have been met. According to a key INL source, the tactical equipment has provided the protection officers need to do their jobs, and has helped the MoIA in its role as the primary responder to threats from armed individuals.

Emergency Data Recovery System

The purpose of this \$3 million 1207 Program-funded project was to assist the MoIA and other GOG ministries, such as the Ministry of Finance, in developing the capability to continue to operate if their main servers become disabled or inaccessible during a time of conflict or natural disaster. This possibility loomed large during the August 2008 conflict with Russia amidst reports that key GoG buildings might be bombed. The MoIA's headquarters building in Tbilisi was evacuated and its personnel lost access to its servers. The MoIA had no back-up or recovery capability for its main server and had the building been attacked or lost power for an extended time, its system and the operations that depend on it would have shut down countrywide.

In June 2009, efforts began to establish an emergency data recovery system – often referred to as a Business Continuity Center. This system would automatically take over the functions of the main server in cases of server malfunctions. However, during the period April–June 2010, after a series of meetings INL held with Ministry staff, the MoIA requested that the national crime database and emergency data recovery center projects be combined into a single activity to ensure that the two systems would be compatible. With assistance from Embassy IT staff, INL developed a statement of work for the integrated activity and, over the next two years, an arduous procurement process was undertaken that ultimately led to the purchase and installation of the hardware and software needed to establish the MoIA Business Continuity Center. According to a senior MoIA official, the Center officially opened in a new building constructed to house it in September 2012. At about the same time, the integrated data recovery/criminal database activity came to a close. Project Performance Measures – a functioning data recovery system appropriately used – have been met, although the same MoIA official said that it has been tested but not fully activated in response to a serious threat or problem.

Police Training and Development

In the aftermath of the 2008 hostilities, INL and MoIA officials viewed police training and development as a key element in any ongoing effort to maintain stability in the formerly occupied areas close to the conflict zones. Accordingly, this project was intended to strengthen training for new police officers in diverse areas, including democratic policing skills, increased and proactive patrolling, effective communication with citizens, and tactical and investigative skills to deter and disrupt criminal activity. Supported by just under \$1.5 million in 1207 Program resources, the project began in June 2009 and, although impacted by a year-long funding delay, the large majority of courses and exercises were completed by the end of 2013.

According to DoS source documents, the earliest project-related activity provided tactical response training to police and first responders located adjacent to or near the ABL. Subsequently, a few months after the June 2009 arrival of a new senior policy advisor, two training needs assessments were completed between November 2009 and January 2010. However, the recommendations from these assessments and related ongoing deliberations were not incorporated into specific training activities until July–September 2010, when a total of eight courses were conducted, including: three on the new Criminal Procedures Code, two on M-4 rifle marksmanship, and two on crowd management. The next series of training activities,

conducted during the first part of 2011, consisted of two tactical rifle instructor courses and one course on responding to hostage, barricade, and active shooter situations. These were followed by a series of classes on domestic violence case investigation that began in February 2012 and continued throughout the year. Lastly, as described in the latest DoS 1207 periodic progress report, made available to the Team during the fieldwork, six crowd management courses and an added arrest team course were completed in September 2013. The report states that a total of 260 police officers completed the courses and were joined by 340 role players in three days of practical training exercises designed to test the participants' knowledge.

The Project Performance Measures, which consisted of training provided in areas such as tactical skills, criminal investigation, and policing in a post-conflict environment, have been met. This training and other training exercises were conducted, directly and indirectly benefitting thousands of police officers and other MoIA personnel. However, according to an authoritative INL source, the training program had one major drawback, in that many officers that had completed courses – e.g., tactical rifle training – are no longer with the MoIA due to political changes and other factors associated with high turnover.

Question 2: Takeaways and Lessons Learned

What are the takeaways and lessons learned, such as things that worked well or didn't, that would benefit any on-going programs or future stabilization initiatives?

Lessons Learned

1. Future post-conflict/stabilization initiatives in general – but, large-scale ones in particular – need to anticipate and plan for items such as increased personnel, specialized expertise, and technical equipment that will likely have to be deployed in relatively short timeframes for the assistance to be effective. In 2009, for example, tens of millions of dollars of 1207 funds were placed in one DoS Bureau's account, but there were just five staff at Post to coordinate and oversee their expenditure. According to a key Embassy staffer, this was on top of “the overwhelming training and development schedule that was underway that could not be ignored...” The result, he went on to say, was an “incalculable amount of undocumented overtime” on the part of the involved Embassy staff.
2. Capacity building for officials and staff at the national, regional, and local levels became an essential part of shoring up the GoG's limited ability at the outset to manage its response to the difficult and complicated situation in conflict-affected areas, such as Shida Kartli. In one way or another, this view came up in interviews with Embassy/USAID and IP officials and staff, as well as in source documents. For example, one Embassy source said, “the most important aspect of post-conflict recovery is to have a capable government in place” and the way to help bring this about is through capacity building. The essence of these views was repeated in comments by a former GoG regional official who was suddenly thrust in a position coordinating humanitarian assistance activities and found that it took weeks of on-the-job experience for him get up to speed. He said he wished at the time that there had been a “crash course” to help him with his crisis management responsibilities. In another case, a former IP emergency assistance official said the approach he used after the August 2008 war was to build capacity through on-the-job-coaching as he worked with GoG representatives in parallel with delivering assistance to IDPs. Relatedly, under lessons learned regarded as applicable over the life of the program cited in 1207

quarterly reports, DoS/PRM states, “enhancing the GoG’s capacity to manage IDPs is a key to enhancing protection and the establishment of durable [housing] solutions for IDPs.”

3. Cost sharing is an effective way to engage local government authorities and keep them involved in following through on project activities. One senior IP official cited the positive effects he had observed along these lines – e.g., the 15 percent cost-share provided by city governments in certain infrastructure rehabilitation activities – in overseeing the implementation of the New Economic Opportunities project. Similar views were expressed by another IP official, who mentioned a 10 percent cost-share provided by Gori government authorities in support of a job placement center located in one of its municipal buildings.

4. Flexible funding mechanisms that allow for funds to be adapted to changing circumstances and conditions can be an important asset for IP officials and staff. One Embassy source emphasized the importance of such flexibility in grants which, for example, allowed humanitarian assistance organizations to develop synergies in their activities and otherwise gave IPs room to determine how to get their work done. Similarly, a Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation official recalled that such flexibility played a significant role in addressing the controversy that unexpectedly arose in late 2008 over the issue of temporary versus durable housing for IDPs. In yet another example, a former emergency assistance worker mentioned the need for flexibility versus rigidity in funding documents, citing the example of his own organization’s strict requirements regarding fencing for plots of land or around houses.

5. The participatory approach used in the Schools Rehabilitation Project could well serve as a model for future projects where community involvement is viewed as a key feature of the implementation plan. This approach helped build community support for and trust in project activities by bringing together students, parents, teachers, administrators, community members, and government representatives in a continuous process of small group and public meetings and consultations with IP officials and staff. In this sense, it played a key part in the project’s successful completion and sustainable effects.

6. Being part of an overall assistance effort, which involved enormous sums of money focused on a small country, created problems for some IPs whose activities were supported by 1207 funds. As one key Embassy official succinctly put it, there was “too much money, too quickly with too few staff to implement the program” in his activity area. Emergency assistance IP officials expressed similar frustration. One of these sources said his organization got so much funding that where it came from was “a blur.” He repeatedly used terms like “so much assistance, so much overlap, and over-saturation with assistance” to describe the situation he observed at the start of the recovery phase of the overall post-conflict effort.

7. Location of IDP settlements are thought to have had unintended consequences. Embassy and IP sources, as well as IDPs, believe that over the years more remote settlements have suffered the effects of significantly fewer job and other related economic opportunities than their counterparts located nearer to population centers. While to the best of its knowledge there is no documentation that supports this contention, the Team’s impression from visits to more remote settlements, such as Khurvaleti, and ones located close to a population center, such as Karaleti, is that there may well be some merit to it and, therefore, a matter worthy of further consideration.

8. The absence of 1207 program performance management (PMP) and monitoring plans and other related reporting guidance has been consequential. In the larger sense, it is not possible to compare actual to intended overall program results because no performance indicators were

established to enable such a comparison. Nor, as is acknowledged in the August 2014 Embassy accomplishments and lessons learned summary,⁷ was there any formal public strategy document that could have served this purpose. At the project level, moreover, this has allowed reported results to go unquestioned that have been based on estimates that, for example, correlate increases in farmer household incomes with project activities without taking into account other factors, such as weather, that cannot be isolated.

Things That Worked Well

Food-for-work/cash-for-work (WFP) – helped IDPs to be engaged, productive, and involved with helping themselves and their communities, while at the same time being a source of badly needed income. FFW/CFW efforts helped improve water supply to nearly 29,000 hectares of land; increase the utility of more than 180 hectares of agricultural land; and, construct or rehabilitate 27 km of potable water pipeline.

Anti-parasite treatment (FAO) – anti-parasite treatments before and after distribution of animal feed were intended to ensure that the cattle were parasite-free during feeding. In turn, this ensured good nutritional intake during the feeding period and reduced the chance of re-infection upon return to pasturelands and mixing with other cattle. By increasing the number of cattle treated in the Shida Kartli region, the risk of re-infection was significantly decreased. More than 38,000 animals were treated, representing 78 percent of the total estimated number of cattle in the region.

Electronic vouchers (CNFA/GAARP) – the magnetic strip, bank card-like voucher that enabled eligible IDP farmers to purchase necessary agricultural tools and supplies for their orchards. The cards were issued in the name of each individual beneficiary, had an expiration date, and could not be sold. The voucher card worked so well that it became a model for and is still being used by the GoG for other government programs and activities.

Farm machinery services (CNFA/AMP) – the 21 farm machinery service centers (MSCs) established under the AMP project were intended to address countrywide shortages of agricultural machinery, such as tractors, plows, and other farm implements. The MSCs purchased 82 tractors and 235 implements, provided services, such as planting and harvesting, to 16,539 small-scale farmers, and served more than 30,000 hectares of agricultural land. Estimates of increases in small-scale farmers' annual incomes as a result of MSC services range as high as \$6.1 million over the life of the project.

Disposal of explosive remnants of war (EMWs) (HALO Trust) – HALO teams cleared and returned a total of 3,400 hectares of land to safe, productive use by removing and/or safely destroying 1,762 cluster munitions and 2,032 other items of ordnance. A total of 38,000 individuals were identified as direct beneficiaries of these activities. All NGOs working in Shida Kartli at some point benefitted from HALO's work, either from information it provided or by being able to safely implement projects on HALO-cleared land.

⁷ *Georgia: Accomplishments and Lessons Learned from Implementation of the U.S. \$1 Billion Aid Package to Georgia Six Years After the Georgia-Russia Conflict*; DoS Cable, 14 TBILISI 1870, Aug 05, 2014.

School improvement Plans (CHF/SRP) – the extraordinary end-product of a highly inclusive and collaborative process conducted during the rehabilitation of 16 public schools in Shida Kartli. School staff, students, parents, Trustees, and community members worked together to develop the Plans, which included: an overview, school profile, parent survey results, strengths and weaknesses, vision statement, strategic aims and objectives, and future improvement activities. The Plans played a key role in the schools’ rehabilitation and immediate post-rehabilitation improvement efforts, although it is unclear how many are still actively being used.

Increased employment opportunities (CHF/BAVSHVI) – as the result of a concerted effort among CHF, AIR, and IOM, hundreds of graduates/clients of the VEP and JCP programs obtained short-term employment in BAVSHVI project school and small-group home rehabilitation activities. In the case of VEP (AIR), CHF included a requirement in its bidding documents that BAVSHVI contractors hire semi-skilled graduates who appeared to be capable of and willing to work on the school and/or group home renovations. CHF also required a minimum number of JCP (IOM) clients to be hired by a winning contractor.

Things That Didn’t Work Well

Unwanted settlement buildings (UNHCR) – bathhouses were built in several IDP settlements that did not provide any benefit to residents, after being constructed over their objections. Residents made it clear to those in charge of the construction that there was not enough water available to supply the bathhouses and still provide for basic needs in their individual cottages. At the time of the Team’s visit to the affected settlements some of the bathhouses remained completely unused, while others were serving as a medical clinic or storage facility.

Land documentation (APLR) – initial interest was high among IDPs on the idea of verifying and registering properties they were forced to abandon during the conflict. However, as hope faded that they might be able to return to their homes, the level of IDP interest declined accordingly. A senior APLR official alerted Team members about the likelihood that if interviewed IDPs would likely be unenthusiastic about the claims registration effort. This proved to be the case; the IDPs the Team spoke with were dismissive or disinterested in having just a piece of paper. Nevertheless, the APLR official summed up the situation by noting that while IDPs are understandably dissatisfied with mere paperwork, the fact remains that there is “hard data that has accurate information on what someone owned, if this issue is ever addressed/resolved in the future.”

Disabled access (CHF/BAVSHVI) – because there were no standards or local design templates and very little tradition of providing for disabled access, during the early part of the project contractors were forced to implement ad-hoc solutions, resulting in questionable deliverables. USAID staff responded by providing detailed architectural solutions, but it was not reported how much this helped. Judging from comments made by a CHF official regarding school rehabilitation activities, disabled access requirements apparently raised questions there, too. In the context of a discussion on helping communities follow up on activities after the project is completed, the official mentioned the need to change attitudes toward people with disabilities. A

view expressed by some had been, disabled access “was imposed on us;” prompting the official to ask if it is possible to change peoples’ mind-set in just eight or nine months.

Design-build contracts (MDF) – design-build contracts can provide significant cost and schedule benefits to a project, but require prior experience and, ideally, that the engineers and contractors have worked together before. Such proved not to be the case with local contractors who reportedly “lack[ed] the capacity to execute these innovative contracts in any meaningful sense.” In the case of a number of important irrigation projects this resulted in major delays and contractor disputes.

Question 3: Program requirements

A. Did the funded agencies fulfill the requirements of the 1207 Program as a unified reconstruction and stabilization program with specific implementation guidance and reporting requirements?

B. Did the 1207 funds keep their identity as a stand-alone program or were they subsumed into other initiatives?

The answers to this two-part question are based on a review of relevant source documents, key informant interview discussions and, most importantly, the previously described mini-survey questionnaire sent to more than 60 potential respondents with direct knowledge of 1207 Program activities. In answer to question A, the evaluation found that the funded agencies did fulfill 1207 Program requirements. In the case of question B, the summary finding is that, in some instances 1207 funds kept their identity while in other cases they were subsumed into other initiatives. The evidence in support of these findings is presented below.

Funded Agencies/Requirements Fulfilled

In answering question A, the Evaluation Team first consulted with DoS/CSO to clarify the meaning of the terms “funded agencies” and “uniform.” According to CSO staff, “funded agencies” refers to USAID and the Bureaus of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM), International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), and Political Military Affairs (PM). The term, they added, does not include the more than dozen NGO partners that implemented the projects supported by 1207 funds. The term “uniform” was more difficult to define, but after some thoughtful exchanges, the CSO staff and the Evaluation Team agreed that the meaning is captured in the phrase “diverse, comprehensive, and mutually reinforcing.”

Next, the Team turned to the task of identifying the appropriate criteria to determine whether or not the funded agencies had fulfilled the 1207 Program requirements. The handbook, *1207 Guidance* (January 2010), developed by the 1207 Selection Committee – comprised of senior DoS, USAID, and DoD officials – was a key source for developing the appropriate criteria.⁸ The handbook describes 1207 Program guiding principles, roles and responsibilities, and monitoring/reporting requirements. Among the seven guiding principles, two are important to mention here: (1) programs should reflect a whole-of-government perspective following wide

⁸ Additional source documents consulted were the FY 09 Program (Project) Proposals for: *Meeting Priority Food, Shelter, and Livelihood Requirements for Internally Displaced Persons in Shida Kartli*; *Support for Effective Governance Through Economic Revitalization of Post-conflict Georgia*; and, the *Police Support Package*.

consultation in the field and Washington; and (2) programs should be clearly linked to overall USG strategic and policy goals. The monitoring/reporting requirements include performance management tools, reporting guidance, and “action item” deliverables, i.e., monitoring plan, quarterly report, year-one narrative report, and final report. According to DoS/CSO staff, however, because 1207-supported activities in Georgia began in late 2008, nearly 18 months before the reporting requirements were published in the handbook, the monitoring plan and year-one narrative report were set aside. This left the quarterly reports as the only requirement that has been met over the past five-plus years, along with a final report that is scheduled to be done once all 1207-supported activities are wrapped up some time later this year.

Using the guiding principles and reporting requirements as the basis for comparison, the next step was to identify the corresponding actions undertaken by the funded agencies. For example, the Evaluation Team found that the funded agencies routinely contributed updated information on their projects to the 1207 Program quarterly reports filed initially with S/CRS and later CSO in Washington. The first quarterly report was submitted by the Embassy’s 1207 Coordinator on May 1, 2009 and succeeding editions have continued without interruption through February 1, 2015. Similarly, a virtually endless stream of Embassy/USAID documents – including but not limited to 1027 program proposals, Embassy/USAID strategic plans, action memos, activity approval packages, internal committee and working group records, and GMP reports – point to the routine observance of/conformance with the whole-of-government and strategic policy goals and other 1207 guiding principles.⁹

However, perhaps the strongest evidence to support the findings comes from the results of the evaluation mini-survey questionnaire item: “Did involved USG agencies – USAID, INL, PRM, and PM – fulfill the requirements of the 1207 Program as a unified reconstruction and stabilization program with specific implementation guidance and reporting requirements?” Thirty-five of the 62 respondents in the sample answered the question and 30 (86 percent) answered “yes,” none said “no,” and five (14 percent) replied that they “did not know.” In other words, the finding is, while respondents either agreed or did not know, no respondent stated that the involved USG agencies failed to fulfill the 1207 Program requirements. Further evidence in support of these findings appears in comments provided by respondents:

“All agencies contributed to quarterly reports. All implementation was done in accordance with the requirements.

I felt there was good coordination among the interagency [working groups and committees] at post about general assistance funding, including 1207 funding, and we

⁹The other guiding principles are: countries/regions should demonstrate a high or increasing risk of violence, state failure or regional instability, neglect of which could impact U.S. national security and policy interests; countries/regions will be selected based on inter-agency consensus that providing 1207 resources can address root causes of conflict or strengthen local sources of resilience, thereby diminishing the probability of U.S. military intervention, reducing possible stress on U.S. forces or decreasing the space for activities that may threaten U.S. national security; activities will only be funded if they address urgent or emergent issues and could not, therefore, be considered for funding through the normal annual foreign assistance budget request or appropriations process; countries/regions selected should face urgent or emergent risks or threats or immediate reconstruction and stabilization emergencies that can be measurably impacted through the allocation of a one-time injection of 1207 funds; and, projects should be designed to leverage host government and local contributions and participation where possible and appropriate.

met regularly (once a month) and also filed quarterly updates on our progress implementing projects with 1207 funds.

As I recall from reporting at the time, implementers of the 1207 funding used it and other funding in an integrated manner to address the most important issues facing Georgia in the aftermath of the war.”

Funds Identity – Stand-alone or Subsumed

To answer question B, the Evaluation Team started with an analysis of the 16 projects supported by 1207 funds to to: (1) identify possible classification categories for the projects and, (2) categorize the projects. From the first of these activities, three categories of projects were identified: (i) extensions of activities initiated before the August 2008 conflict; (ii) activities where 1207 funds were combined with other revenue sources; and (iii) activities where 1207 funds were the sole source of support. The Team’s subsequent effort to determine the number of projects that fell into each category yielded the following results: extensions (3); 1207 funds combined (8*); and, 1207 funds sole source (7*).¹⁰

In the Team’s view, it is reasonable to conclude that when funds were combined, they were “subsumed.” Sole source funds can be viewed as being “stand-alone.” The data suggests that, in half (8 out of 16) of the projects, the 1207 funds were “subsumed,” while in just under half (7 out of 16) of the other projects, the 1207 funds can be viewed as “stand-alone.” Therefore, the answer to the question is: “yes,” on both accounts. In some instances 1207 funds were stand-alone and in others they were subsumed.

These conclusions and the analysis on which they are based are supported by the mini-survey questionnaire results obtained from respondents on the identical question: “To the best of your knowledge, did the 1207 funds keep their identity as a stand-alone program or were they subsumed into other initiatives?” Thirty-four of the 62 respondents in the sample answered the question, 14 (41 percent) answered *the funds kept their identity as a stand-alone program*, 9 (27 percent) answered *they were subsumed into other initiatives*, and 11 (32 percent) replied *don’t know*. In addition to these quantitative indicators, the following comments offered by the respondents are equally useful:

“...The 1207 funds accomplished much, alongside other funding streams. The programs were at times distinct, at times merged with other initiatives. They became part of a broader strategy, but with relatively distinct implementation. To ensure the sustainability of some of the programs, baseline program funds kicked in. What program is completely stand-alone? How would that be a good thing?

It was not a requirement for 1207 funds to keep their identity. The recipients don't care what funding stream is used to provide assistance. Why would we dilute the USG or USAID brand with 1207 branding? The designation of 1207 funding should only be for D.C. to track its funding sources and reporting requirements. Outward facing, it should be known as aid from either [the] USG or USAID.

¹⁰ The asterisk indicates that each of these figures includes a further breakdown of data within the extension category; i.e., the number of funds combined (1) and the number for sole source (2). This also explains the difference between the total number of projects supported (16) and the total for the three categories (18).

We were emphasizing that it was the part of [the] one billion [dollar] support fund, but we never noted that it was under 1207. Generally, it should be remarked that USAID and USG were understood [by]...most beneficiaries as one entity. Personally, I do not recall that we were deliberately indicating that it was USG 1207. There was not any notion or informed agreement about it.”

CONCLUSIONS

As administered by USAID and DoS/INL, PRM, and PM, 1207 funds clearly served their intended purpose and, equally important, did so in a manner consistent with the guiding principles regarding their use established by the 1207 Selection Committee. The evidence, as described at length in the answer to evaluation question number one, overwhelmingly demonstrates that 1207 program support helped “meet the large scale needs of the Republic of Georgia...following the 2008 conflict with Russia.”¹¹ Without exception, the nearly two dozen projects that received 1207 funds accomplished their stated objectives or, in those few cases where their activities were still ongoing, had already achieved significant results.

The evidence is equally compelling that the 1207 funds were administered and used in accordance with the program’s guiding principles. For example, 1207-supported projects were supposed to have involved a “whole-of-government” approach by integrating initiatives across multiple sectors. The Team found that this was often the case in the post-conflict projects in Georgia, such as the joint efforts on the part of CHF, implementer of the BAVSHVI schools and small-group homes rehabilitation project, and AIR and IOM, implementers of the vocational education (VEP) and job placement (JCP) projects, respectively. The result of this coordinated effort was the short-term employment of hundreds of VEP graduates and JCP clients – some of whom were IDPs – by BAVSHVI project contractors. It was also clear that 1207 funds were used in accordance with guiding principle language stating that such funds were meant to address “urgent or emergent risks or threats or immediate reconstruction and stabilization emergencies.” This was particularly applicable in 1207 funding support of the diverse activities in the immediate post-conflict period undertaken by UNHCR, FAO, and the WFP.

Notwithstanding these noteworthy successes, it is important to point out that the \$100 million in 1207 funding committed and spent¹² was part of the USG’s overall \$1 billion aid package and was in effect at the same time that an additional \$4.5 billion in assistance was committed by other bilateral donors and multilateral organizations. Thus, while 1207 program support clearly was associated with the formidable accomplishments described above, it was also a small part of an enormous amount of the post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization funding brought to bear in Georgia’s behalf. In other words, for example, there almost always was other donor funding directly mixed in with or surrounding 1207-supported projects, such as the one carried out by UNHCR. In that case, the \$9 million in 1207 program support was part of a \$35 million assistance fund that came from the U.N.’s 2008 “Georgia Crisis Flash Appeal.” Not incidentally,

¹¹ Evaluation SOW, p. 2.

¹² As of the end of 2014, the actual amount was \$95.6 million.

this enormous amount of funding was an expressed concern among some key informants the Team interviewed. One of them, for example, repeatedly used words like “overlap” and “over-saturation” in describing the situation he observed in 2009, while another said there was “too much money, too quickly” and insufficient staff to implement the activities the funds supported.

Finally, there are the perhaps confusing findings in response to evaluation question number three. Most particularly, the evidence suggests that in some cases 1207 funds kept their identity in a “stand-alone” sense, but in others were subsumed into other initiatives – the ratio was about evenly divided. Moreover, aside from Embassy/USAID officials and staff and a smattering of senior IP and GoG personnel, the Team found that virtually no one at the activity level knew or, one might argue, had any reason to know that their activity was all or partly funded by 1207 program support. At most, they might have been aware that the funding was from the USG and/or USAID since, according to one IP emergency assistance official, USAID branding is known to be a prominent part of its projects. These cross-currents are perhaps best captured in the comments cited earlier by the mini-survey respondent who stated that: it was not a requirement for 1207 funds to keep their identity; recipients do not care what funding stream is used to provide assistance; and asked what benefit there would be in diluting the USG or USAID brand with 1207 branding. In the end, it remains to be seen if the stand-alone/subsumed identity issue will be deemed a matter for further consideration by DoS/CSO and/or the 1207 Review Committee.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The experience with the 1207 Program in Georgia suggests that there is room for improvement in planning for and initially responding to future post-conflict situations in general, and large-scale ones in particular. In the case of Georgia difficulties arose at the outset and, in some instances continued on well into program implementation, in the areas of personnel, specialized expertise, and technical equipment. As noted in the first of the lessons learned above, the small number of staff of a key Embassy office responsible for tens of millions of dollars of 1207 funds was overwhelmed by the task they faced in coordinating and overseeing their expenditure. Additionally, there was the typical complicating factor that many of these initial needs had to be met within accelerated timeframes. Accordingly, DoS/CSO and/or the 1207 Review Committee should consider the development of appropriate procedures – possibly in the form of an amendment to the *1207 Guidance* or other such documentation – to better enable those responsible to respond to post-conflict/stabilization situations and assure that necessary staffing and resources are in place as quickly and sustainably as possible.

2. In most, if not all, cases government agencies of countries selected to receive 1207 program funds are unlikely to possess sufficient capacity to manage emergency humanitarian assistance and other urgent needs effectively. According to a number of sources the Team spoke with – including a former GoG official – this lack of capacity was a serious issue in the aftermath of the 2008 conflict with Russia. This same source was the one who said he wished there had been a “crash course” he could have taken as he assumed his crisis management responsibilities. Accordingly, DoS/CSO and/or the 1207 Review Committee should consider the idea of having

some kind of capacity building “toolkit” available for immediate use upon a country’s selection as a recipient of 1207 program funding.

3. Performance management (PMP) and monitoring plans should be a “no-exceptions” requirement for all 1207 country programs, since without them there is no systematically sound way to track progress (or lack thereof) in achieving project objectives. Nor is there a basis for comparing the situation at the start of a project with what it may have achieved by the end. While there were understandable reasons why the decision was made to forego the specified reporting requirements in Georgia’s case, the latter situation of having no basis for comparing the program’s start and end points is what occurred. The implications in this regard were acknowledged in the Embassy’s *Accomplishments and Lesson Learned* summary, which stated that, “in hindsight, a formal, public strategy document would have been useful for comparing actual to intended results and telling the USG story to the public.” Even better would have been the required PMP.

ANNEX A: STATEMENT OF WORK

DoS Bureau of Conflict Stabilization Operations (CSO) 1207 Program Evaluation: Republic of Georgia

- **DESCRIPTION**

The requirement is for an evaluation of conflict stabilization programming in the Republic of Georgia, funded via the “1207” mechanism in FY 2008 and 2009, following the conflict with Russia. See Section D for more details on “1207” funds.

- **NATURE AND PURPOSE**

This evaluation is being conducted to assess whether the full set of 1207 activities implemented through INL, PM, and USAID achieved their stated objectives. The evaluation should also help to extract lessons learned to guide decisions regarding future stabilization initiatives, whether funded by 1207 monies or through other means. Due to the large amount of funding involved, a third party evaluation specialist(s) will be hired to conduct the evaluation to help ensure its independence and objectivity.

The target audience for the evaluation is the 1207 Review Committee, comprised of CSO, F, INL, USAID, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Joint Staff. In addition, the evaluation will be further disseminated among EUR/ACE, PM/WRA, implementing agencies, program implementers, international partners, including other donors, and relevant representatives of the Government of Georgia, and Georgian NGOs and private sector.

- **BACKGROUND**

The August 2008 conflict with Russia had major economic, social, and political consequences for Georgia that needed urgent addressing to stabilize the country, restore previous economic gains, and increase public confidence in democratic governance. Donor support was considered critical to Georgia’s recovery. According to a UN-World Bank Joint Needs Assessment, the conflict resulted in the weakening of investor, lender, and consumer confidence; a contraction of liquidity in the banking system; stress on public finances; damage to physical infrastructure; and increased numbers of IDPs. With the economy weakened, Georgia faced a large budget shortfall just as private sector investments were drying up and rising social needs placed greater demands on the treasury. Construction, real estate, retail and tourism—all key sectors for economic growth and tax revenue in the pre-war boom—were particularly hard hit.

The donor community responded to these identified needs in a coordinated fashion and the USG was the largest bilateral contributor to the recovery effort. The 1207 funding to Georgia, while large in terms of 1207 programs, represented just a portion of the billion dollar commitment of USG assistance delivered to Georgia in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 conflict.

In Fiscal Years 2008 and 2009, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), now subsumed within the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO), provided a total of \$100 million (\$50M each year) in 1207 funds to the U.S. Agency for

International Development (USAID), and the State Department's Bureaus of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) and Political Military Affairs (PM), to meet the large scale needs of the Republic of Georgia (ROG) following the 2008 conflict with Russia.

The \$100 million package represents the largest amount of 1207 funding ever awarded to a single country. The 1207 funded programs were targeted at providing economic and humanitarian assistance to large numbers of IDPs, rebuilding damaged public infrastructure, and strengthening the capacity of the police to prevent and respond to increasingly high incidents of crime in conflict affected areas.

In summary, the \$100 million funded three large lines of effort:

Fiscal Year 2008

1. Meeting Priority Food, Shelter and Livelihood Requirements for IDPs in Shida Kartli (\$30 million)
2. Strengthening Police Capacity (\$20 million)

Fiscal Year 2009

3. Rebuilding the Operational Capacity and Physical Infrastructure Necessary to Provide Security to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) Returning to their Homes (\$50 million)

• **GENERAL 1207 INFORMATION**

With conflict and instability watch lists at the time identifying roughly 60 countries that were at risk of conflict within the next two years and nearly half of recovering countries falling back into conflict within a few years, there was a pressing need for the United States to engage in conflict prevention activities around the world in order to establish long term stability and security. Congress responded to this need by enacting Section 1207 of the Fiscal Year 2006 National Defense Authorization Act, which authorized the Secretary of Defense to transfer up to \$100 million per fiscal year, through FY10, to the Secretary of State to fund whole-of-government strategies, and civilian agency-led activities that address reconstruction and stabilization risks which, if neglected, could negatively impact U.S. policy and security interests for the provision of civilian-led reconstruction, security and stabilization assistance. In general, 1207 programs are meant to quickly respond to emerging crisis or to respond in countries emerging from crises, outside of the Federal budget cycle. As the funding is for no-year money, programs continue to be implemented with remaining funds under this authority.

CSO is the chair of the interagency 1207 Committee, which reviews and approves the conflict-focused programs. CSO also serves as the 1207 Secretariat, monitoring project implementation and adherence to program goals. In its role as committee chair, CSO serves as an honest broker of proposed interventions

• **PROGRAM DESCRIPTIONS**

As mentioned, the \$100 million in 1207 funding invested in three key areas:

Program One: Georgia Food, Shelter and Livelihood Requirements for IDPs

Fiscal Year: 2008

Funding: \$30 million

Funded Agencies: USAID, State/PM

Implementers: World Food Program (WFP), UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Association for Protection of Landowner Rights (APLR), UN Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs (CNFA), American Institutes for Research (AIR), NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) -- now named the NATO Support Agency (NSPA), and Global Communities.

This program consists of nine components, all targeted at assisting IDPs:

1. *Food (\$5M)*—Implemented by the World Food Program, the funding was to provide an adequate food supply for 30,000 IDPs throughout the 2008-09 winter.
2. *Shelter (\$9M)*—Implemented by UNCHR, the funding was intended to provide temporary shelter and winter supplies for up to 12,000 long-term IDPs, as listed in the UN Flash appeal following the conflict.
3. *IDP Property Registration (\$.5M)*—Implemented by APLR, the program was to register up to 2000 houses that were to be purchased by the Government of Georgia (GoG) for IDP resettlement; provide satellite mapping and registration of South Ossetian lands lost by IDPs; and digitize property records and establish secure data storage.
4. *Winter Crops (\$2M)*—The program, implemented by CNFA, was to provide seed and fertilizer for 12,000 hectares of farming land.
5. *Winter Livestock Maintenance (\$5.5M)*—Implemented by FAO, the funding was to provide fodder for up to 10,000 head of livestock during the winter, help ensure an adequate supply of water, and establish an agricultural sector coordination and advisory unit to coordinate donor funded recovery activities targeted at the agricultural sector.
6. *Community Needs Grants Program (\$4M)*—Implemented by a number of US NGOs, the program was to support grants in up to 100 villages that suffered damage during the conflict. The grants would be used to meet the priority needs of the communities but were expected to be targeted at increasing access to irrigated water, road and school repair, purchase of farm tools, and rehabilitation of utilities for water, electricity and heating.
7. *School Rehabilitation (\$2.7M)*—Implemented by Global Communities, the program was to rehabilitate 16 schools in the Shida Kartli region (Kareli and Gori municipalities), including the installation of water and sanitation services.
8. *Vocational Education (\$3.5M)*—the program implemented by AIR, was to provide 2-4 months of vocational training in the construction trades to 2,000 IDPs.
9. *Demining (\$.5M)*—Implemented by NAMSA, this component was to train 66 members of the Georgian Army Engineer Battalion to conduct demining and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) activities following international standards, provide advanced Train the Trainer (TOT) training to Georgian Army soldiers in survey and site management, information management, quality assurance and quality control, methods of EOD instruction, and provide needed EOD equipment.

Program Status: All activities were completed by the beginning of FY 2010.

Program Two: Police Support

Fiscal Year: 2008

Funding: \$20 million

Funded Agencies: State/INL

Support to the police was provided to secure post-conflict areas for safe and orderly return of IDPs, provide a safe environment for commercial activity and demonstrate an active patrol presence and investigatory capability to deter organized crime and militia activity. The Letter of Agreement (LOA) signed between the USG and GoG provided that any equipment donated under this program shall be subject to verification and monitoring for compliance in accordance with the terms outlined in the LOA. The monitoring of the equipment provision is to be contained in an annual global reporting requirement for all posts with INL-funded activities.

The police support package of equipment and training was to consist of five components:

1. *Emergency Data Recovery (\$3M)* – During the August 2008 conflict with Russia, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MOIA) headquarters building in Tbilisi was evacuated based on reports that the Ministry and other key government buildings were being targeted for aerial bombing. The main data server for the MOIA is located in the headquarters building and supports all MOIA operations nationally. Once the building was evacuated, MOIA personnel did not have access to the servers, and were forced to make haphazard tapes to store at their homes in case of data loss. If the headquarters building had been targeted or even suffered an extended power loss, MOIA's system would have shut down nationally. The MOIA had no back-up or recovery capability for its main server. An emergency data recovery system would automatically take over in case of damage to the main server and would be operational within 30 minutes to one hour for the most critical applications. Personnel working from locations outside the HQ would continue to operate normally and HQ personnel could access the system from any remote terminal. The Ministry had plans to develop an alternate secure workplace for headquarters employees, either separately or co-located with the data recovery system. This type of system is often referred to as a "Business Continuity Center (BCC)" as it allows for a nearly seamless continuity of operations requiring most critical data. As a matter of national security, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) is interested in using some capacity of the MOIA system for protection of their most critical data, including Customs and Revenue, and tax data. The MOF also had no back-up capability. Loss of these applications could potentially shut down the banking system in Georgia, as well as preclude any Customs clearances at border areas or tax and revenue collection. While this system was not designed to house all of the MOF's data, some capacity could be used to accommodate the most essential data to allow for continuity of critical operations. This data recovery system was meant to complement INL's National Criminal Database project by backing up that data plus other critical data that any government ministry would have – personnel records, statistical information, accounting information, and all e-mail and internet capability.

2. *Vehicle Replacement (\$3.5M)*—A mix of 75 off-road passenger vehicles and 25 pick-up trucks with a passenger cab were to be provided for use in the former “buffer zones” to provide for the secure and successful return of IDP’s, and resurgence of commercial and agricultural activity. The specific models selected by the MOIA (Toyota Landcruiser 78 and Toyota Hilux Pick-up) were chosen for durability in mountain terrain with poor road conditions. MOIA has some of these models currently in its fleet and is thus familiar with the maintenance requirements. Vehicles are to be provided with blue and white “police” graphics painted on the exterior for patrol in the Gori region, and the former “buffer zone” areas and environs. The vehicles were designed to allow for a more visible and proactive police presence in the former “buffer zones.”
3. *Police Equipment (\$2.8M)*— Radios: Due to damage, looting and theft, the police lost hundreds of radios. Now more than at any other time, communication among the police and other first-responders is critical. The mountainous terrain and of the operating environment and distance between population centers requires a higher end model radio. The police had used the Motorola XTS 3000, which was then phased out and replaced by the new generation XTS 5000. Because of the high cost of this model and the necessary accessories, the budget allowed for a mix of the high-end model 5000s and a medium range radio comparable to the XTS 3000 for shorter range daily operations.

Tactical Gear: The police have been historically under-equipped with tactical equipment, compromising officer safety. The budget proposed the basic gear needed per officer engaged in tactical operations.

Computer workstations/printers: Due to damage, looting and theft, IT equipment was an urgent requirement for the police. Additionally, the increased presence and operating requirements of the police in the Gori region necessitate quantities beyond simple replacement of lost equipment.

4. *Criminal Records Database and Emergency Communications System (\$9.2M)*— A nationwide criminal database was to be developed for the MOIA with capability for access by the police, prosecutors, other ministries and the courts to share critical information on suspected and convicted criminals. The project to develop the database included data on vehicle registration, administrative violations (AVIS) (a wide variety of violations from drug offenses to petty theft) and criminal histories (CHD). This information was not accessible to police outside the Tbilisi area.

Further developing the accessibility and capacity of the system included three requirements as determined in consultation with MOIA:

1. *Additional Computers and Software:*

- Approximately 170 on-board computers for existing police cars
- 200 fixed computer terminals for regional access (including Gori)
- Software licenses for administrative violations database (AVIS), criminal history database (CHD) and security software

2. *Data Center Capacity Upgrade:* Existing software licensing and main backup infrastructure at the data center needed to be upgraded to support the large increase in user numbers. The upgrade of the main servers and patrol police data center would then be able to reliably support computing and backup needs of new and existing users.

3. *Training and Support for New and Existing Users:* With the addition a large number of new computers and users (2-4 policemen per shift, per car/computer) to the existing system, approximately 800 police officers needed training and support as new users. Hardware, systems and software support needed to be provided in a live 24/7 operational schedule. Existing help desk and warranty support needed to be expanded. A larger stock of hardware spare parts and increased software engineering capacity was required to have immediate capability to fix ongoing software errors/bugs and other technical problems in a 24-hr operating environment.

In addition, a new emergency communication system was to be installed to connect East and West Georgia. The project aimed to expand TETRA (communications switch) to connect East and West Georgia, offering a true national network beyond then-current project plans for Tbilisi region and environs (USG project via INL funds). This other project was in a phase-one completion state at the time of the request for 1207 funds: five base stations had been installed in the Tbilisi area and one in Gori -- however, these stations are not interconnected. Further development of that ongoing project using regular INL funds included installation of a communications switch to interconnect the base stations. The additional 1207 funds were meant to expand the network to base stations in 6-8 new locations. During the conflict the communications capability was cut since Gori is in the center of the country. Interconnectivity of all 13 base stations and the associated hardware, equipment and training would offer the Georgians a viable emergency communications system to vastly improve law enforcement capability, especially in times of crisis.

5. *Training (\$1.49M)*— Police in the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL) region, and those responsible for responding to incidents in the ABL region, were provided tactical response training because of the level of violence targeting law enforcement on the ABL. The Georgian government outfitted officers with shoulder-fired weapons (civilian versions of the M4 battle rifle) without adequate training so the funds were used to provide instructor training for these officers. Additionally, money was used to provide training on tactical response for the various first responders along the ABL. Finally, funds were used to provide domestic violence training for first responders along the ABL.

Bolstering training for law enforcement officers was seen as key to maintaining stability in the formerly occupied areas close to the conflict zones. At the time, training for new police officers was 6 weeks at the national police academy. Following this, officers received the bulk of their training on the job. Old habits and methods of policing are being handed down from experienced officers to the new generation. The INL training project intended to emphasize democratic policing

skills; increased, proactive patrolling; effective communication with area residents; and tactical and investigatory skills to deter and disrupt criminal activity.

Additionally, as the police academy sought to expand its curriculum, the basic and in-service training requirements of officers was to be re-evaluated in the post-conflict context and a comprehensive training program developed and implemented. A new senior police advisor, with skills and experience in post-conflict environments was to spearhead this effort.

Program Status: As noted in 1207 funding quarterly reports submitted by Embassy Tbilisi, most of the equipment and training under this program has been delivered. However, some additional police training, police equipment purchases, and a secure communications equipment procurement are ongoing and are expected be completed by the end of 2014.

Program Three: Georgia Economic Revitalization and Stabilization

Fiscal Year: 2009

Funding: \$50 million

Funded Agencies: USAID, State/PM, DHS/Customs and Border Protection (CBP)

Implementers: Global Communities, CNFA, International Organization of Migration (IOM), Chemonics, and Tetra Tech.

The program consists of five components:

- *Shida Kartli Region Recovery (\$12.3M)*—Implemented by CHF and CNFA, the program was to support individuals and communities affected by the conflict to rebuild their livelihoods by reestablishing agricultural production and maintaining household livestock in Shida Kartli region, which is the area's primary means of income generation. The activity was to provide seed and plowing services for 20,000 hectares of land, helping 16,000 households and generating an estimated \$28 million in harvest revenue. The ability to earn income and raise crops would enable individuals affected by the conflict to return to their villages instead of staying in shelters or relocating to Tbilisi in search of employment.
- *Employment and Vocational Training (\$7.355M)*—The estimated \$1.5 billion that was to be invested by donors in post-conflict reconstruction was expected to result in a demand for skilled workers in the construction sector, which are in short supply in Georgia. The activity was to support training of approximately 20,000 Georgian workers to fill job opportunities created by post-conflict reconstruction projects as well as secondary support industries through rapid, intensive courses that directly meet the needs of employers. Expected results were that the graduates of the training programs would be placed in paid apprenticeships with construction firms within two years of graduation. The activity was to be closely coordinated with the European-community funded vocational education program that is focusing on policy level interventions such as developing national training standards.
- *Rebuilding School and Municipal Infrastructure (\$25.771M)*—A total of \$9.221M was allocated to rehabilitating fifty schools in ethnic minority and geographically remote areas, as well as locations where IDPs were housed after the August 2008 conflict. The

school renovation activity was to be closely coordinated with the vocational education program to ensure graduates of USG-funded construction training have opportunities for employment in the renovation of schools. The remaining \$16.55 million was dedicated to municipal infrastructure projects in those regions most affected by the conflict and those which are home to IDP populations. Over a two-year period the activity was to assist municipalities to implement high-priority development projects identified in their economic plans. The activity was to be coordinated with other international donors, the Ministries of Regional Issues and Economic Development, local government officials and community leaders. Local governments were to be encouraged to engage citizens in the selection and monitoring of projects through transparent and inclusive mechanisms. The activity was expected to benefit up to three million people living in eleven regions in Georgia.

- *Displaced Persons Resettlement Assistance (\$1.558M)*—This activity was to cover payments to utility companies that provided electricity, water, and gas at no cost to the IDPs under a deferred billing arrangement with the GoG. In addition, technical assistance was to be provided to the GoG to help them incorporate new IDPs into existing social safety net programs. Electricity and water was to be provided to 7,200 IDP households and gas for 2,900 IDP homes over approximately four months.
- *Security and Unexploded Ordnance (\$3.016M)*—The program consisted of surveying and clearing landmines and explosive remnants of the war (\$2.144M) and restoring operations at the Poti Coast Guard base, and the Radar Station at Anaklia (\$.872M). The ordnance removal was to involve surveying and clearing landmines, cluster munitions, and other unexploded ordnance in areas affected by the 2008 and 1992 conflicts. Clearance of these areas would prevent casualties and allow for the safe return of displaced persons. During the conflict, the Poti Coast Guard Base and Anaklia radar station suffered from damaged or stolen equipment, supplies, furniture and infrastructure which was to be replaced with 1207 funding.

Program Status: All activities were completed by the end of January 31, 2014, except for the development of municipal infrastructure.

- **EVALUATION QUESTIONS**

The evaluation will address the following questions:

1. Did the three programs achieve their objectives? If not, why not?
2. What are the takeaways and lessons learned, such as things that worked well or didn't, that would benefit any on-going programs or future stabilization initiatives?
3. Did the funded agencies fulfill the requirements of the 1207 program as a unified reconstruction and stabilization program with specific implementation guidance and reporting requirements? Did the 1207 funds keep their identity as a stand-alone program or were they subsumed into other initiatives?

- **EVALUATION DESIGN AND COLLECTION METHODS**

EUR/ACE invested \$2M in the Georgia Monitoring Project (GMP) for the \$1B U.S. commitment to Georgia following the war. The evaluation occurred between June 2010 and May 2012. Reports can be found at <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/ace/gmp/>. In addition, several of the afore-mentioned USAID projects have undergone evaluations or audits (list and links below – many of these documents are available in USAID's Development Experience Clearinghouse at

dec.usaid.gov). These existing reports, and any others the implementing partners have produced to-date, should be utilized during the course of the evaluation.

Agricultural Mechanization Project (AMP) – completed, performance evaluation (http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pdacy464.pdf); Municipal Infrastructure Project (MDF) – planned for September 2014, performance evaluation; Strengthening of Childcare Services and Systems (SCSS) – completed under GMP; Social Infrastructure Project (SIP) – completed under GMP; Georgia Vocational Education Project (GVEP) – completed under GMP; Nursing Vocational Georgia Monitoring Project I Education Project (NVEP) - completed under GMP; Georgia Agricultural Risk Reduction Program (GARRP/CNFA) – covered by GMP Shida Kartli evaluation; Livestock Fodder (FAO) – covered by GMP Shida Kartli evaluation; and School Rehabilitation Project – a rigorous performance assessment completed by USAID’s Inspector General (<http://oig.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/audit-reports/2-114-12-005-s.pdf>).

The evaluation will apply a mixed method approach, relying on a number of sources of information, including:

1. Background on the 1207 program and Georgia 1207 program documents (eg. program proposals, program designs, performance reports, evaluations, grant and contract agreements, and Letters of Agreement with the GoG) and other relevant documentation held by CSO, INL, PM, USAID, EUR/ACE, GoG, implementing partners, and other stakeholders.
2. Interviews with key informants in Washington, DC, and in the field, such as CSO, USAID, INL, PM, EUR/ACE, U.S. Embassy, USAID mission, GoG, targeted municipalities, implementing partners, and others who were involved in the design, coordination, implementation, monitoring, oversight, evaluation or management of the programs.
3. Interviews and/or surveys of targeted beneficiaries such as IDPs, residents of targeted municipalities, and graduates of the vocational training and police training programs to solicit their general views of the assistance and the impact that it had on their lives, institutions, and communities.

Methodological Limitations: As some of the key informants of USAID, INL, implementing agencies, and others who were involved in the 1207-funded Georgia programs may have moved on to other positions and may not be accessible, the information gathered through interviews may not reflect as comprehensive a perspective of the programs as desired. Locating key Georgian beneficiaries and informants to interview may prove the most challenging given the time that has elapsed between today and when most activities were completed.

The contractor should also submit additional potential limitations specifically linked to its proposal, as part of its proposal package.

- **EVALUATION TEAM**

The evaluation team should include one senior evaluation expert who shall design the evaluation, serve as team leader and guide writing of the evaluation report. The individual should have:

1. At least 10 years of field experience in program evaluation, including experience evaluating conflict prevention and mitigation efforts.
2. Graduate degree in social sciences, skilled in research design, and quantitative and qualitative methods, including process-tracing.
3. Experience working with State, USAID, other USG agencies, host-country governments, NGOs and other international donors.
4. Should understand the internal State policy-making process

The evaluator should partner with a local Georgian firm to assist with the field portion of the evaluation. At a minimum, one Georgian mid-level evaluator should be on the team to assist with field research, data analysis and writing. The individual should have:

- A. At least 3 years experience leading or participating in evaluation studies
- B. Graduate degree in social sciences or equivalent experience
- C. English proficiency
- D. Proficiency with MS Office Suite Programs

It is understood that the contractor will use staff at other lower levels to assist with research, data analysis, and writing to keep costs reasonable to the USG.

One State/CSO staff member from the Office of Learning and Training. This individual will travel to Georgia with the team to assist with the evaluation and facilitate interactions with representatives of the USG, other donors, NGOs, host-country government and other key personnel. The cost of this individual will be borne by CSO.

• **DELIVERABLES**

1. Detailed draft evaluation design plan and work plan
 - a. The design should include key questions, methods, main features of data collection instruments, and a data analysis plan.
2. Presentation of final evaluation design plan (design and data collection instruments will require CSO approval)
3. Brief on DC-based portion of evaluation
4. Video teleconference with CSO to discuss Georgia activities
5. Draft report
6. Final report
7. The evaluator shall also be prepared to provide a sixty minute briefing to members of the 1207 Review Committee following submission to CSO of the final evaluation report.

• **EVALUATION REPORT**

The Final Evaluation Report shall be no more than 40 pages in length, double-spaced, Times-Roman 12 Font, plus annexes. The report is to contain the following elements:

- A. Executive Summary (maximum 3 pages)
- B. Table of Contents

- C. Introduction
- D. Scope and Methodology
- E. Analysis
- F. Findings
- G. Conclusions
- H. Recommendations
- I. Annexes:
 - a. SOW
 - b. List of documents reviewed
 - c. List of Individuals Interviewed and contact information
 - d. Interview and Focus Group Questions
 - e. Survey Instrument(s) and Responses/data
 - f. Signed written disclosure of conflict of interest from all team members and optional statements of difference..

- **PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE**

The Total Project Period of Performance is 4.5 months from date of task order award. Workweeks while in the field will be Monday through Saturday, with no premium pay. The evaluation is expected to begin in September 2014.

- **ACTIVITIES**

Activity	Description	Completion Time
Activity #1	Initial meeting with CSO	Within 3 working days following Notice to Proceed from Contracting Officer
Activity #2	Preparation	Within 10 working days after completion of Activity #1.
Activity #3	Presentation to CSO of detailed evaluation design and work plan and instruments	<i>On last day of Activity #2.</i>
Activity #4	CSO comments on design and plan and instruments	Within 3 days after completion of Activity #3
Activity #5	Presentation of final evaluation design and work plan and instruments	<i>Within 2 days after completion of Activity #4</i>

Activity #6	Data collection in Washington, including document review and interviews	Within 15 working days after completion of Activity #5.
Activity #7	Discussion with CSO on Washington findings and preparation for field research	<i>On last day of Activity #6.</i>
Activity #8	Travel to Georgia (approx. 3 weeks of travel will be allowed in Georgia)	Within 2 working days after completion of Activity #7.
Activity #9	Data collection in Tbilisi	Within 6 working days after completion of Activity #8.
Activity #10	Video teleconference with CSO to discuss Georgia activities	<i>On last day of Activity #9.</i>
Activity #11	Travel to Shida Kartli Region	Within 1 working day after completion of Activity #10.
Activity #12	Data collection in Shida Kartli Region	Within 9 working days after completion of Activity #11.
Activity #13	Travel back to Tbilisi	Within 1 working day after completion of Activity #12.
Activity #14	Travel back to Washington	Within 2 working days after completion of Activity #13.
Activity #15	Analyze data and write draft report	Within 20 working days after completion of Activity #14.
Activity #16	Submit draft report to CSO	<i>On last day of Activity #15.</i>
Activity #17	CSO feedback on draft report	Within 5 working days after completion of Activity #16. (<i>Contractors not paid in this period</i>)
Activity #18	Submit final report and present key findings to CSO and 1207 Committee.	<i>Within 5 working days after completion of Activity #17.</i>

- **SCHEDULING AND LOGISTICS SUPPORT**

The evaluation team lead (or organization to which employed) is responsible for hiring the local evaluator, making all travel arrangements (international and local), furnishing all necessary supplies and equipment, and obtaining work space in the field. U.S. Embassy Tbilisi will not provide logistical support, but staff will be available for interviews as needed. Country clearance will be required for travel to Georgia; please work with the assigned contracting officer's representative in CSO to facilitate. Visa applications should be filed with maximum lead time as possible, as processing can take a month or longer. Travel inside of Georgia will need to be coordinated with the security officer at the Embassy via the CSO evaluation point of contact.

ANNEX B: WORK PLAN




EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
AND WORKPLAN
1207 Program Evaluation: Republic of Georgia

Evaluation Methodology and Workplan

December 08, 2014

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This document was produced for the Department of State by Development and Training Services, Inc. (dTS) and Management Systems International (MSI).



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I. BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

The dTS team is tasked with conducting an evaluation of conflict stabilization programming in the Republic of Georgia, funded through the “Section 1207” mechanism¹³ in Fiscal Years 2008 and 2009. The purpose of the evaluation is to assess whether the full set of 1207 program activities implemented through the Bureaus of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) and Political Military Affairs (PM) and USAID achieved their stated objectives.¹⁴ The evaluation is also intended to extract lessons learned from its findings and conclusions to help inform the decision-making process regarding future conflict stabilization initiatives. The 1207 program activities to be examined fall into three areas:

- providing internally displaced persons (IDPs) with food, shelter and livelihood requirements;
- police support; and,
- economic revitalization and stabilization.

BACKGROUND

The five-day war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 killed hundreds, left thousands of IDPs in temporary shelters, and brought relations between Russia and the United States to their lowest point since the end of the Cold War. Centered in the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the conflict resulted in substantial damage to the country’s infrastructure and displaced 192,000 ethnic Georgians, approximately 30,000 of whom were still displaced a year later. In addition, the conflict resulted in: the weakening of investor, lender, and consumer confidence; a contraction of liquidity in the banking system; and, stress on public finances. Two months after the end of the conflict, the World Bank and European Commission chaired a donor Joint Needs Assessment Conference in Brussels to enlist support for Georgia’s post-conflict recovery. Pursuant to this effort, the U.S. pledged one billion dollars of humanitarian assistance, \$100 million of which were 1207 funds.

¹³ Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2006 (P.L. 109-163) provided authority for the Department of Defense (DOD) to transfer to the State Department up to \$100 million per fiscal year in defense articles, services, training or other support for reconstruction, stabilization, and security activities in foreign countries.

¹⁴ DoS/CSO documents also mention the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (EUR), Offices of Assistance to Europe and Eurasia (EUR/ACE) and Caucasus Affairs and Regional Conflicts (EUR/CARC); Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM), and the Georgian Border Security and Law Enforcement Assistance Program (GBSLE).

In keeping with Congressional intent, 1207 program funds were meant to address situations that could not be dealt with by conventional forms of foreign assistance. Projects were to be short-term and coordinated with longer-term development efforts and other U.S. security-building programs. The 1207 programs were to involve a “whole-of-government” approach by integrating initiatives across multiple sectors. Once completed, it was expected that they would be assumed by host country governments or other donors. Program requirements also stipulated that proposals for specific activities be developed by Embassy country teams for submittal through the Ambassador to the relevant DoS regional bureau.

Because 1207 funds have been available for obligation without fiscal year limitation, program activities have continued for varying lengths of time since they began in Georgia in 2008. All of the IDP-focused activities were completed by the end of 2010, but some of the police support activities are still ongoing. Most of the economic revitalization and stabilization activities were completed by the end of January 2014, although support for the development of municipal infrastructure is on-going.

As indicated above, the 1207 program activities under review in this evaluation fall into three areas: food, shelter and livelihood requirements for IDPs, implemented through USAID and DoS/PM; police support, implemented by DoS/INL; and economic revitalization and stabilization activities, implemented through USAID and DoS/PM.¹⁵

Food, shelter and livelihood requirements for IDPs (\$32.7 million)

Food (\$5 million), World Food Program;

Shelter (\$9 million), U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR);

IDP Property Registration (\$.5 million), Association for Protection of Landowner Rights (APLR);

Winter Crops (\$2 million), Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs (CNFA);

Winter Livestock Maintenance (\$5.5 million), U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO);

Community Needs Grants Program (\$4 million), CNFA and other U.S. NGOs;

School Rehabilitation (\$2.7 million), Global Communities (CHF);

Vocational Education (\$3.5 million), American Institutes for Research (AIR);

De-mining (\$.5 million), NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA).¹⁶

¹⁵ The Department of Homeland Security/Customs and Border Protection supported the restoration of operations at the Poti Coast Guard base and Radar Station at Anaklia, a 1207 program activity not encompassed by this evaluation.

¹⁶ Now called the NATO Support Agency (NSPA).

Police Support (\$20 million)

Emergency Data Recovery (\$3 million), DoS/INL;

Vehicle Replacement (\$3.5 million), DoS/INL;

Police Equipment (\$2.8 million), DoS/INL;

Criminal Records Database and Emergency Communications System (\$9.2 million), DoS/INL;

Training (1.49 million), DoS/INL.

Economic Revitalization and Stabilization (\$50 million)

Shida Kartli Region Recovery (\$12.3 million), CHF and CNFA;

Employment and Vocational Training (\$7.355 million), , International Organization of Migration (IOM);

Rebuilding School and Municipal Infrastructure (\$25.771 million), CHF, Tetra Tech;

Displaced Persons Resettlement Assistance (\$1.558 million), Chemonics

Security and Unexploded Ordnance (\$3.016 million), Halo Trust.

OBJECTIVES

The overarching goal of Section 1207 programming in Georgia was to: meet urgent needs; help the country stabilize in the immediate aftermath of the war with Russia; maintain public confidence in democratic governance; and restore economic gains enjoyed prior to the war.

Pursuant to this overall goal, three objectives were established for FY 2008:

Objective 1 – provide food assistance to IDPs during the winter;

Objective 2 – provide winterized shelter for up to 12,000 long-term IDPs in the Shida Kartli region; and,

Objective 3 – provide assistance to rebuild the livelihoods of IDPs living in or returning to homes in the Shida Kartli region.

For FY 2009, five objectives were established:

Objective 1 – provide assistance in the Shida Kartli region (phase two);

Objective 2 – provide employment and vocational training in construction trades;

Objective 3 – provide assistance to rebuild schools and municipal infrastructure;

Objective 4 – provide assistance for IDPs to resettle; and,

Objective 5 – provide security for IDPs.

To assess the overarching goal and its corresponding FY 2008 and 2009 objectives in terms of the evaluation purposes described above, the following

questions specified in the Task Order's Statement of Work (SOW) will be addressed:

- Did the three programs achieve their objectives? If not, why not?
- What are the takeaways and lessons learned, such as things that worked well or didn't, that would benefit any on-going programs or future stabilization initiatives?
- Did the funded agencies fulfill the requirements of the 1207 program as a unified reconstruction and stabilization program with specific implementation guidance and reporting requirements? Did the 1207 funds keep their identity as a stand-alone program or were they subsumed into other initiatives?

II. METHODOLOGY

The evaluation team is comprised of Harold (Hal) Lippman (Team Leader), Konstantine Peradze (Local Evaluation Expert), and one or two yet-to-be hired local assistants. The Team has been assembled to conduct an evaluation of 1207 conflict stabilization programming in Georgia after its 2008 war with Russia. The evaluation will determine whether the various activities implemented pursuant to this effort achieved their objectives and elicit lessons learned to inform decision-making regarding future conflict stabilization initiatives.

APPROACH

The Team will employ a mixed-methods¹⁷ approach, a flexible, industry-standard evaluation approach that utilizes a variety of available sources to provide information about program design, implementation, management, and sustainability. Typically, mixed methods include, but are not necessarily limited to: document reviews, key informant interviews, focus groups, group discussions, and in-person observation at activity sites (e.g., reconstructed/rehabilitated schools, new settlements, vocational training centers, etc.). Information and data obtained through these qualitative tools will be augmented by a yet-to-be determined number of electronic mini-surveys of program beneficiaries. The mixed-method approach is intended to generate qualitative and quantitative information and data on program activities and outcomes, including:

- The effect of expedited food, shelter, and livelihood assistance on IDPs in the Shida Kartli Region;
- Results of employment/vocational education and training efforts;
- The effects of police training, new equipment (e.g., vehicles, radios), and upgraded/expanded emergency communications systems;
- Results of school rehabilitation/reconstruction activities; and,
- Improvements in municipal infrastructure.

¹⁷ Also known as Rapid Appraisal.

PRE-FIELDWORK/ FIELDWORK

The pre-fieldwork in Washington commenced immediately following the October 22, 2014 post-award initial dTS Team meeting with concerned DoS/CSO staff. Subsequent to this meeting, the Team Leader worked with CSO and INL staff to develop an introductory letter/e-mail requesting the cooperation of all concerned USG agencies and implementing partners. Given the large number of the latter – four USG entities and 11 IPs – and the correspondingly large number of documents to be obtained and initial contacts made, this letter/e-mail has been playing an important role in the pre-fieldwork phase of the evaluation. Documents obtained and/or requested include program proposals and designs, quarterly and annual reports, grant proposals/contract agreements, final evaluations, performance management plans (PMPs), Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs), Letters of Agreement (LOAs), activity schedules, and tracking information.

At the same time, key informant interviews (KIIs) utilizing an initial list of questions based on those posed in the SOW have been or will be scheduled and/or conducted in-person, via conference call or Skype. Respondents have been selected on the basis of their current or prior direct knowledge of and/or involvement in the administration, oversight, and/or implementation of the 1207 Program activities under review. Among those interviewed or to be interviewed are present and former DoS CSO, INL, PM, EUR/ACE, Georgia Monitoring Program (GMP), and implementing partner staff. (see Annex E) In concert with the ongoing gathering and review of key source documents, the interviews conducted have served as the basis for the development of this work plan.

* * * * *

The Team presently anticipates conducting the fieldwork in Georgia from around January 12 through January 31, 2015. The work undertaken in this three-week period will be completed by the Team Leader and the Georgia-based evaluation specialist, supported by local research and/or administrative assistants. As soon as possible after arrival in Tbilisi, the Team Leader will organize a team building meeting with the local team members to discuss the proposed work schedule and clarify individual roles and responsibilities. The Team will then have its orientation meeting with Embassy and USAID staff to go over the evaluation purpose and objectives, review the work plan, and obtain their advice and input regarding potential key informants, activity sites to be visited, and any contextual issues or concerns that might affect data collection.

The venues for the fieldwork will be in Tbilisi and Gori (the Shida Kartli Region), with about two-thirds of the time tentatively allocated for work in and around the latter and one-third in the former. As this work plan is being prepared, it is uncertain how these estimated blocks of time will be broken down. Since the distance between Gori and Tbilisi is about 50 miles (an hour – hour-and-a-half by car), it is possible some work will be accomplished in daytrips. It is also possible that the work schedule will be best accomplished by one or more overnight stays in

Gori. It is unlikely that this matter will be resolved fully until after the Team Leader's arrival in Georgia.

In Tbilisi, the primary focus will be on the police support initiatives implemented by DoS/INL, in cooperation with the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MOIA). The information gathering and research in this regard will rely on a mix of KIIs with current and former MOIA officials and affected staff (e.g. beneficiaries of training and material assistance) and structured observation of the emergency data recovery system, vehicles and tactical gear, and IT equipment (computers, printers, software) provided by INL. It is also envisioned that KIIs and group discussions will be arranged with officials and staff of 1207 program IPs that still have offices in the capital.

In Gori/Shida Kartli, the Team will focus on the two other 1207 program components: food, shelter and livelihood requirements for IDPs; and economic revitalization and stabilization. As with the work in Tbilisi, the Team will utilize KIIs and structured observation, but with particular emphasis on IDP beneficiaries of the 1207 program assistance – e.g., farmers, vocational training program participants, students/teachers/administrators of rehabilitated schools, and families relocated in new settlements. In addition, the Team will look for opportunities to obtain the kind of value-added information that can come out of a successful focus group discussion. Likewise, opportunities – e.g., the existence of databases regarding activity participants or assistance recipients – will be sought for mini-surveys, to provide the added perspective of information derived from quantitative sources.

LIMITATIONS

Two significant potential limitations could affect the Team's ability to carry out its evaluation tasks: the length of time since the 1207 program activities were operational; and the sheer number of activities that are being examined. In the case of the first potential limitation, time between program activities and this evaluation, experience has shown that a years-long lapse in time between project completion and evaluation launch need not be overly disruptive in terms of locating and arranging interviews of key implementing partner staff, government officials, and beneficiaries. Such was the case in connection with two recent dTS evaluations in which the Team Leader was involved – one in Iraq, the other in Bangladesh – where three or four years had gone by since the end of the project activities under review. In response to this situation, additional time and resources were devoted to track down and talk with key individuals who, for example, were no longer in-country but were still working for DoS, USAID, or international NGOs. Likewise, evaluation team members were able to locate and interview implementing partner staff, local stakeholders, and activity beneficiaries who were still in Georgia.

The other potential limitation is whether the Team will have sufficient time and resources to adequately examine the unusually large number of 1207 program activities (19) and associated grantors and partner organizations (15) involved in this evaluation. An immediate concern in this regard arises from the voluminous

source documents – periodic progress reports, baseline studies, and end-of-project evaluations – that will have to be obtained and reviewed in a timely manner to meet evaluation milestones, such as completing the pre-fieldwork and/or following the schedule for the fieldwork. Similarly, there are the time consuming procedural, logistical, and related challenges associated with identifying, contacting, and being able to meet with the unusually large number of prospective key informants and beneficiaries who were involved with 1207 program activities.

In anticipation of these challenges, the Team has been working (and will continue to work) with CSO, INL, USAID, and others to identify contacts that are still in Georgia and available for interview, either in-person or through some other method. Likewise, efforts are underway to make use of Skype, telephone, and other means to access prospective informants who have left Georgia and/or are located in areas outside of Washington. However, as this work plan is being prepared, it remains an open question whether or not the Team will be able to collect and review the expected volume of source documents, both in the pre-fieldwork and fieldwork phases of the evaluation.

III. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

The foundation for data collection and analysis in this evaluation lies in the desk study document reviews and initial interviews with CSO, INL, PM, EUR/ACE, GMP, USAID, and others the Team has already begun and will complete prior to departure for the field. In completing the desk study, team members will have reviewed all obtainable relevant documents, as described above in the methodology section. The desk study will help the Team gather comparative data and gain an understanding of 1207 program objectives, implementation, and results. The desk study will also help the Team identify relevant indicators regarding outputs and outcomes and develop its evaluation design and workplan based on a more thorough understanding of program activities.

Building on the information and knowledge base derived from the desk study, data collection in the field will utilize the research tools embodied in the mixed-methods approach – document review, key informant interviews, focus groups, mini-surveys, and on-site observation – to focus on several target groups, as illustrated below:

Target Groups	Data Collection Method
USG officials and 1207 program implementing partner staff	Documents, face-to-face, phone, or Skype interviews with key informants
Local counterparts and organizations that participated in and/or benefitted from 1207 program activities	Documents, face-to-face interviews with key informants, focus groups, mini-surveys, on-site observation

GoG/Ministry of Internal Affairs officials and staff that were involved with and/or benefitted from program activities	Documents, face-to-face interviews with key informants, focus groups, mini-surveys, on-site observation
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DOCUMENT REVIEW

The document review will be conducted in two phases: the pre-fieldwork documents review; and the ongoing review of documents collected in the field. The pre-fieldwork document review, already under way, will be conducted during the first three months of the evaluation. From the initial review, the Team will:

- Learn about the three 1207 program components and 19 activities;
- Identify some of the causal links between and among the activities' objectives, implementation, and results;
- Develop preliminary thoughts regarding lessons learned and actions taken to overcome obstacles and problems; and
- Inform the implementation of the evaluation methodology and data collection effort.

The on-going document review in the field will include materials that become available to the Team as a result of the KIIs and other meetings and contacts, such as activity records and reports, LOAs, MOUs, GoG/MOIA records and reports, IP tracking information, media releases, database spreadsheets and printouts, and more. Combined with the results of the pre-fieldwork review, the information and data derived from these source documents will play a major part in data collection and analysis and, ultimately, in answering the questions posed in the evaluation SOW.

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS

Semi-structured key informant interviews will be used to deepen the Team's understanding of program activities, obtain informed opinion on results achieved and problems experienced, and assess the program's overall effectiveness. In particular, KIIs will help the Team:

- Obtain firsthand accounts from beneficiaries and counterparts on their views of the assistance and the impact it had on their lives, institutions, and communities;
- Corroborate claimed outcomes and factors that contributed to them; and
- Assess the longer-term effects and sustainability of conflict stabilization programming.

Key informants will be selected from a comprehensive list of individuals knowledgeable about 1207 activities in terms of program planning and implementation, such as CSO, INL, USAID, and IPs, and others who have been involved with and/or beneficiaries of the activities, such as IDPs, residents of targeted municipalities, vocational training program graduates, and police. Interviews will be conducted by the Team Leader and Local Evaluation Expert,

either together or singly, with translation support provided by local individuals and/or firms. The key informant interview guide can be found in Annex C.

FOCUS GROUPS

The evaluation team will attempt to organize one or more focus groups, either at a location in or around Gori and/or at a site in Tbilisi. Potential targets for such a discussion are IDPs (e.g., farmers, resettled families), users of police equipment, and vocational training program participants. However, depending on information to be derived early in the fieldwork, it is possible that participants could be drawn from different target groups. Also, if there is an unexpectedly strong response to a focus group invitation, additional sessions in either or both locations might be organized.

From a pre-determined list, questions will be asked by the moderator – most likely the evaluation Team Leader – to promote an interactive group discussion among the participants. The free flowing discussion, guided by the moderator, will encourage participants to spontaneously express their opinions on and attitudes toward their experiences with the activity in question. These focus groups will last between 60 and 90 minutes. The focus group protocol can be found in Annex D.

The Team will rely on its Georgia-based members to recruit prospective participants. As necessary, IP, USAID, and Embassy officials/staff will be contacted to solicit their support in these recruitment efforts. None of the participants will receive any form of inducement or incentive to take part in the focus group. It will be made clear to prospective participants that their presence is voluntary and questioning will begin only after informed consent has been secured. Participants will be assured about non-attribution of their remarks. If possible, participants will be offered light snacks and beverages.

MINI-SURVEYS

The Team is considering plans to conduct one or more small-scale mini-surveys of beneficiaries of 2007 program activity efforts, such as IDPs, police personnel, and vocational training participants. The mini-survey questionnaires will be sent as an e-mail attachment and will feature a limited number of close-ended, narrowly-focused questions to generate quantitative data that can be collected and analyzed quickly. Personal identifier information will be kept separate from the questions and answer page(s). The results of these surveys will help the Team assess beneficiaries' attitudes toward the 2007 program assistance, determine whether they consider the assistance useful, and degree to which the assistance impacted their lives, institutions, and communities.

The Team will rely on IP and governmental databases, spreadsheets, and other records to develop lists and contact information on prospective survey participants. Once this information is obtained, the questionnaire (see Annex B)

will be finalized¹⁸ and sent to the designated respondents by e-mail. If e-mail is not available or participants are not responding by the date specified, follow-up calls will be made to conduct the survey over the phone. It is anticipated that a response rate of at least fifty percent will be achieved.¹⁹ Confidentiality will be assured by the firm with which the Team would contract to administer, collate, and analyze the questionnaire responses. For example, identifying e-mail addresses of respondents will be de-coupled from the analysis of the survey response form.

Sample questions might include:

- How did the assistance/training help you?
- What types of assistance were most helpful and in what ways did they do so?
- Did the assistance help your community and/or institution and, if so, how?
- In the case of training, did what you learned provide a particular tool/skill/piece of information you did not have before?
- How have you used this new tool/skill/piece of information?
- Has the assistance or training improved your organization's ability to do its work? How?
- Has the assistance or training improved your organization's effectiveness? How?
- Do you have any suggestions on ways the assistance provided could have been improved or more effective?

DATA ANALYSIS

As a starting point, the evaluation team's data analysis will reference two key DoS documents: 1) *Guidance for FY 09 Section 1207 Process*, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Department of State Cable 00005876, January 22, 2009; and 2) *1207 Guidance*, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization: Conflict Prevention (S/CRS/CP), January 2010. For the purposes of this evaluation, the contents of these two documents – and particularly their respective segments on selection criteria and guiding principles – effectively constitute the 1207 program's logical framework (logframe). Also known as the development hypothesis, the logframe is the conceptual tool that describes the causal linkages and underlying assumptions among inputs, activities, outputs, and outcomes. This framework also identifies the target population, defines clear objectives, and establishes relevant outcomes based on appropriate and measurable indicators. Using the 2007 program logframe will help determine not only how effective program activities have been in achieving intended results, but also why.

¹⁸ Given the limited scope/depth of the questionnaire – between 5-10 yes/no questions and small sample size (up to 100) – a pilot test is deemed unnecessary. However, input/comments on the draft questionnaire will be sought from DoS/CSO, INL, relevant IPs, and Embassy/USAID staff.

¹⁹ To help bring this about efforts will be made to develop an introductory letter from a relevant authority figure requesting respondents to cooperate in completing the survey.

The Team's analysis will incorporate a rigorous examination of activity monitoring reports and comparison of them with any other information and data collected related to performance and outcomes. During the analysis, information collected for the desk study will be reviewed and used to inform the findings, lessons learned, and recommendations. Having used a set of common questions in its data collection efforts, the Team will be able to systematically compare the answers and reactions of different beneficiaries and stakeholders, thereby making it possible to draw inferences on program performance and effects. In addition, outcomes will be assessed in terms of program activities' implementation schedules, available resources, and the relationship between results achieved and resources available.

Lastly, and arguably the most important facet of the Team's data analysis efforts, will be to use the multiple data points yielded by the mixed-methods approach to assess the qualitative and quantitative results of the overall research. Having used a variety of methods, data collected using one method (e.g., document review) can be compared to data collected using other methods (e.g., key informant interviews and mini-surveys). In effect, to the greatest extent possible, multiple data points will be used to triangulate the findings derived from the analysis. Such triangulation, by promoting cross-verification of data and information collected, will help strengthen the validity of evaluation findings and at the same time minimize the effects of bias.

IV. DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES

The evaluation will be implemented according to the division of responsibilities below and step-by-step workplan outlined in Annex A.

The Team Leader has overall responsibility for conducting the evaluation, including start-up, pre-fieldwork and fieldwork, and reporting. He will ensure that the final report and other deliverables meet DoS/CSO expectations and that work is conducted according to DoS/CSO and dTS policies and procedures. With the support of the dTS Project Director, he is responsible for oversight and management of the work of the other Team members. His responsibilities include:

- Designing the evaluation methodology, preparing the interview guides and data collection instruments, and developing the evaluation workplan;
- Supervising roles and coordinating assignments of the Local Evaluation Expert and other local assistants;
- Leading, overseeing, and coordinating the fieldwork – data collection (documents, interviews, focus groups, mini-surveys) and data analysis;
- Preparing the draft and final evaluation reports;
- Preparing and leading briefings for and maintaining regular communication with DoS/CSO and Embassy staff; and
- Managing administrative and logistical requirements.

The Local Evaluation Expert will be relied on for his combined evaluation qualifications and extensive experience working on post-conflict recovery and humanitarian assistance efforts in Georgia for major actors such as the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and European Centre for Minority Issues. His specific responsibilities include:

- Supporting the efforts to design the evaluation methodology, prepare the interview guides and data collection instruments, and develop the evaluation workplan;
- Taking the lead for preparing and updating the Team's fieldwork schedule;
- Coordinating arrangements for and conducting interviews and meetings as needed;
- Supporting data collection and analysis efforts;
- Assisting with drafting, responding to comments, and finalizing the evaluation report; and
- Assisting with preparations for briefings with the Embassy and others, as needed.

Local Evaluation Assistants will support the Team's activities in the field, especially with regard to the logistics surrounding efforts to collect data and conduct face-to-face interviews. Their responsibilities include:

- Planning for, scheduling, and coordinating logistical support for key informant interviews, focus groups, and site visits;
- Participating in interviews and meetings and preparing discussion summaries;
- Providing translation support for interviews and other evaluation efforts, such as preparing Georgian language versions of interview guide questions and mini-survey questionnaires;
- Making arrangements for local and inter-city travel;
- Obtaining documents and other information resources as needed; and
- Providing on-the-ground follow-up when other team members are unavailable.
-

WORKPLAN ANNEX A:

ACTIVITY	RESPONSIBLE PARTY(S)	TIMEFRAME
Award		
Finalize team arrangements	dTS Project Manage-ment Team (PMT)	Completed
Task 1: Document Review and Evaluation Methodology Preparation		
Kick-off meeting with DoS/CSO and request their assistance with initial contacts and source documents	PMT & Team Leader	Completed
Team building	PMT, Evaluation team	Completed
Review source documents, conduct pre-fieldwork meetings, complete desk review	Evaluation Team	Oct 22 - Jan 10, 2015
Prepare and submit draft evaluation methodology and work plan to DoS/CSO	Team Leader	Dec 8, 2014
Prepare and submit final evaluation methodology and work plan for DoS/CSO approval	Team Leader	Dec 15, 2014
Arrange logistics and schedule for fieldwork	PMT, Team Leader	Dec 1- Jan 10, 2015
Task 2: Conduct Fieldwork – Tbilisi/Gori (Shida Kartli)		
Travel to Tbilisi	Team Leader	Jan 9 - Jan 11, 2015
Team building/orientation meeting(s) with Embassy/USAID	Evaluation team	Jan 12 - Jan 13, 2015
Finalization of interview protocols, including selection of key informants; begin interviews	Evaluation team	Jan 13, 2015
Key informant interviews and other data collection activities, Tbilisi/Gori (Shida Kartli)	Evaluation team	Jan 13 - Jan 27, 2015
Select activity and participants for mini-survey, prepare questionnaire, transmit	Evaluation team	Jan 21 - Jan 23, 2015

ACTIVITY	RESPONSIBLE PARTY(S)	TIMEFRAME
questionnaire to respondents		
Select activity or group for focus group; organize and conduct meeting	Evaluation team	Jan 15 - Jan 26, 2015
Fieldwork update video teleconference with CSO	Evaluation team	Jan 21, 2015
Task 3: Complete Fieldwork		
Complete data collection	Evaluation team	Jan 13 - Jan 28, 2015
Meeting on initial findings, preliminary conclusions	Evaluation team	Jan 28 - Jan 29, 2015
Debriefing with Embassy/USAID	Evaluation team	Jan 30, 2015
Team Leader departs Tbilisi for U.S.	Evaluation team	Jan 31, 2015

Task 4: Briefings, Report Preparation		
Complete data analysis	Evaluation team	Feb 2 - Feb 6, 2015
Power point presentation/briefing on findings and preliminary conclusions to DoS/CSO	Evaluation team	Feb 18, 2015
Prepare and submit draft evaluation report	Evaluation team, PMT	Feb 9 - Feb 27, 2015
Task 5: Submit Final Report		
Receive DoS/CSO comments on draft report; submit final report		NLT Mar 13, 2015
Submit final report incorporating DoS/CSO comments on draft report	Evaluation team, PMT	NLT Mar 27, 2015
Task 6: Updates/briefings		
Regular updates to DoS/CSO	Evaluation team	Feb, 2015
Briefing for DoS/CSO on final report	Evaluation team	NLT Mar 31, 2015
Briefing for 1207 Review Committee	Evaluation team	NLT Apr 10, 2015

WORKPLAN ANNEX B: MINI-SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

We work for Development and Training Services, an independent consulting business, which was contracted by the U.S. Government (USG) to conduct a study of assistance, such as food, housing, job training, seeds and fertilizer for winter crops, and more, provided to the people of Georgia most affected by the August 2008 war with Russia. The purpose of this study is to find out how effective this assistance was in helping the more than 192,000 citizens of Georgia who were displaced by the war and whether or not such efforts have continued relevance for future USG post-conflict humanitarian and economic stabilization programs.

We are conducting a short e-mail survey with a random sample of recipients of this post-conflict assistance between 2008 and 2010. You have been selected because you participated in _____. We hope that your responses and those of other recipients of this assistance will aid us in learning about your experience with it and the effect it had on you and your families' lives and the communities you live in.

You should know that your response to this survey is voluntary and that your identity and specific answers to these questions will be kept strictly confidential. For example, your name or other personal identifier information will be stored physically and/or saved electronically separately from the individual response forms. You do not have to answer all the questions, although we of course hope you will do so. Only summary data based on all the responses received in the survey will be used and that information will be contained in the final report resulting from this study.

* * * * *

Name of respondent	
Position	
Date questionnaire filled out	

When and for how many days did you participate in the training?

Month: ____|____| Year: ____|____|____|____| Number of days: ____|____|

On a scale of 1 to 5, where "1" means "not useful at all" and "5" means "very useful," please circle the number that corresponds with how useful the training was?

Not useful	Not useful	Average	Useful	Very	Don't
------------	------------	---------	--------	------	-------

at all				useful	know
1	2	3	4	5	99

Did the training provide you with a particular tool/skill/piece of information you did not have before? [Circle appropriate number]

1	Yes
2	No
99	Don't know

If yes, in a few words, please explain what the tool/skill/piece of information was?

Have you used the tool/skill/piece of information? [Circle appropriate number]

1	Yes
2	No
99	Don't know

If yes, please explain briefly

Has the training improved your institution/organization's ability to perform its functions? [Circle appropriate number] (If participant was the beneficiary of police support efforts)

1	Yes
2	No
99	Don't know

If yes, please explain briefly

Has the training improved your institution/organization's effectiveness in doing its work? [Circle appropriate number] (If participant was the beneficiary of police support efforts)

1	Yes
2	No
99	Don't know

If yes, please explain briefly

WORKPLAN ANNEX C: KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDE

KEY INFORMANT NAME(S)	
KEY INFORMANT TITLE AND/OR ORGANIZATION	
INTERVIEWER	
DATE/LOCATION/TIME	

INTRODUCTION

Hello. My name is _____. My colleagues and I are conducting an evaluation of U.S. Government assistance, such as food, housing, job training, seeds and fertilizer for winter crops, and more, provided to the people and Government of Georgia after the end of the August 2008 war with Russia. That conflict caused substantial damage and displaced 192,000 citizens of Georgia, 30,000 of whom were still displaced a year later. The purpose of this study is to find out how effective this assistance was in helping those who were affected by the war – especially from communities in the Shida Kartli Region – and whether or not such efforts have continued relevance for future USG post-conflict humanitarian and economic stabilization programs.

You have been asked to meet with us because your expert opinion will help us learn about the efforts made in carrying out these assistance activities and provide the USG recommendations on how they can be improved in the future. Participation in this interview is voluntary. Your identity and specific answers to these questions will be kept strictly confidential. However, summary data based on these key informant interviews will be used in the final report, which will be made public.

During the interview, if we come to any question you do not wish to answer, just let me know and I will go on to the next question; or you can stop the interview at any time. However, we hope that you will participate throughout the interview since your views are important. At this time, do you want to ask me anything about the purpose of this interview? May I begin the interview now?

Signature of Interviewer: _____ Date:

QUESTIONS

DoS/USAID/Other USG

What was your position and how long did you serve in it?

What were your specific responsibilities pertaining to Georgia 1207 program activities?

Among the various 1207 program activities – IDP assistance, police support, economic revitalization/stabilization -- are there any specific ones that stand out in your mind as most or least successful?

Are there any factors that helped make the activities in your answer to question #3 more or less successful ?

Are there any lessons learned from your experience with 1207 program activities?

In your opinion, did the funded agencies fulfill the requirements of the 1207 program as a unified reconstruction and stabilization program with specific implementation guidance and reporting requirements; if yes, how?

In your opinion, did the 1207 funds keep their identity as a stand-alone program or were they subsumed into other initiatives; if yes, how?

Do you have any suggestions on ways the assistance provided could have been improved?

Implementing Partners

What was your position and how long did you serve in it?

What were your specific responsibilities pertaining to Georgia 1207 program activities?

How effective were your 1207 program efforts in FY 2008 to: (adjust list below to applicable IP)

provide food assistance to IDPs during the winter;

provide winterized shelter for up to 12,000 long-term IDPs in the Shida Kartli region;

provide assistance to rebuild the livelihoods of IDPs living in or returning to homes in the Shida Kartli region?

How effective were your 1207 program efforts in FY 2009 to: (adjust list below to applicable IP)

provide food assistance in the Shida Kartli region (phase two);

provide employment and vocational training in construction trades;

provide assistance to rebuild schools and municipal infrastructure;

provide assistance for IDPs to resettle;

provide security for IDPs?

Among the 1207 program activities you were involved with implementing are there any specific ones that stand out in your mind as most or least successful?

Are there any factors that helped make the activities in your answer to question #5 more or less successful?

Are there any lessons learned from your experience with 1207 program activities?

In your opinion, did the funded agencies fulfill the requirements of the 1207 program as a unified reconstruction and stabilization program with specific implementation guidance and reporting requirements; if yes, how?

In your opinion, did the 1207 funds keep their identity as a stand-alone program or were they subsumed into other initiatives; if yes, how?

Do you have any suggestions on ways the assistance provided could have been improved?

MOIA/Other GoG/Local Government

What was your position and how long did you serve in it?

What was your specific role pertaining to Georgia 1207 program activities (police support, IDP assistance, economic revitalization/stabilization)?

What impact has the 1207 program assistance had on your agency/institution/organization's functions and operations?

Has the assistance provided improved your agency/institution/organization's ability to perform its functions?

Has the training improved your institution/organization's effectiveness in doing its work?

Among the types of assistance your agency/institution/organization received, is there any one that was most important and least important and most successful and least successful?

Do you have any suggestions on ways the assistance provided could have been improved?

WORKPLAN ANNEX D: FOCUS GROUP PROTOCOL

Hello. My name is _____. I'd like to introduce my colleagues present in the room, _____ and _____. We work for Development and Training Services, an independent consulting business, which was contracted by the U.S. Government (USG) to

to conduct a study of assistance, such as food, housing, job training, seeds and fertilizer for winter crops, and more, provided to the people of Georgia most affected by the August 2008 war with Russia. The purpose of this study is to find out how effective this assistance was in helping the more than 190,000 ethnic Georgians who were displaced by the war and whether or not such efforts have continued relevance for future USG post-conflict humanitarian and economic stabilization programs.

You have been selected to be part of this focus group discussion because your views and those of the other participants will help us learn about how these post-conflict assistance activities have affected you, your families, and the communities in which you live and work. This session will last between 60 and 90 minutes and I will guide the discussion by introducing new questions from time to time. Your views are very important for our study and therefore we will be taking notes on what you have said and will also be using a tape recorder (or other device) to record your comments as you speak. The information we collect will be used to inform U.S. Government decisions on how to provide post conflict assistance in the future.

Participation in this focus group is voluntary. All information heard and recorded here today will be kept confidential and will not be shared with any Iraqi government, civil society, or political organization. Your name will not be used and only summary information regarding the discussion will be used in the final report, which will be made public.

During the discussion, you should add your thoughts to the informal conversation as you see fit. If we come to any question you don't want to answer, feel free not to add to the conversation or speak at all. You may leave at any time if you wish. However, we do hope that you will stay and participate actively in the discussion.

At this time, does anyone have any questions?

All right, let's begin.

Signature of Moderator: _____

Date: _____

Signature of Observer #1: _____
Date: _____

Signature of Translator: _____
Date: _____

Focus Group Discussion date: ____/____/____

Moderator: _____

Observer: _____

Venue: _____

Time started: _____ Time ended: _____

Language used: _____

Number of participants: Male _____ Female _____

Estimated Age Groups:

Focus Group Discussion Category:

IDPs _____

Police _____

Vocational training program participants _____

WORKPLAN ANNEX E: CONTACTS LIST

NAME OF CONTACT	PHONE NUMBER	EMAIL
State Department		
Sara Mangiaracina (CSO)		
Hilary Bullis (CSO)		
Rachel Holtzman (INL)		
Judith Campbell (INL)		
John Wilcox (EUR/ACE)		
Greg Meier (EUR/CARC)		
David Froman (ISN/ECC)		
Turner, Mike F		
Mary Stewart (EUR/ACE,ret.)		
Embassy/Tbilisi		
Nika Chachkhiani		
Eka Tordia (PRM)		
USAID		
Heather Ward		
Nick Higgins		
Craig Hart		
Kent Larson		

Joakim Parker		
John Hansen		
Jock Conley		
Robert Wilson (ret)		
Keti Chogovadze		
Lela Kerashvili		
David Garibashvili		
Monika Gorzenlanksa		
UNHCR		
UN World Food Program		
Association for Protection of Landowners' Rights (APLR)		
Ms. Marika Lapachishvili		
Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs (CNFA)		
David Tsiklauri		
UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)		

Mr. Mamuka Meskhi		
CHF International		
Nubar Goudsouzian		
Natia Berdzenishvili		
Temur Drokini		
Medea Toraia		
Giorgi Kvenetadze		
IOM		
Natia Kvitsiani		
Mark Hurst		
NATO Partnership for Peace Trust Fund / NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency		
Chemonics International		
HALO Trust (landmines)		
Mr. Irakli Chitanava		

Densus Group LLC.		
Tetra Tech EM, Inc.		
Municipal Development Fund		
Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation		
Ms. Tamar Martiashvili		
M OIA Ministry of Internal Affairs		
Mr. Shota Utiashvili		
Ms. Tatia Salukvadze		
Mr. Shalva Kvinikhidze		
Ministry of Foreign Affairs		
Ekaterine Tkeshelashvili		
Ministry of Justice -National Agency of Public Registries (NAPR)		

ANNEX C: INTERVIEWS

Key Informants		
Name	Organization	Position
Natia Berdzenishvili	CHF	Georgia Program Manager, 2009-2010
Natia Kvitsiani	IOM	Georgia Program Manager
Ilyana Derilova	IOM	Georgia Chief of Party, 2011
Manana Amonashvili	IOM	Shida Kartli Coordinator
Eka Japiashvili	GoG	Shida Kartli Development Specialist, 2008-2012
Christine Mucker	State	Mission Assistance Program Coordinator
Tracey Newell	State/INL	INL Program Director
Tamar Shaverzashvili	State/INL	INL Program Coordinator
Monika Gorzelanska	USAID	Program Officer
David Tsiklauri	USAID	Project Manager
Lela Kerashvili	USAID	Program Development Specialist
George Kokochashvili	USAID	Engineering Specialist
Nick Chachkhiani	AIR	Khidistavi VEC Director, 2009-2011
Louisa Namicheishvili	CNFA	Deputy Chief of Party
Louis Faoro	CNFA	Chief of Party
Davit Kirvalidze	CNFA	Member of Board of Directors
Dragan Angelovski	FAO	Chief Technical Advisor/FAO
David Giorgadze	APLR	Program Manager, 2008-2010
Raimonds Pavlovskis	State/PRM	Regional Refugee Coordinator
Eka Todria	State/PRM	Assistant to Regional Refugee Coordinator
Stephen Haykin	USAID	Mission Director
Kirk Ramer	NEO	Chief of Party
Maia Nizharadze	NEO	LED Advisor
Edvard Shermadini	NEO	Rural Economic Development Specialist
Rusudan Telia	ACT	Program Manager
Diana Mariamidze	GoG/MRA	Berbuki Settlement Coordinator

Bidzina Samniashvili	ACT	Shida Kartli Regional Coordinator
Shalva Pipia	CNFA	AMP Program Manager
Zurab Chinchilakashvili	GoG	Former Deputy Governor of Shida Kartli
Eka Valishvili	UNHCR	Assistant Program Officer
Valeri Kopaleishvili	GoG/MRA	Former Deputy Minister of the MRA
Irakli Chitanava	HALO	Program Manager
George Tepnadze	MoIA	Deputy Head of Main Division (IT)
Goga Svimonishvili	Farm Service Center	Director, Agrokartli, Gori
David Vadachkoria	WFP	Program Manager
Kartlos Gviniashvili	MDF	Program Manager
Gia Manvelashvili	AIR	Gori VEC Director
Guram Bortsvadze	Karaleti Settlement	IDP Farmer
Ketino Kumaritova	IOM/JCP	Bakery Owner
Group Discussions		
	Gori Area Group	IDP Farmers (15)
	Karaleti Settlement	IDP Farmers (4)
	Khurvaleti Settlement	Coordinator, resident
	Berbuki Settlement	Coordinator, psychologist, children
	MoIA	TETRA IT staff, Tbilisi
	MoIA	Central Dispatch Facility, Tbilisi
	MoIA	Kurta Regional Office, Ditsi Police Station, Patrol Officers
	MoIA	Gori Police Station
	Biliki Group Home	Residents, Caregivers, Manager
	Metekhi School, Shida Kartli	Director and Staff
	Karbi School, Shida Kartli	Director and Staff

ANNEX D: DOCUMENTS

AIR, Vocational Education Project in Georgia (VEP), Final Report, December 2011

AIR, Vocational Education Project in Georgia (VEP), Semi-Annual Reports, December 2008 – December 2010

APLR, Land Market Development II Activity, Final Report, December 15, 2010

Chemonics, NEO, Annual Reports for 2012, 2013, and 2014

CHF, BAVSHVI Program, Quarterly Report, January 1, 2012 – March 31, 2012

CHF, BAVSHVI Program, Quarterly Report, July 1, 2010 – September 30, 2010

CHF, BAVSHVI Program, Quarterly Report, July 1, 2011 – September 30, 2011

CHF, Final Performance Report for CHF International, Georgia Employment and Infrastructure Initiative (GEII), Reporting Period: September 30, 2004 – June 30, 2010

CHF, Semi-Annual Reports No. 10, October 2009 (with annexes)

CHF, Semi-Annual Reports No. 11, April 2010 (with annexes)

CNFA, Access to Mechanization Project PY1 Annual Report – 10/01/09-9/30/10, October 31, 2010

CNFA, Access to Mechanization Project Q3 Report – 4/1/10-6/30/10, July 30, 2010

CNFA, Access to Mechanization Project End of Project Report, 10/1/09-11/30/12 (with Annexes)

CNFA, Georgia Agricultural Risk Reduction Program (GARRP), Final Report, March 1, 2010 (with Annexes)

Counterpart International, Banyan Global, and United Nations Association of Georgia, NEO Local Economic Development Planning Baseline Impact Evaluation Report, June 2012

Counterpart International, Banyan Global, and United Nations Association of Georgia, Report on the Baseline Impact Evaluation of NEO's Component 2 and 3 Activities

FAO, Final Report, Emergency supply of animal feed to conflict-affected small-scale farming households and support to the agriculture sector and Food Security Cluster coordination, 2010

FAO, Report on the outputs and outcomes obtained under project, The Emergency supply of animal feed to conflict affected small-scale farming households and support to the Agriculture Sector and Food Security Cluster Coordination in Georgia, 2010

GMP, Efficiency Analysis of USG Cash Transfer Assistance, December 2010

GMP, Georgia Monitoring Project: Maritime Security Special Thematic Report, April 1, 2012

GMP, Health and Social Infrastructure Special Thematic Report, 2012

GMP, Pre-Monitoring Review of IDP Data & Information, November 2010

GMP, Review of Selected Activities in Georgia Supported by: U.S. Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement & U.S. Department of Justice Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training Special Thematic Report, 2012

GMP, Review of U.S. Assistance in the Post-Conflict Area of Shida Kartli, Georgia, 2011

GMP, Weekly, Quarterly, Annual Reports, 2010 – 2011

HALO, Grant Progress Report, 4th June 2009 – 31st May 2010

IOM, Quarterly Reports, April 2010 - March 2012, for Economic Empowerment for Internally Displaced Persons and Unemployed in Georgia through Job Counseling and Placement (JCP) as Well as Targeted Small Business Development and Vocational Training, Job Counseling and Placement (JCP) Project

IOM, Final Performance Report, Economic Empowerment for Internally Displaced Persons and Unemployed in Georgia through Job Counseling and Placement (JCP) as Well as Targeted Small Business Development and Vocational Training, Job Counseling and Placement (JCP) Project, 2012 (with Annexes)

MDF, Irrigation Rehabilitation Hand-over Certificate, September 26, 2014

MDF, Municipal Infrastructure and IDP Housing Rehabilitation Project, Semi-Annual Reports 2010 – 2014 line spacing

Mendez England & Associates, Performance Evaluation of the USAID/Georgia Municipal Infrastructure Project (GMIP), Final Evaluation Report, 20 November, 2014

Mendez, England & Associates, Evaluation of the Georgia Land Market Development Program, Final Report, August 8, 2011

Mendez, England & Associates, Performance Evaluation of the USAID/Georgia Access to Mechanization Project, June 2013

MoE, Letter of First Deputy Minister of Energy Mariam Valishvili to USAID, August 3, 2009

MRA, Letter of Deputy Minister Besik Tserediani to USAID, August 17, 2009

NSPA, Georgia Explosive Remnants of War and Medical Rehabilitation, Trust Fund Project, Final Report, May 2013

NSPA, Grant Progress Report for March 31 –May 31, 2011

STATE/CRS Financial Quarterly Reports: FY09 - FY15

STATE/CRS Narrative Quarterly Reports: FY09 - FY15

STATE/CRS, 1207 Guidance, January 2010

STATE, Embassy/Tbilisi Letter to Minister of Energy Alexander Khetaguri, April 7, 2010

STATE, Embassy/Tbilisi, Georgia: Accomplishments and Lessons Learned from Implementation of the U.S. \$1 Billion Aid Package to Georgia Six Years After the Georgia-Russia Conflict, 14 TBILISI 1870, Aug 05, 2014

STATE, Guidance for FY 09 Section 1207 Process, STATE 005876, January 2009

STATE/INL, Assessment of the August 2008 Conflict in Georgia Foreign Assistance Recommendations, September 2008

STATE/INL, End Use Monitoring Reports for 2012 and 2013

STATE/INL, Police Support Package for Georgia – FY 2008 1207 Funds

UNHCR, Breakdown of 1207 DoS/PRM \$9 million

United Nations, Georgia Crisis Flash Appeal, 2008 Consolidated Appeal Process

United States Mission to International Organizations, Grant Agreement to UNHCR for winterization shelter and non-food item activities, February 11, 2009

USAID, Activity Approval Package, IDP Energy Payment Program, May 2009

USAID, Assistance Agreement No. AAG-114-G-10-002, Assistance Agreement between Georgia and the United States of America for Improved Infrastructure, Economic Opportunities, and Support for Internally Displaced Persons, Aug 2010

USAID, Electricity and Gas Meter Inspection Report in IDP villages Shavshvebi, Tserovani and Preseti

USAID, implementation Letter No. 3 to MDF Executive Director, February 18, 2011

USAID Inspector General, Review of Selected USAID/Caucasus's School Rehabilitation Activities (Report No. 2-114-12-005-S), April 2012

WFP, Final Progress Report, Food Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Conflict Affected Populations, November 2009

ANNEX E: MINI-SURVEY

Methodology

As part of the research, the team implemented a mini-survey in order to assess the following key questions:

- Are you a current/former Embassy/Tbilisi, USAID/Georgia, or 1207-funded Implementing Partner employee?
- From your experience working as an employee, are you aware of the USG 1207 funding that supported post-conflict and stabilization activities after the August 2008 hostilities with Russia?
- Based on your experience, did involved USG agencies - i.e., USAID, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), and the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) - fulfill the requirements of the 1207 program as a unified (diverse, comprehensive, and mutually reinforcing) reconstruction and stabilization program with specific implementation guidance and reporting requirements?
- To the best of your knowledge, did the 1207 funds keep their identity as a stand-alone program or were they subsumed into other initiatives?

The survey was meant to assess respondents' knowledge of the 1207 program, as well as awareness of its existence and whether or not it fulfilled its mandate, by utilizing a listed sample of people (both past and present) who were involved with it. The total sample size was 62, with a total of 35 respondents, for a response rate of 56%. As a note, this is considered to be high for a voluntary, online survey. Any response that receives over 50% + 1 is considered to have a *majority* of the responses. Response options that have the highest percentage of responses among a group of them have a *plurality* of the responses. The margin of error was $\pm 11.02\%$. Any response percentage that exceeds this threshold will be considered to be *definitive*; i.e., even if its true percentage is minimized and the next leading response's percentage is maximized it will still remain greater. In other words, if the margin of error is $\pm 10\%$ and the highest response option receives 65% of the responses and the next highest receives the other 35%, then the highest response option has a *definitive* majority of the responses because 55 (65-10, the lower bound for the highest response) is still greater than 45 (35+10, the upper bound for the next highest response).

Because of the specific nature of the questions, as well as the limited sample, the survey results can only be considered representative of USG-affiliated personnel and implementing partners. In addition, efforts were taken to ensure that the respondent's answers were kept anonymous in aggregate. The survey was active for

a period of three weeks (2/13/2015 – 3/6/2015), during which time reminders were sent to participants at least once a week. Initially, the researchers intended to close the survey on February 23rd, but in the interest of soliciting more responses, the deadline was extended to March 6th. Due to the short length of the survey, participants could reasonably expect to finish it in 5-10 minutes, depending on how much detail they chose to go into for comments – a key factor in boosting response rates.

Email

Below is the text sent out to potential participants to ask them to answer the questionnaire:

Dear Questionnaire Respondent:

In conjunction with a Department of State, Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations-requested evaluation of 1207-funded USG activities in Georgia after the August 2008 hostilities with Russia, Development and Training Services (dTS) evaluators have developed a short (four questions) survey. It is being sent to you and other former/current Georgia Embassy, USAID, or Implementing Partner employees who have been directly involved with or otherwise knowledgeable about the 1207-funded activities. I would very much appreciate your cooperation in responding to the questionnaire. You can access it by clicking on the following link: <https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/288KHDL>. We respectfully request that you complete the survey by February 23rd, 2015. If you have any questions, please contact our survey coordinator, Michael Caughey, at mcaughey@onlinedts.com

Again, my sincere thanks for your participation,

Harold (Hal) Lippman, Ph.D.

Team Leader, Georgia 1207 Evaluation

Development and Training Services, Inc

4600 North Fairfax Drive, Suite 402

Arlington, VA 22203


hblipp2@verizon.net

703-237-9089


Results

The mini-survey asked four questions of people from four broad categories – Embassy/Tbilisi employees, USAID/Georgia employees, Implementing Partners (that were 1207-funded), and an ‘Other’ category to capture others that were missed. Of the 35 respondents to the survey, according to the first question ($n=35$) a plurality were from USAID/Georgia, but nevertheless they were more or less evenly divided between the four categories – 23% were Embassy/Tbilisi, 31% were USAID/Georgia, 23% were Implementing Partners, and 23% were ‘Other’. In the

‘Other’ category, the respondents were from such places as DoS and USAID, but not with the Embassy or the Mission in Tbilisi. It is possible that some participants were confused as to how they were related to the project and chose ‘Other’, even though they may have qualified for another category. In addition given the period of time that elapsed from the conclusion of 1207-funded projects and this evaluation, it is possible that these respondents used to be affiliated with either, but have since rotated out of these missions. The results are below in Chart E-1.




Post-field, both the researchers examined what responses were given to the ‘Other’ category, since respondents were asked to specify. Of those eight results, seven of them were from respondents who worked for either DoS or USAID, yet were based out of Washington and as such were not captured by the response options ‘Embassy/Tbilisi’ or ‘USAID/Georgia’. To accurately reflect this, the team decided to create a new category ‘USAID/State/Washington’ and recode those responses under it to accurately represent their affiliation. Consequently, 20 percent of those surveyed (n=35) work in Washington with USAID or State, and the amended chart (Chart E-2) reflects this.




For the second question ($n=35$) in the survey, which asked if respondents were aware of USG 1207 funding after the August 2008 hostilities with Russia, results were more certain. A definitive majority of respondents (94%) as seen in Chart E-3 stated that they are aware of the USG 1207 funding that supported post-conflict and stabilization activities. In addition, some respondents chose to add comments to their answers, mainly stating where they worked at the time when the funds were made available – in other words, they explained how they knew of the existence of the funding.

Chart E-3: From your experience working as an employee, are you aware of the USG 1207 funding that supported post-conflict and stabilization activities after the August 2008 hostilities with Russia?
n=35



As in the second question, in the third question ($n=35$) a definitive majority of respondents (86%) agreed that involved USG agencies – in the case of 1207 funds, USAID, DoS/INL, DoS/PRM, and DoS/PM – fulfilled the requirements of the 1207 as a unified reconstruction and stabilization program as seen in Chart E-4. To clarify what is meant by ‘unified’, both researchers and DoS agreed that in this scenario ‘unified’ means “diverse, comprehensive, and mutually reinforcing”. What is perhaps the most telling result of this question is that respondents either agreed that involved agencies fulfilled 1207 requirements or that they did not know (14%). No respondents stated that involved USG agencies failed to fulfill the 1207 program’s unified requirements.




The question with the most mixed responses was the final one (*n=34*) – whether or not, to the best of the respondent’s knowledge, the 1207 funds kept their identity as a stand-alone program or were subsumed into other initiatives. A plurality of respondents (41%) stated that they kept their identity, but a sizable number did not know (32%) and said that they were subsumed into other initiatives (27%) – Chart E-5 details the results. Respondents were invited to clarify their responses, and the ones that did provided very detailed answers. For example:

“This is the wrong question in my view. The 1207 funds accomplished much, alongside other funding streams. The programs were at times distinct, at times merged with other initiatives. They became part of a broader strategy, but with relatively distinct implementation. To ensure the sustainability of some of the programs, baseline program funds kicked in. What program is completely stand-alone? How would that be a good thing?”

“It was not a requirement for 1207 funds to keep their identity. The recipients don't care what funding stream is used to provide assistance. Why would we dilute the USG or USAID brand with 1207 branding? The designation of 1207 funding should only be for DC to track its funding sources and reporting requirements. Outward facing, it should be known as aid from either USG or USAID.”

“We were emphasizing that it was the part of one billion support fund, but we never noted that it was under 1207. Generally, it should be remarked that USAID and USG were understood for the most beneficiaries as one entity. Personally, I did not recall that we were deliberately indicating that it was USG 1207. There was not any notion or informed agreement about it.”



ANNEX F:

Karbi Public

School Improvement Plan



Karbi, Gori, Shida Kartli, Georgia 2010

Karbi Public School Improvement Plan was developed by:

1. Nino Kolotashvili (School Director)
2. Marine Razmadze (Teacher)
3. Marine Gigauri (Parent)
4. Tsiuri Chokheli (Teacher)
5. Izolda Chalauri (Teacher)
6. Mzia Markozashvili (Teacher)
7. Maia Sagirashvili (Community representative)
8. Gvantsa Gogichashvili (Student)
9. Vladimer Gnolidze (Student)
10. Beka Tevdorashvili (Student)
11. Tina Zabaxidze (Parent)
12. Ekaterine Razmadze (Teacher)
13. Natia Tevdorashvili (Teacher)
14. Meri Zaridze (Teacher)
15. Teona Tsiklauri (Teacher)
16. Zurab Rusishvili (Administration)
17. Vasil TevdoraSvili (Administrative unit representative)
18. Levan Bidzinashvili (Administrative unit representative)

Karbi Public School Improvement Plan was developed within the framework of USAID funded Georgia Employment and Infrastructure Initiative (GEII) School Rehabilitation Program implemented by CHF International~Georgia.



Within the framework of GEI School Rehabilitation Program, CHF International rehabilitated badly deteriorated schools in Shida Kartli region, since June 2009. Karbi Public School was involved in this project, as the school needed rehabilitation. In snowy and rainy weather, water leaked into the building and damaged school and its inventory. Broken and old windows made it impossible to keep warmth in the building. Due to this children often got ill and missed the lessons. Besides electricity and Heating system was also problematic issue.

After the community meetings held by CHF school problems and priorities were defined. With their active participation, company for conducting the rehabilitation works was selected. Windows and roofs have been replaced, new electricity, heating system has been installed, toilets have been organized and the interior of the building has been rehabilitated. After the rehabilitation works conducted we now have a fully rehabilitated school that provides the conditions for the best learning environment, and one that has increased the motivation of both parents and teachers.

Within the framework of this program, working group composed of teachers, parents, students and those individuals who care about the children's teaching practices and the existing learning environment was created, which mainly focused on the school improvement plan. Each member actively participated in completing the work. Much can be attributed to the regular meetings held and it is clear that significant results were achieved. Taking the importance of parental involvement into consideration, survey of parents was held so to define the priorities, outline various strengths weaknesses, and to further define the existing and required resources. Our aims and objectives were formed and took into consideration all the above mentioned issues.

Group activities, as selected by CHF's approach have brought about positive results. As a result of the concerted effort, the Karbi public school improvement plan was developed, which aimed to bring about the maximum usage of existing resources and raising additional funds and seeking outside investments, which is considered as is the best way to bring about an optimum learning environment. As the school has small budget school, the development of School Improvement plan was a really timely step made forward in order to seek out additional funding sources.

Nino Kolotashvili

Karbi Public School Director

General Overview

Introduction

The survey and planning process started in June 2009; it was based on the principles of the school improvement plan. Within the framework of Karbi Public School, a working group composed of teachers, pupils, parents, graduates and administrative unit members was created.

A meeting held in order to form the above-mentioned working group and this was attended by 37 people: 25 females and 12 males. A total of 18 individuals were selected to form the working group. The importance of the School Improvement Plan development was defined during the meeting and group members were handed parental survey forms. The number of people surveyed was selected in accordance with the number of parents present.

Geographical location of the village

Village Karbi is located in the Gori Municipality. It is situated to the Northern part 25 km away from Gori. It is bordered with Village Mereti from the North, and from the North-Eastern, South Ossetian villages and an irrigation channel, "Tiriponi" and river Liakhvi flows through the village.

After the Russian-Georgian war of 2008, the village suffered great losses. A total of 9 innocent citizens were killed, 20 building were destroyed and 80% of the houses damaged.

An elementary school and a kindergarten currently functions, as for the community club, it is damaged and in need of rehabilitation.

Main source of population income

295 families – totally 880 people currently reside in this village. The distribution, 446 females and 434 males. The absolute majority of the population (98%) are Georgians, only 2 % are Ossetians and Russians, The village occupies an area of 367 hectares of agricultural land. It is distributed by use as follows: 152 hectares are arable, 215 is planted with permanent pastures.

Most of the population is unemployed. The main source of their income consists of fruit production, market gardening and the raising of cattle.


Karbi Public School Profile

Karbi Public School

Karbi public school was first opened in 1967. This school was always famous for high level of teaching skills. The school has graduated many successful students. The Russian Georgian war in 2008 severely impacted the school building, which was badly damaged. It was Due to necessary to replace the roof and the facade of the building, and replaced the broken or blown out windows. The Ministry of Education and Science of Georgia purchased glass for these broken windows, which has been installed with local help. The renovated windows didn't solve the problem and there has been water damage and some of the equipment has been destroyed (inventory). USAID funded CHF International came as a rescue to this problem. The school building is now totally

rehabilitated. The roof and the floor of the building have been replaced. New electricity and energy efficient stoves have been installed and the inner part of the building rehabilitated. The results turned out to be really significant; students and teachers have access to the best learning environment to study and their development.

School structure:



Karbi Public School is an elementary school with a total of 83 children, 46 females and 37 males. All of them are Georgians. The number of teachers in school administration is 22, 19 females and 3 males.

Student distribution in the classes is as follows

Academic classes	Number of classes	Number of Students	Female	Male
I grade	1	6	5	1
II grade	1	6	6	0
III grade	1	6	5	1
IV grade	1	9	2	7
V grade	1	3	2	1
VI grade	1	10	2	8
VII grade	1	18	11	7
VIII grade	1	13	7	6
IX grade	1	12	6	6

Students' Local Self-Government

Schools have Local Self-government, and the students are actively involved in school life. They actively participate in developing the school's internal policy; they also suggest different proposals to the board of trustees about important issues facing the school. Below is given the list of members, their duties and rights.

#	Name and Surname	Grade	Rights and Duties
1	Gvantsa Gogichashvili	IX	Chairman
2	Mariam Gnolidze	IX	Secretary
3	Beka Tevdorashvili	IX	Member
4	Mzia Kapanadze	VIII	Member
5	Tornike Tevdorashvili	VIII	Deputy Chairman
6	Teona Bidzinashvili	VII	Member

Board of Trustees

The Board of trustees is also actively involved in the life and activities of the school life. It is responsible for adopting the school's budget, the schools internal policy, annual report, and ensures its publicity with the close cooperation of school director. Besides, it accepts the curriculum developed by the board of teachers, and stamped teachers' books as recommended by the assessment centre. It also controls spending of funds and the regulation of how school property is disposed). It has power to stop contract of school director in case that rules are violated as foreseen by Georgian legislation. Besides it is empowered to cease the contract of school teacher or any school employee under certain circumstances. The staff and their positions are distributed as follows:

#	Names of the members of board of trustees	Position ! Status
1	Izolda Chalauri	Chairman ! Teacher
2	Mzia Markozashvili	Member ! Teacher
3	Tinatin Zabakhidze	Deputy ! Teacher
4	Mariam Dakrashelidze	Member ! Teacher
5	Maia Zabakhidze	Member ! Parent
6	Maia Kikvadze	Member ! Parent
7	Mariam Razmadze	Member ! Parent
8	Ekaterine Razmadze	Member ! Parent

School Funding

Schools are funded by the Ministry of Education and Science of Georgia, using the voucher system of funding, in compliance with the number of students. Thus this type of funding is not efficient for achieving curriculum related goals and objectives, i.e. the required amount of money per child defined by financial standards, exceeds the actual amount of money allocated for one child. According to the decision made by the Ministry of Education and Science of Georgia we receive additional funds in the form of increased voucher.

School possesses actives

Below is the list of school possessed property

Name	Amount	Condition
Land (Yard), adjoining territory	2000 sq/m	Fenced
School building	240 sq/m	Good
Computer	5 units	Good
Desks	83 units	Good
Students' chairs	83 units	Good
School inventory(Teacher's tables and chairs)	Table -10 units, Chairs – 10units, Bookcase -9 units.	Old
Classroom	5 units	Good
Sport field	1 unit	Unimproved

Perspectives and Challenges of school

Many problems in the school have already been solved as the result of the USAID~CHF implemented project. School teachers and students now have opportunity to conduct lessons under normal learning conditions. However, in order to come closer to modern standards more effort is required on a daily basis. Also, in working in this direction, it is necessary to keep the school's certification criteria in mind. Every functioning school is required to meet these criteria. We think that in case of additional fundraising, we have potential to increase school functions, which can be reflected in being able to make use additional areas and buildings. Also, rich historical heritage enables us to organize different events, like cooperation with other schools, organizing different kinds of excursions, such as picnics or other cultural activities. We hope that any positive activity will bring about a corresponding reaction from our graduates and in time they will be able to help support their school.

We welcome any interested individual to cooperate with us. Please contact:

Address: Village Karbi, Gori, Shida Kartli

Contact Person: Nino Kolotashvili

Phone Number: 877 922 565

Bank Requisites of our school are: Pro Credit Bank Georgia, Gori Branch

Account Number: 360801011400007

Karbi Public School Improvement Plan

**Results of parents' survey forms
in Karbi Public School**

60 parents took part in the survey that aimed to define their priorities. We tried to question all the parents, despite the age, level of school completed, social state or their nationality of their children. The questionnaire was based on the seven main characteristics, which are considered as essential for schools to be met in order to work efficiently. A clear, focused vision for learning, safe and orderly environment, high expectations for success, a focus on a high level of children's achievement, strong educational leadership (Instructional leaders), frequent monitoring on students' progress and strong home-school relations. The survey indicated that most of the parents positively assess current situation at schools, though school achievements put this kind of evaluation under question. This fact can be seen from three external facts. Firstly, rehabilitation works conducted at schools involved parents in the excitement, as the results were really substantial, especially since rehabilitation work was carried out in such a short period of time. This is why they are satisfied with the outcomes. Secondly, parents fulfill their obligations on a high level; not only did recognize their responsibilities, but simultaneously faced their assumed roles. Thirdly, as their children attend the school that they have to assess, parents may have attempted to avoid providing a negative evaluation in protecting the school's reputation.

In the future, we recommend schools to conduct survey in the form of organized focus groups, which will enable parents to become more involved and express their position ideas more freely.

Analysis of the results

The survey conducted in Karbi public school, indicated that most of the parents are

Actively involved in school life, and posses the necessary information, in particular: The work conducted by the board of trustees students' evaluation system, code of behavior and all kinds of innovations at school. More detailed information can be seen in the chart below:

Strengths and Weaknesses of Karbi Public School

<u>Strength:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Students' high interest with humanitarian subjects• Qualifies to adapt• Simplicity to adapt• More support for parents• More information from informational sources• Access to additional books• Lack of students in the classes	<u>Weakness:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Less interest of students towards technical subjects• Lack of visual materials• Lack of motivation• Absence of laboratories• Lack of handbooks due to high prices• Poor library• Lack of interest• Lack of rooms• Lack of parents involvement
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Vision

In the next three years, Karbi Public School will be supplied with modern equipment that will bring about a high level of students attendance and greater access to information via the Internet.

Also, the cooperation between the school and the parents will be improved and school will cooperate with successful graduates fundraising opportunities.

Strategic Directions (Strategic aims and objectives)

1. Students' interest with technical subject

- 1.1. Providing classes with required inventory and verified visual materials
- 1.2. Providing students with books

2. Parents awareness of their role

- 2.1. Parental involvement in school events
- 2.2. Volunteering from parents

3. High expectations for success

- 3.1. Realizing and raising the important role of education among students
- 3.2. Encouraging and raising motivation among teachers and students

School Improvement Plan Activities

Goal: To increase students' interest towards technical subjects

Performance Target: By 2013 Students interest towards technical subjects will be increased by 15%

	Strategies	Indicators of Success	Time lines	Approximate Budget, Financial sources and resources	Responsible person	Status monitoring	Revision, Update
	<p>National exams, based on the free choice of subjects to be passed, finally lowered the status of technical subjects. We hope that new reform, foreseeing passing exams in nearly all kinds of subjects, will raise student's attendance and knowledge in technical subjects. Besides, providing schools with modern laboratories will once again support raise of interest towards technical subjects.</p> <p>Equipping schools with modern inventory:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Schools will develop different strategies to raise additional resources and funds Any party interested to improve school environment can be involved in the process. <p>To verify visual materials</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Teacher will develop projects, due to which students will be required to create works on particular topics. From Individually performed works the best one will be selected, or on the basis of best works final form of the visual materials will be outlined, later used in teaching as a visual display materials 	Opportunity to participate in laboratory works.	3 years	Government, non government, private sector and graduates	Nino Kolotashvili	2013-2014 School year	Every trimester
	<p>Providing children with school books.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assuring parents in the necessity of school books that will support the reassessment of values and make school books for parents prior. It can be reached by close cooperation with parents, conducting meetings, surveys and different ways of cooperation. <p>Due to the hard financial situation in the village, it is desirable to involve sponsors, graduates, capable to contribute to school libraries.</p>	Each Student will be provided with all kinds of school books	1 year	Government, non government, private sector and graduates, parents from 75 GEL to 150 GEL According to the classes	Nino Kolotashvili	2010-2011 School year	Every trimester

Goal: To increase parents involvement in improving teaching process							
Performance Target: By 2011 the involvement of parents and graduates in teaching process will be increased with 25%							
	Strategies	Indicators of Success	Time lines	Approximate Budget, Financial sources and resources	Responsible person	Status monitoring	Revision, Update
	<p>Teachers will develop strategies, that will help parents to support their children in learning:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • parents will be able to be more concentrated on their children's success, • To reason the duties as a parent more, • To support their active involvement in school practices, parental volunteers in bringing about development of improved teaching practices. <p>It can be reached with regular meetings,</p>	Close, cooperative home-school relations	3 years	Students and teachers, board of trustees, and students' local self-government	Nino Kolota-shvili	2011-2012 School year	Every trimester

Target: Climate of high expectation of students' success

Performance target: Improving learning environment for increasing attendance by the year 2013 by 15%

	Strategies	Indicators of Success	Time lines	Approximate Budget, Financial sources and resources	Responsible person	Status monitoring	Revision, Update
	<p>Teachers in each class will use the sample of curriculum issued by the Ministry of Education and Science of Georgia, to develop a particular strategy to</p> <p>increase the value and importance of receiving education among students. It can be fulfilled by conducting the following activities.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The school will develop methodology, to show children that learning is the best way for reaching success, bright future. • Meeting will be held, that will support children in realizing the above mentioned questions. • The schools will use success achieved by graduates as role models. The school will work to increase the level of motivation among students and teachers alike • Teacher in particular subject will develop project. The organization of different conferences will be conducted within the framework of this project. • The schools will develop student's assessment criteria, after which best students' works will be highlighted at school. <p>School will take care to create necessary</p>	Increase the number of successful students	3 years	Students and teachers, board of trustees, and students' local self-government	Nino Kolotashvili	2013-2014 School year	Every trimester

ANNEX G: CONFLICT OF INTEREST

Conflict of Interest forms are on file. Please contact Christina Bautista at 703-522-6153.